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In the last decade, there has been a newfound interest within economics in culture, its 
effects on economic outcomes, and its historical determinants. Although significant 
progress has been made, there are still many large questions that remain unanswered. My 
dissertation addresses two of those, namely the effect of history on current levels of trust 





My first chapter examines the effect of historical changes in political borders on current 
citizens’ levels of trust in political institutions. Political trust also depends on current 
political institutions, so that a straightforward cross-country analysis would not be able to 
disentangle the effect of history from the effect of institutions. To address this problem, I 
compare regions that are part of the same country today and therefore share the same 
political institutions, but have had a different number of border changes in the past. I 
study six countries that have such within-country variation in border changes—Slovenia, 
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine. Using data for five hundred years of 
border changes and three contemporary household-level surveys, I show that more 
frequent border changes in the past lead to lower current trust in political institutions.  
The estimated effect is large: border changes can explain 45% of the observed average 
difference in household-level political trust between the countries studied in my paper 
and the UK, which has enjoyed stable borders.  
The second chapter examines immigrants’ socio-economic outcomes. I use the variation 
in cultural distance between immigrants’ birth and host countries to estimate the cost of 
adapting to a new cultural milieu. Using individual level data on immigrants from 
Europe, Canada and the US, I find that a increase of one standard deviation in the cultural 
distance between an immigrant’s birth and host countries decreases the immigrant’s 
expected earnings by 7.2% and has negative effect on numerous immigrants’ social 
outcomes as well. As predicted by my model, the effect of cultural distance is the 
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Chapter 1: Do Less Stable Borders Lead to Lower Levels 
of Political Trust? Empirical Evidence from Eastern 
Europe 
1.Introduction  
Changes in political borders have happened quite often in history. The number of 
independent countries increased from 31 in 1815, to 56 in 1900, and to 157 in 1994 
(O'Loughlin et al, 1998). Nevertheless, this big increase underestimates the overall 
number of political border changes, because it does not take into account border changes 
between already existing countries. For example much of Rivenska Oblast in today’s 
Western Ukraine has belonged to eight different countries in the last 100 years. This 
means that individuals who were born there in 1913 may have lived in 8 different 
countries without ever moving out of their homes. It is very easy to imagine that frequent 
border changes affected how they perceive themselves as citizens and their views on the 
credibility of political institutions. 
This paper examines the effect of border changes on one aspect of culture, namely on 
levels of political trust. The main finding is that individuals who live in a region that had 
more frequent border changes have lower levels of political trust. This substantially 
broadens the economic literature on border changes, which previously has focused on 




Helliwell 1998) or finding the economically optimal size of a country  (Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2005, Etro 2003). 
Trust in political institutions is crucial to democracy (Mishler and Rose, 2001). If people 
have more trust in political institutions, they are more likely to participate actively in 
political discourse, which may lead to better political decisions (Mishler and Rose, 2001, 
Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Further, if people have higher levels of trust towards the 
government, they will be less opposed to government reforms, making reforms easier to 
implement and thus more efficient (Levi and Stoker 2000, Luhiste 2006). Moreover, they 
will be more willing to comply with government demands, including taxpaying (Scholz 
and Lubell 1998, Levi and Stoker 2000).  
The analysis presented in this paper adds to the literature on determinants of political 
trust. It introduces a new factor that has a significant and large effect on the level of 
political trust – the stability of political borders.
1
 The main hypothesis tested is whether a 
region that changed its foreign rulers more often during the period from 1450 to 1945 has 
lower levels of trust in political institutions today. Additionally, my paper contributes to 
the cultural persistence literature by showing a novel mechanism of how events in the 
past can influence the current behavior of economic agents – through the choice of school 
names. 
                                                 
1
 Determinants of political trust are usually divided into two broad categories – cultural and institutional. 
Cultural determinants originate outside the political sphere. These include beliefs and values that are rooted 
in cultural norms and communicated through early-life socialization. Institutional determinants of political 
trust are endogenous to the political system, and they depend on the overall performance of political 




1.2 Identification strategy and conceptual framework 
In order to understand fully what this paper is analyzing it is useful to clarify what is 
considered to be a border change. In this paper a border change is said to occur when a 
conflict, peace treaty, or the dissolving of an empire results in a region changing its ruling 
polity, so that the region switches from being part of one country to being part of another. 
Inhabitants of the region get a new state capital, experience a change of administration 
and have tax obligations to the new ruler of the region. If citizenship is defined in today’s 
terms, these historical border changes would be equivalent to a situation where 
everybody in the region ceased to be citizens of an old country and became citizens of a 
new country.
2
 For the purpose of this paper a change has to last for at least 6 years to be 
counted as a border change. In this way, frequent changes of borders during wars are 
omitted, which allows focusing on more permanent changes that could have a lasting 
effect on trust in political instructions. 
 In order to test empirically whether border changes can predict political trust, the 
identification strategy must take into account that current levels of political trust also 
depend on current political institutions. Therefore if one conducts a cross country 
analysis of the effect of historical border changes on current political trust, it will be very 
hard to distinguish the effect of different history from the effect of different current 
political intuitions.  
                                                 
2
 Change in the polity that rules a region and change in political borders of a region denote the same thing 




To address this problem, the identification strategy of this paper focuses on within-
country variation, that is on countries that have regions with different numbers of 
historical border changes. Therefore, the comparison is between regions that share the 
same current political institutions but differ in their historical experience, namely the 
frequency of changes in the polity that rules the region. This is the reason why the 
empirical part of the paper will focus on six south-eastern European countries that satisfy 
the aforementioned criterion on within-country variation in historical border changes - 
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine. These six countries have 
an extremely rich history with frequent border changes. This is due to their geographic 
position, as they were situated between powerful empires or kingdoms that often fought 
wars with each other, including the Habsburg, Polish, Russian, Ottoman and Italian 
(Venetian) states. 
As an example of how this identification strategy relates historical border changes to 
current levels of political trust, consider two regions within the same country. The two 
regions share the same set of current political institutions, that is the same parliament, 
government, president and laws, with courts and police that operate under the same set of 
rules and procedures. Let us assume that these regions differ in their historical 
experience, notably that one region has changed from one country to another country 
more often than the other one in the past. For example, the coastal region of Dalmatia in 
Croatia was under Turkish, Venetian, Napoleonic, Habsburg, Italian and Yugoslav rule in 




same time period, from Habsburg to Yugoslav. Due to this different historical experience, 
people in those two regions have different levels of trust in political institutions today.
3
  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following fashion. The next Section describes the 
dataset used and gives a short history of the region. The main explanatory variable, a 
Historical Change Index that measures intensity of border changes in the past, is 
described in detail in Section 3. Estimation strategy and main results follow in Section 4. 
Section 5 performs various robustness tests including an instrumental variable analysis to 
control for potential endogeneity. Section 7 describes potential persistence mechanisms 
and Section 7 concludes. 
2.Datasets and a short history of sample countries 
The effect of historical border changes on current levels of political trust is best examined 
by using an identification strategy focused on within-country variation in border changes. 
Because of this, data will be taken from six European countries that are composed of 
regions that exhibit large variation in numbers of border changes – Slovenia, Croatia, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine. These countries have a rich history and 
variety of border changes because of their geographical position; they were located 
between the powerful Habsburg, Russian, Ottoman and Venetian (Italian) empires. The 
following subsections describe datasets used in estimation and provide a short history of 
                                                 
3
 For instance,  in 2010 average trust in the court system, on a scale from 1 to 5, five being the best, was 
significantly lower in Dalmatia than Northern Croatia (1.89 vs. 2.25, t-stat of difference in means =4.1). 





the region to explain why there is enough variation in the border changes occurring the 
past to allow for identification. 
2.1 Datasets  
The main data source for individual trust levels is the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) I 
and II, collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 
29 countries. LiTS I was administered in 2006 and LiTS II in 2010. Besides socio-
demographic information such as age, gender, and education, the survey collected 
information on trust in political intuitions, social trust, as well as measures of civic 
behavior. 1,000 households were interviewed in each country, based on a sample of 20 
households in 50 different geographical locations (Primary Sampling Units, PSUs). 
Those locations can be specific villages, towns or parts of a bigger metropolitan area. The 
LiTS datasets give the exact name of each PSU, so one can easily locate them and gather 
the needed data about the specific PSU.  
 Another dataset used is the European Values Survey (EVS) from 2008. A drawback of 
the EVS is that it does not allow identification of the exact location of an individual 
respondent. It provides only information about the respondents’ NUTS-3
4
 region, which 
does not allow for as precise identification of relevant historical political border changes 
as does the exact location of PSUs given in the LiTS datasets. Because of this, results 
obtained with the EVS dataset might be considered less precise than the ones from LiTS. 
                                                 
4
NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics, which is a European Union standard for 
the statistical subdivision of a country. The minimum number of inhabitants for a NUTS 3 region is 




One reason for using the EVS survey is the benefit of having another independent 
dataset. Furthermore the EVS contains some questions that are not found in LiTS that are 
relevant for distinguishing possible mechanisms for how changes in borders might affect 
political trust. For example, EVS asks about the respondents’ degree of identification 
with a geographical unit. 
The main dependent variable represents trust in political institutions. The LiTS surveys 
measures respondents’ current political trust using the following questions:
 5
 
To what extent do you trust the following institutions? 
1) The presidency 
2) The government/cabinet of ministers 
3) The parliament 
4) The courts 
5) Political parties 
6) The police 
Answers to each of these questions are scaled from 1-5, where 1 stands for complete 
distrust and 5 for complete trust. Individual answers to those questions are commonly 
used in existing literature as a measure of political trust (Mishler and Rose 2001, 
Catterberg and Moreno 2006, Luhiste (2006) to name just a few).
6
 If this paper’s 
hypothesis is correct, then individuals in regions that had more frequent changes of 
                                                 
5
 The EVS question is formulated a bit differently - How much confidence do you have in the following 
institutions? Possible answers are on scale from 1 to 4, where 4 stands for “A great deal.”  
6
 Furthermore, I use aggregate measures of these answers (the sum and principal component) as robustness 




polities ruling the region in the past will have lower trust scores on average, ceteris 
paribus. 
This paper focuses on Balkan countries plus Ukraine in order to achieve a higher degree 
of reliability in mapping historical border changes into a single number.
7
 All countries in 
the sample were influenced by numerous wars between the Habsburg, Russian and 
Ottoman Empires. The same set of core events (wars, peace treaties, rebellions) had an 
impact in all the countries in the sample.
8
 Giving the same weight for the same events 
that affected multiple regions in the sample increases consistency in the measure of 
historical border changes.  
An additional reason for not studying other countries is that it would complicate the 
analysis by including additional empires that influenced regional border changes - the 
Prussian, Swedish and Saxon empires in the case of Poland and the Baltic countries, for 
example. This could increase the heterogeneity of the sample and as a consequence 
decrease the potential explanatory power of the analysis, making causality harder to 
discern. Including countries from other parts of the world would make it more difficult to 
distinguish between the specific effect of a change itself, the effect of the new polity that 
rules the region, and specific characteristics of the region.   
                                                 
7
 Other countries for which the criterion of within-country variation in the number of historical changes is 
satisfied would be Poland, the Baltic countries and ex-colonial African and Asian countries, to name just a 
few. 
8
 Examples of common events include the wars between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and the rise 




2.2. A brief history of the region 
The purpose of this concise description is to show that border changes in Slovenia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine were frequent and that there is 
enough variation in changes within any country to allow identification of the effect of 
past border changes on current levels of trust in political institutions. This very short 
history of the region gives an incomplete log of the changes that have happened in the 
countries under study. A more detailed overview can be found in Stavrianos (2000), 
Lampe (1989 and 2000) and Kann (1974).  
This paper's main explanatory variable, the Historical Change Index, considers the time 
period between 1450 and 1945. The year 1450 is used as a starting point because at that 
time the Ottomans began their expansion into the North Balkans. The Ottomans started 
their expansion by conquering Serbia and all of Montenegro except its coastal parts. In 
the 16th century the Ottomans managed to bring the whole of Romania, most of Croatia 
and a huge part of Ukraine under their rule.  Ottoman power and the size of its territories 
began to diminish after defeat in 1699 in its war against the Christian alliance of Venice, 
the Habsburg empire, Poland and Russia. 
This decline in Ottoman power was exploited by the Habsburg and Russian Empires, 
which increased their territories in today’s Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine. Those 
two Empires, together with Prussia, also participated in the partitioning of Poland in the 
18
th
 Century, when previous Polish territories in Ukraine were seized by the Habsburgs 




expense of the Ottoman Empire and played a very important role in forming national 
Montenegrin, Serbian and Romanian states in the second half of the 19
th
 century. All of 
those national states were formed around previous Ottoman provinces. The process of 
their border changes, for these states mostly expansion, continued during the Balkan wars 
in 1913 and in the aftermath of WWI. 
Venice controlled the coastal parts of today’s Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro up to 
1806, when Napoleon conquered Venice and brought it under French rule. After the fall 
of Napoleon, these territories became part of the Habsburg Empire. The Adriatic coast of 
the Balkans stayed under the Habsburg crown up until the end of WWI, when some parts 
were given to Italy and some became part of the newly-formed Yugoslavia.  
 In the peace treaties that followed the end of WWI, the Habsburg Empire was 
dissolved. West Ukraine became part of Poland and Czechoslovakia, Romania gained 
control over Transylvania, the South Slavic parts of the Habsburg Empire became part of 
Yugoslavia, and some parts of the Adriatic coast became part of the Italian Kingdom. The 
final borders of today’s countries were established after WWII and have remained stable 
until today.
 
Even though USSR and Yugoslavia dissolved those changes in borders 
affected the whole countries in the sample and could not be used in identification.  
 
3.  Main explanatory variable - Historical Change Index  
This paper constructs a new variable – the Historical Change Index (HCI) - for the 




the intensity of past changes of ruling polities in a given Primary Sampling Unit, PSU, 
from 1450 to 1945. More specifically, the HCI is constructed using two guiding 
principles: 
HCI discounts events that happened further away in history more than recent events. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that events that happened 50 years ago have more impact on 
current political trust than events that occurred 500 years ago. 
Changes that lasted longer have a greater weight. The longer one polity rules a region, the 
more people will become accustomed to it. As a consequence changes that lasted longer 
will have a bigger effect on a region’s current culture, including levels of trust in political 
institutions. The reason for this assumption is a belief that, for example, the 176-year  
Ottoman rule in Transylvania in Romania had a different effect than the 27-year Ottoman 
rule in Podolia in Ukraine. 
Applying these two principles to every change in political borders that happened in year y 
and lasted l years, the effect of the change is calculated in the following way: 
 
                                                       (1) 
 
Where 
                 
 
        
     (2) 
               
 
               





The length effect is a concave function, which approaches 1 as the length of the change 
becomes longer. This specific form implies that after one generation, usually considered 
to be 25 years, the length effect is 0.9, i.e. 90% of the maximum possible length effect of 
the change has materialized in the first 25 years. In two generations the length effect 
becomes 0.99. After two generations have been raised, schooled and lived in the same 
country, families are well accustomed to the country and additional years will bring little 
change in a family’s identification with the current country. 
The time discount has a convex shape. This shape was chosen because it emphasizes 
recent events more and allows a greater differentiation between events that took place 
recently. For example, take two events that happened 50 years apart. Two events that 
happened in 1475 and 1525 will have very similar time discounts (0.15 vs. 0.18), while 
two events that happened in 1895 and 1945 will have significantly different time 
discounts (0.82 vs. 1). This is in line with the intuition that recent events matter more.  
This kind of discounting has also been used in the previous literature, for example in 
Putterman et al. (2003). Those authors examine the history of statehood for 113 countries. 
They construct an index of state antiquity and show it affects recent growth rates of GDP. 
They discount over 2000 years of history and they use an annual discount rate of 0.1%, 
which means that an event that happened in the middle of their time period would have a 




of the time period, a higher discount rate of 0.4% is applied.
9
 This discount rate means 
that approximately 10% of the effect of a polity change is lost in one generation (a period 
of 25 years).   
Having calculated the separate effects for every change of borders, the HCI is calculated 
as the sum of the effects of all border changes in each PSU, as shown in the following 
formula: 
 
                                           
                                
 
 
 This aggregation of all border changes affecting a PSU is the main explanatory variable 
used in this paper. It is referred to as the Historical Change Index (HCI). The HCI 
represents a mapping of all changes of a region’s political borders in the 1450-1945 
period into a single number, where a higher value of HCI corresponds to more frequent 
and significant changes of foreign rulers in the last 550 years of PSU history. Constructed 
in this way, the HCI uses three sources of variation in regional border changes: 
differences in the number of changes, the length of changes and how long ago the 
changes happened. 
To give an example of how the HCI is calculated, consider all PSUs located in the 
Romanian region of Transylvania. Historically all changes in political borders that 
                                                 
9
 This is because the time period here is four times shorter (500 years compared to 2000 years) then in 





affected Transylvania affected the whole region. This means that all PSUs located in 
Transylvania have the same value of the HCI.
10
 Table 1 gives the list of changes that 
happened in Transylvania, as well as the measured effects of these changes and their total 
sum, the HCI score.   
From Table 1 it can be seen that the most recent changes have a larger effect. 
Nevertheless, changes that happened almost 500 years ago (in this case the Ottomans' 
conquering of Transylvania in 1526) still have an impact on the HCI. This summarizes 
two features of HCI – it is a weighted sum of all changes that have happened since 1450 
in a given PSU, where more recent changes have a larger effect. The HCI scores for all 
regions and their PSU's are given in Appendix D. 
Robustness checks are performed on the HCI using different discount rates, as well as 
different functional forms for length and time discounts, notably linear and concave 
forms. Details about these alternative measures, as well as the results from using them 
can be found in Appendix A. The robustness tests show that the main results remain 
qualitatively similar under different specifications of the discount functions. 
                                                 
10
 This is true for most sample PSUs. In another words, most sample PSUs are part of a region which was 
never divided in the historical period after 1450. Whenever there was a change in foreign ruler the whole 
region was affected. This means that there are other PSUs in the same region that have the same value of 
HCI. Because of this, the description of the calculation of HCI in this section always uses region as a 
reference point. All PSUs that belong to a particular region and have the same border changes as the region 





4. Estimation strategy and main results 
This paper analyses the effect of border changes on political trust by comparing regions 
that are part of the same country today and therefore share the same set of current 
political institutions but have a different history of changes in their political borders. The 
next subsections describe my specific estimation strategy and results. Overall, I find that 
individuals living in regions with frequent historical border changes exhibit lower levels 
of political trust and indentify less with their current country today. Moreover this effect 
is stronger for older individuals and people who lived all their life in the same location, 
which gives additional support to paper’s main hypothesis.   
4.1  Estimation strategy 
Given my within country identification strategy, the main estimation equation, evaluated 
using ordered probit and OLS, for an individual i who lives in PSU j in super region k is: 
 
                     
             
 
                          
 
                           (5) 
 
The dependent variable of interest is individual trust in political institutions. Various self 




dependent variables. These include trust in the president, parliament, government, police, 
local government, courts and parties. All standard errors are clustered at the PSU level.  
The main explanatory variable of interest is the Historical Change Index, which is 
calculated at the PSU level. Larger values of the HCI represent more important, more 
recent and/or more frequent border changes for a given PSU. If more border changes in 
the past lead to lower levels of trust in contemporary political institutions, then one would 
expect a negative coefficient    for HCI. 
Since the analysis is at the individual level, individual respondents' characteristics are 
included in the covariates. Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, marital 
status, number of children, labor market status, education, self reported subjective 
income, religion and ethnic minority status are taken into account in the regression. 
Furthermore, individual beliefs that could affect levels of political trust are also 
controlled for. Those include current satisfaction with life and generalized trust.
11
 The 
reason for including this last set of variables is to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. 
For example, it could be that frequent border changes lead to lower generalized trust 
levels. Due to this lower generalized trust, individuals in regions that changed their 
borders more often might display lower levels of political trust. To show that there is a 
direct effect of past border changes on current levels of political trust per se, generalized 
trust is included as a covariate in the regression.  
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 This is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say most people can be 
trusted or  that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Answers are range  from (1) – complete 




The last important group of explanatory variables are PSU characteristics. These include 
a measure of regional PPP GDP per capita as a proxy for local economic conditions.
12
 
The distance from the state capital is also added to the set of covariates, as one would 
expect that areas further away from the center of political power have less trust in 
political institutions.
13
 Rural, urban or metropolitan status of the PSU is also accounted 
for with appropriate dummies.  
The ethnic composition of a PSU might differ from the rest of the country, and this might 
both be associated with more frequent changes of borders and at the same time might 
independently affect levels of political trust. To take this possibility into account, the 
regression uses the percentage of the country’s largest ethnic group living in the specific 
district. Furthermore, population density at the district level has also been included in the 
covariates. Locations with frequent wars and border changes might also have lower 
population densities and this lower population density might lead to lower levels of 
trust.
14
 The last two variables defined at the PSU level are Empire weights, related to the 
time period spent under the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires. I include them because it is a 
known fact in the literature that a legacy of belonging to the Habsburg Empire is related 
with better quality of current institutions and the opposite is true for belonging to the 
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 The regional GDP measure was not available for Montenegro and Ukraine. In Ukraine the average 
regional wage was used instead, while for all regions in Montenegro, country-level GDP was used. Using 
either an absolute measure (in euros), a relative measure (index value where the country average was set to 
100) or the natural logarithm of the absolute regional GDP does not have effect on the main results. 
13
 Again, here both absolute (in km) and relative distance are used. Relative distances are scaled to be in a 
range 0 to 1 where 1 represents the most distant PSU in the country, while 0 is the capital city. Using two 
ways of defining distance did not cause change in the results of the analysis. Squared relative distance is 
chosen as the preferred measure as it appears to have the best fit in the regressions. 
14
 For robustness purposes, regressions are also done without controlling for population density and share 




Ottoman Empire. Empire weights are constructed in the same way as in Dimitrova-Grajzl 
(2007) and explained in more detail in Appendix A. 
The level of trust individuals have in their political institutions may also depend on how 
aligned their political preferences are with the political party currently in power. This 
could represent a problem for the chosen estimation strategy if political preferences are 
omitted but related to the PSU’s history of border changes. For example, in Ukraine, the 
west part of the country usually votes for pro-European parties, while the eastern part of 
the country has preferences for pro-Russian parties. To control for this and similar 
problems, 21 superregional dummies are included in the regression.
15
 This procedure of 
controlling for super-region fixed effects is also used in Acemoglu et al. (2011). The full 
list of variables as well as their description is given in Appendix B. Appendix D gives a 
list of all PSU’s in LiTS II 2010 with the corresponding HCI and super-regions. 
Endogeneity of the main independent variable, HCI, could cause a threat to estimation 
strategy proposed in this section. To address this potential problem instrumental variable 
analysis is preformed in Section 5.2 as one of the robustness test, showing that the main 
results of the paper are stable even when pure geographical variables are used as the 
instruments. 
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 In Montenegro two superregional dummies are constructed. Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia have three, 
Romania four and Ukraine six. The number of superregional dummies is chosen to be proportional to the 





 This section gives results of analysis done on individual-level observations from 
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Romania. Data sources are LiTS I 
(2006) LiTS II (2010) and EVS (2008). After discussing the baseline results, I discuss 
analysis on various subgroups, and perform a comparison of my sample countries with 
UK, which enjoyed stable borders over this time period. While I report results separately 
for each survey the same covariates are used in the main specification in all surveys, 
allowing for data to be pooled into a single regression. Pooled results do not differ 




4.2.1 Core Results and Magnitude of the Effect – LiTS I (2006) and LiTS II (2010) 
 The first six columns in Table 2 present the results of ordered probit regressions using 
trust in the president, government, parliament, courts, political parties and police. All 
those measures are self-reported by individuals and range from 1, complete distrust, to 5, 
complete trust. The seventh column contains results from a probit regression where the 
dependent variable is 1 if the individual voted in the last parliamentary or presidential 
election and 0 if she did not. These regressions, as well as all that follow, include a rich 
set of covariates as described in the previous section. Due to limited space only, the 
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coefficients on the more interesting explanatory variables are reported in the tables.  All 
standard errors reflect clustering at the PSU level.  
In all regressions, the coefficient on HCI is negative and in the majority of them, it is 
significant, confirming the hypothesis that more stable borders lead to higher levels of 
current trust in political institutions. This result is confirmed in all datasets used in the 
paper as well under various robustness tests performed in latter section. 
To see the magnitude of the effect of border changes in the past consider an individual 
born in Rivenska Oblast in West Ukraine in the first half of the 1910s, as mentioned in 
the introduction. Assuming this person has lived in the same house his entire life, he still 
has lived in seven different countries. If he had lived in Kharkiv Oblast instead, holding 
everything else constant, the estimates in Table 2 suggest he would have on average 0.62 
points more trust in parliament on the 1 to 5 scale.
17
 A comparison with the effect of 
other covariates helps to illustrate the size of the effect of historical border changes. For 
example, the income variable is defined as the answer to the following question: 
Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 
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 The HCI index for Rivenska oblast is 2.32 while that of Kharkiv Oblast is 0. Kharkiv oblast is the only 
location in six countries studied in this paper that did not change their foreign ruler in the 1450-1945 
period. 
18
 In LiTS I data about household expenditure was also available. Using expenditure variable instead of 
subjective ladder self placement does not alter results. Self placement on a income ladder was chosen 




According to the results given in Table 2, if an individual goes from the lowest decile of 
income to the highest, his increase in trust in parliament will be 0.5. This increase is 
smaller than the effect of being born in Kharkiv instead of in Rivenska Oblast in the first 
half of the 1910s.  
Consider two additional historic examples showing that the effect of past border changes 
has magnitudes comparable to other determinants of trust already known in the literature. 
First, imagine a region that switched country after WWI and then again after WWII.
19
 
The HCI value for this specific change after WWI would be 0.79.
20
 This change alone 
would cause individuals in affected regions to have 0.178 less trust towards government, 
on a 1-5 scale.
21
 This corresponds to the effect of a decline in income of 4 subjective 
deciles on the income ladder. Second, suppose a region became part of the country to 
which it belongs today as a result of the Berlin Congress in 1878. This event would have 
an HCI value of 0.76.
22
 Again this effect would be the same as individuals dropping 4 
deciles on the income ladder. 
 Other explanatory variables shown in Table 2 have the expected sign. If 
individuals are more satisfied with their life or have higher self reported income their 
trust in political institutions is higher. Citizens living in richer regions have higher trust in 
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 In Slovenia the whole coastal area was given to Italy, as were some coastal parts of Croatia. Western 
Ukraine became part of  Poland and Czechoslovakia. All these changes happened after WWI and lasted till 
the end of WWII. 
20
 This is calculated using formulas (1), (2) and (3), for a change that happened 92 years ago and lasted for 
27 years.  
21
 Of course to get the complete picture one should add weight for changes that happened after WWII, 
when the regions in question become part of today’s countries. 
22




political intuitions as do individuals with higher levels of generalized trust. As a 
robustness test regressions without generalized trust as an explanatory variable are 
estimated on all three data sets without much effect on the magnitude and significance of 
the HCI coefficient. Furthermore, HCI has no predictive power when generalized trust is 
used as a dependent variable, showing that individuals living in regions with more 
frequent border changes do not differ in generalized trust levels from other citizens
23
. 
 Results presented in column seven of Table 2 show that more frequent border 
changes in the past have a negative effect on election participation. It seems that in 
regions that changed their foreign rulers more often, not only do individuals have lower 
trust in the political institutions, but additionally they vote less. This negative and 




Table 3 shows results of the analysis using data from LiTS II 2010 survey. Dependent 
and explanatory variables are the same as those for 2006. Again, the coefficient of the 
historical change index is negative and significant for president and government at the 
5% and 1% level respectively. 
When comparing the magnitude of the HCI effect between 2010 and 2006, there is a clear 
pattern that shows a stronger effect in 2006. One possible explanation is that in 2010 all 
sample countries were hit by a Great Recession, while in 2006 all sample countries 
enjoyed strong positive GDP growth. As expected, this is reflected in the general levels 
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 Results available from author upon request 
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of political trust – average trust in political institutions fell in 2010 for all countries. The 
standard deviations of all answers about political trust also became smaller.
25
 This fall in 
the variance of political trust could decrease the explanatory power of the HCI variable.
26
  
4.2.2 Stayers and Movers 
 LITS II (2010) enables me to test an additional mechanism implied by this paper’s 
hypothesis. It asks how long individuals have lived in their current localities. One of the 
possible answers is that an individual has never moved. This is useful, since the effect 
that this paper purports to document should be location specific, working through the 
location where the individuals were born, raised, educated and spent their entire lives. If 
my hypothesis is correct, then the effect of border changes should be highest for 
individuals who spent all their lives in the same location. For these individuals it is 
possible to capture the pure effect of location and its border changes without fear of 
contamination from individuals living in some other area with a different history of 
border changes. 
 Because of this, results obtained on the subsample of individuals who have never moved 
should more accurately represent the effect of living in a region that had a specific 
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 For example, the standard deviation for trust in government in 2006 was 1.25, for trust in president 1.34, 
for trust in parliament 1.23 and for trust in courts 1.25. In 2010 the corresponding numbers were 1.18, 1.29, 
1.12  and 1.18. 
26
 A second possible reason is that in May 2006, Montenegro, after a successful referendum, declared 
independence and left the union with Serbia. The 2006 LITS was administered in October so citizens 
everywhere had a fresh memory of this breakup. This newly declared independence could prime 
individuals into thinking that no state lasts forever. This effect would be greater in regions that had a rich 
history of changing foreign rulers, i.e. where individuals could recall more changes of state their region 




number of historical border changes. Table 4 presents regressions for the subsample of 
individuals who have never moved.
27
 The effect of HCI increases and becomes more 
significant in all measures of political trust compared to the results presented in Table 3, 
confirming the main hypothesis. In the language of the treatment effects literature, 
individuals who lived all their lives in the same place are the ones who received the 
treatment, while those who moved are a control group. A regression based on individuals 
who moved is presented in Table 5. It shows no effect of HCI on political trust, which 
would suggest that early life socialization is an important channel for transmission of the 
effect of past border changes on current political trust. 
4.2.3 Geographical identity 
The last data set used in the paper is the EVS from 2008, which offers a possibility to 
check for geographical identification of individuals. As mentioned before, EVS is less 
suitable for my purposes since it does not identify the exact location where the individual 
lives, providing only the NUTS-3 (EU statistical region with 150 000-800 000 
inhabitants) region of respondents. When the NUTS-3 region has more than one value of 
HCI (different parts of the NUTS-3 region have different numbers of changes of political 
borders in the past) the average is taken.
28
 Therefore, results obtained using the EVS 
dataset should be considered less precise than those using LiTS I and LiTS II . 
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 Approximately 65% of the individuals in the sample have lived in the same location their whole life. 
28




Results of the estimation of equation (1) for the 2008 EVS are given in Table 6. All the 
coefficients for HCI are negative and half are significant, consistent with the results from 
the two other data sources. The coefficients on the other covariates have the expected 
signs.
29
   
What makes the EVS 2008 a valuable dataset for this paper is the question about 
identification with geographical location. More specifically one of the questions was:  
Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? 
The possible answers include locality or region, country, Europe or the world. One of the 
possible mechanisms of how historical changes in political borders might have an effect 
on current levels of trust in political institutions is through a lower identification with the 
current country. If one does not identify with the current country, one will trust its 
political institutions less and will have a lower probability of voting. Table 7 presents 
results of the probit regressions where the dependent variable was an individual’s 
identification with a geographical unit. The table clearly shows that individuals who live 
in regions that changed their foreign rulers more often in the past see themselves first as 
members of the region, and not their country, with no difference for their conception of 
themselves as global citizens.  
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 In LiTSs individuals self reported which income decile they think they belonged to. In the 2008 EVS 
individuals are directly asked for the amount of their household monthly income. Income is then 
transformed into Euros and adjusted for purchasing power parity. In the regression, the natural logarithm of 
that income is used. This different way of income measurement in LiTSs and EVS might be responsible for 




4.2.4 Aggregated trust measures  
One way of summarizing the results presented in this section is to use principal 
components to aggregate answers to the questions about trust in all the different political 
institutions into a single number.
30
 This single number for each individual is the first 
principal component of individual responses about trust in the president, government, 
parliament, police, courts and political parties. 
 The results obtained when the first principal component is used as the sole dependent 
variable in all three surveys are given in Table 8. The results unequivocally show that 
there is a significant negative effect of historical border changes on current levels of 
political trust in all three surveys.
31
  
4.2.5 Young and Old 
An additional test of this paper’s main idea is conducted by splitting the sample by age 
into two groups –“old” and “young”, allowing for heterogonous effects of border 
changes. Older individuals should have higher awareness of past border changes because 
they are more likely to have been alive when some of the changes took place. 
Furthermore, they are closer to generations that directly experienced changes of borders. 
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 Principal component analysis is a multivariate statistical technique, which reduces the set of potentially 
correlated variables into linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. Components are 
constructed in a way such that the first principal component explains the largest possible amount of 
correlated variation from the data. For a review of the method as well as its applications to survey data see 
Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
31
 The highest statistical significance of the HCI coefficient is in the LiTS 2010 survey, which is not 
surprising, given that in this survey only non movers are taken into sample. Furthermore, using the sum of 
all answers about trust in the various political institutions as a different way of aggregating answers into a 
single number, does not change the coefficient associated with the HCI variable (results not shown but 




Therefore, HCI should have a higher negative effect for the subsample of older people. 
Looking at all three surveys and splitting the population by age, with age 50 as the 
threshold; the effect of HCI is more negative and significant for the older subsample, as 
shown in Table 9. Even though differences in coefficients for the young and old 
subsamples are not statistically significant; the pattern in all three independent datasets is 
clear - older individuals exhibit a larger and more significant negative effect of border 
changes on political trust, giving additional corroboration paper’s main hypothesis. 
4.2.6 Comparison with country without border changes – United Kingdom 
 The analysis performed up to this point allows for a simple calculation of the 
effect of border changes on the average level of trust for an entire sample country. First, 
the weighted average of HCI is constructed for each sample country using the following 
formula: 
 
           
                  
              
          (5) 
where i indexes regions. 
Country averages of HCI and trust are presented in Table 10. The average trust on a 1-5 
scale towards parliament is given from LiTS II for each sample country. Average trust for 




has had relatively stable borders in the last 500 years and serves as a comparison with the 
countries studied in this paper.
32
 
As can be seen from column 3 average trust in parliament was lower than in the UK, in 
all sample countries except Montenegro. Applying a coefficient of -0.16 for the effect of 
HCI on trust in parliament (from Table 3) I perform a simple calculation of what average 
trust in parliament would have been if these countries had enjoyed stable political borders 
as did the UK.
33
   
Column 4 shows this calculated counterfactual trust in parliament, which significantly 
reduces differences between UK and sample countries. By construction average trust in 
parliament rises for all countries, and for Slovenia trust would be higher than in the UK.  
In the sample countries average trust in parliament goes up from 2.19 to 2.37 or from 
2.02 to 2.20 if we exclude Montenegro as an obvious outlier. Eliminating border changes 
would reduce the difference in average trust in parliament between the UK and the 
sample counties by 45%. While perhaps over-simplified this back-of-the-envelope 
calculation shows the large effect of past border changes on current political trust.  
5. Robustness tests 
So far the results have consistently shown that individuals who live in regions with fewer 
changes in borders display lower levels of trust in political institutions, vote less and 
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 There were two border changes in the relevant time period.  In 1707, England and Scotland voluntarily 
united after having had the same monarch since 1603. In 1921, the Republic of Ireland gained its 
independence. One being a voluntary union without any change in administration and the other affecting a 
territory which is not in the current UK, neither of these would enter the HCI. 
33




indentify less with the current state. This section addresses possible objections to the 
methodologies implemented up to this point. First, to control for possibility that lower 
levels of political trust are driven by bad government performance in specific regions 
objective and subjective measures of government performance are taken into account. 
Secondly, I use instrumental variables to correct for possible endogeneity of HCI. 
Finally, various placebo tests show that HCI does not affect other socioeconomic 
variables and that HCI is not merely proxying for the impact of past conflicts. All 
additional robustness tests confirm the main result- that more stable borders lead to 
higher levels of political trust. 
5.1 Controlling for subjective and objective measures of political performance 
One reason why individuals in regions with more frequent border changes could have 
lower levels of trust in political institutions is that political institutions in those regions 
might be performing poorly. It is not unreasonable to imagine that politicians might 
choose to put most of their resources and efforts into provinces that have been part of the 
country for a longer time and did not switch their rulers frequently in the past. 
Alternatively, due to the specifics of the region, the government might be less efficient 
and/or its results perceived to be worse in regions that changed their borders more often 
in the past. To address these possible problems, measures of government performance are 
added to equation (1).  
Two measures of political performance are used for each survey. The first one is 




institutions. The second one is more objective; it is the average rating of political 
institution performance of the nineteen other people (excluding the respondent) who live 
in the same PSU. Individual answers might be subjective and might be jointly determined 
with political trust, causing reverse causality issues. Usage of local averages should 
decrease those problems.  
In LiTS II from 2010, the measure of political performance is constructed as the first 
principal component of the answers to the following questions: 
- Please rate the overall performance of the local administration 
- Please rate the overall performance of the central government 
 where answers range from 1,very bad to 5, very good. Results are given in Table 11, 
where for all columns the dependent variable is first principal component of various 
measures of political trust. The first column replicates results of Table 8, which serves as 
a comparison for the other results presented in the table.  
Adding measures of government performance does not change the main results of 
interest. In the second column, the individual respondent’s rating of the performance of 
political institutions is added as a covariate. As expected the coefficient associated with 
this variable is positive and highly significant - if the individual is satisfied with 
government performance, she displays higher levels of trust in political institutions. In the 
last column, the average rating of the local administration and the national government by 
others in the same PSU is used as a covariate instead. The coefficient on this more 




of political performance are added, the coefficient on the HCI variable remains 
significant at 1% and hardly changes in magnitude.  
LiTS I from 2006 does not have such a clear and direct question about government 
performance. Instead, a measure of government performance was constructed as first 
principal component of individual answers to the following questions: 
The political situation in this country is better today than around 1989  
There is less corruption now than around 1989 
To what extent do you agree that law and order is important for your country?  
Those questions do not give direct individual ratings of the performance of political 
institutions, but it is reasonable to assume that they can be used as a proxy for political 
performance. The results are presented in Table 12, which has the same structure as Table 
10. Even after adding subjective and objective measures of the performance of political 
institutions, the coefficient of HCI remains negative and significant, as in Table 11. 
For 2008, the EVS question that most closely measures the performance of political 
institutions is the following: 
People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale 
for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good 
Results of the analysis are given in Table 13. The structure of the table is the same as for 
Table 11 and Table 12. The first column replicates the results given in Table 8, and in the 
next two columns subjective and objective measures of political performance are added. 
The coefficient on HCI remains significant, although slightly smaller in magnitude. 




see that the significance on the measure of government performance by others in the 
same locality is lower. This could be due to the lower level of geographical precision in 
EVS.  
5.2. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 Could the estimates of the previous section be biased due to the presence of reverse 
causality? This seems unlikely given the timing of the measurement of HCI and current 
political trust. However, it is conceivable that political trust is highly persistent, meaning 
that trust in the past is highly correlated with trust today, and that regions with low 
political trust in the past were attractive targets for foreign invasion. This seems 
somewhat implausible: in practice, regions that have had the most frequent border 
changes are the ones lying between powerful empires. Examples include West Ukraine – 
lying between the Polish, Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg empires – or the Adriatic coast 
of the Balkan peninsula –  lying between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires and the 
Italian (or Venetian) Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, this possible source of bias can be addressed using instrumental variables. 
To use an instrumental-variable estimation procedure one must have variable(s) that are 
not directly causally related with the dependent variable but are directly causally related 
with HCI. The instrumental variables used in the analysis are a measure of how easy it 
was for a region to be conquered and a measure of the region’s strategic importance. 
Strategic importance is proxied by how distant the region is from the shortest line 




ease with which a region could be conquered is measured by average terrain roughness. 
The following paragraph discusses these instrumental variables in more detail. 
The first instrument is terrain roughness. The existing literature (Nunn and Puga, (2012), 
Iyigun et al. (2011), Keegan (1993)) has documented the effect of geography, especially 
roughness of terrain, on the probability of military operations in a region. If the terrain is 
rougher, it is harder to conduct military operations and use siege weapons. This is the 
reason why one would expect that regions with higher average slopes should have a 
lower probability of being subject to a conflict. Furthermore, if a region is rough, it is less 
suitable for trade and transportation infrastructure, making it a less valuable possession. 




Average terrain roughness is calculated suing GIS software. Data comes from the 
GTOPO30 project, and contains the median of terrain slopes in 30-second intervals. 
These data were made publicly available as part of the Agro-Ecological Zones system, 
developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
35
 For five of 
the countries in my sample, region maps were available, so it was possible to calculate 
average roughness of a region.
36
 Unfortunately, region maps were not available for 
Montenegro. Because of this Montenegro is not included in the IV analysis. 
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  Population density of the region, which is also correlated with the terrain roughness and might have an 
effect on levels of political trust, is part of a group of covariates that described PSU characteristics, and is 




 More precisely, county maps were available for Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine so 




The second instrumental variable is a dummy for being a coastal region. The idea that 
coastal regions are more vulnerable to attack is also well known in the literature (Iyigun 
et al. (2011), Keegan (1993)). The intuition behind this is that coastal regions are 
strategically valuable, and various empires were naturally interested in having them in 
their possession. One would expect coastal regions to have switched their foreign rulers 
more often in the past and therefore to have a higher HCI. 
The last instrument takes into account the strategic position of the region. Specifically, it 
measures the location of the region with respect to the straight line connecting the 
capitals of neighboring empires. All countries in the sample were strongly influenced by 
conflicts between the big empires that surrounded them. One could argue that this 
influence will be greater if a region is situated on the shortest path between two empire 
capitals, because this will make a region more strategically important. If a region is far 
away from the shortest route between two empire capitals, for example St. Petersburg and 
Vienna, then the region is less strategically important and thus has a lower probability of 
being affected by numerous wars and border changes between empires. Therefore, 
regions that are closer to the line connecting two empire capital cities are expected to 
have a higher HCI. This variable is constructed as a measure of the angles each PSU 
forms with the respect to the shortest line connecting two empire capitals. Construction of 
this variable is somewhat more complicated than the other two, and therefore the details 
of construction are left for Appendix B.  
Regressions using these 3 instrumental variables are performed for all 3 datasets, with 




component of the various measures of trust in political institutions. The only exception is 
Column 3, which presents the first stage of IV analysis, where HCI is the dependent 
variable. Regressions include the standard set of covariates used in the rest of the paper, 
and standard errors reflect clustering at PSU level. 
The first column presents OLS results identical to those in Table 8. The reason for 
including this column is for comparison with column 2, which represents the same OLS 
analysis but on the sample excluding Montenegro, which had to be excluded because of 
the absence of data on the terrain roughness instrument. In LiTS I and LiTS II results 
with and without Montenegro do not differ much, but when Montenegro is excluded from 
EVS 2008, HCI loses its statistical significance.  
Column 3 presents results of the first stage regression. The coefficients reported in this 
column show that the instruments have statistical power in predicting HCI. All these 
coefficients are statistically significant and have anticipated signs except for the 
roughness variable in EVS 2008. If a region is costal, then its HCI will be higher. The 
same is true if a region is less rough or has a smaller angle with respect to the line that 
connects two foreign empire capitals.  
The second stage results are shown in Column 4. In all three datasets, the IV coefficient 
on HCI is negative, and it is significant for LiTS I and LiTS II. Furthermore, in every 
specification, the IV coefficient is larger in absolute value than the OLS coefficient given 




border changes. It could suggest, for instance, that HCI has a bigger effect on political 
trust in strategically more important regions.
37
  
The results of the IV regressions obtained from LiTS I and LiTS II strongly reinforce the 
earlier results. F-test statistics and overidentification tests show support for the use of this 
set of instruments. However, this is not the case for EVS, where the overidentifying 
restrictions test rejects the exogeneity of the instruments. One possible explanation is the 
higher measurement error of the HCI variable in the EVS survey due to lower precision 
in determining an individual’s exact location. Nevertheless the coefficient on HCI in the 
second stage remains negative and larger in magnitude than OLS, as in the other datasets 
used in the paper. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 14 shows that when the main explanatory 
variable is instrumented with strictly exogenous geographical variables, the negative and 
significant effect of past border changes on current levels of political trust is preserved. 
These results confirm the hypothesis that historically more stable political borders lead to 
higher levels of current trust in political institutions. 
5.3 Placebo tests 
 This section performs various placebo tests to show that HCI is not a significant 
predictor of other social and economic outcomes, notably participation in civil actions, 
generalized trust or individual measures of uncivicness. The measures of uncivicness are 
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 It could also suggest that reverse causality, measurement error in HCI, or omitted variable bias causes 




related to individual views about morality and beliefs about what is right and wrong, not 
about relationships with political institutions. Such views and beliefs reflect very 
different aspects of culture than trust in political institutions. If the historical change 
index affected other socioeconomic variables besides political trust, for example 
measures of individual morality, this would challenge this paper’s interpretation and 
might suggest that HCI is proxying for some other underlying process. Another placebo 
test uses a measure of past conflicts instead of HCI to check if the results could be 
explained instead by a history of conflict in a particular region.  
 
5.3.1 Uncivicness and civil action 
Uncivicness measures the degree of respect an individual has for legal and social norms. 
It is usually measured by an individual’s attitude towards bribery, cheating on taxes or 
insurance, or claiming benefits that one has no right to (Algan et al. 2011). In order to 
present parsimonious results I calculate the first principal component of all answers about 
uncivicness use this as the dependent variable. Higher values of the first principal 
component mean that the individual is more uncivic. Appendix C lists the questions used. 
The results presented in Table 15 show that HCI does not have a significant effect on 
uncivicness. In other words, individuals living in the regions that changed their rulers 




5.3.2 Civil action 
Another placebo test is conducted on individual measures of potential civic participation. 
In all three surveys the following questions were asked: 
How likely are you to 
- Attend lawful demonstrations 
- Participate in strikes 
- Join a political party 
- Sign petitions 
The possible answers are 1, have done, 2, might do and 3, would never do. Because these 
answers measure the same underlying phenomenon, willingness to perform civil action, 
aggregation of the four answers is justifiable. The results using the first principal 
component as a dependent variable are presented in Table 16. The HCI coefficient is 
insignificant in all three datasets. These results show that border changes in the past do 
not affect individual willingness to participate in civil action. 
5.3.4 Past Conflicts 
It could be that HCI captures not the effect of changes in foreign rulers, but the effect of 
the battles and conflicts related to border changes. For example, if a region changed its 
rulers often, the region also must have experienced many battles in the past. Perhaps HCI 
proxies for the effect of these battles - death, destruction and plunder. To examine this 
possibility, an additional placebo test is performed – one in which the HCI variable is 




this way it is possible to see if conflicts are the driving force of the effect of HCI on 
current levels of political trust. 
Two datasets on conflicts are usually used in the literature. The first one is Correlates of 
War, which documents conflicts from the 1800s. The second one is a work in progress by 
Brecke (1999) called Conflict Catalogue, which is a compilation of annual records of all 
conflicts that occurred in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East since the 1400s.
38
 
Because of the longer time period, which coincides with the time studied in this paper, 
the Conflict Catalogue is used here.
39
 Overall, there are over 1300 conflicts in the dataset, 
and 98 of them have a location within the six countries analyzed in this paper. For every 
conflict happening in year y, the time discounting formula (3) is used, giving conflicts 
that have happened more recently a higher weight. Summing up all weighted conflicts 
that have happened in a PSU’s region for every PSU gives a new variable that reflects 
conflict intensity in a given region. That variable is called past conflicts and replaces HCI 
in the equation (4). 
 Regressions show that past conflicts cannot predict current political trust. Again the first 
principal component of various measures of political trust is used as the dependent 
variable. Results are reported in Table 17 and can be compared with Table 8, which uses 
HCI instead of past conflicts as the main explanatory variable. Table 17 presents clear 
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 Conflict Catalogue defines conflict as “An occurrence of purposive and lethal violence among 2+ social 
groups pursuing conflicting political goals that results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group 
organized under the command of authoritative leadership. The state does not have to be an actor. Data can 
include massacres of unarmed civilians or territorial conflicts between warlords.” Conflict needs to have at 
least 32 deadly casualties to be measured.  
39





evidence that the history of conflicts in the region does not affect current levels of 
political trust, nor they diminish the effect of HCI. One interpretation is that past conflicts 
themselves are not enough to have an impact on trust in political instructions, and that 
formal changes in the region’s rulers were needed for individuals today to display lower 
levels of trust in political institutions.  
6. Persistence mechanisms 
There could be several mechanisms through which this historical experience works. First, 
if a region today is part of a country different from that of 50 years ago, and was part of 
yet another country 100 years ago, then the individuals living there might have a higher 
awareness of the fact that the current institutional arrangements might be temporary. 
They would be more likely to believe that there is a positive probability that they will be 
living in another country in the future. This would reduce the credibility of current 
institutions. The expectation that no state is permanent might lead citizens to identify less 
with the current state, and hence have less trust in its political institutions.  
Second, frequent changes in borders might cause lower intergenerational transmission of 
patriotism and thus lead to lower levels of political trust. During most of the historical 
period relevant to this paper (the last 500 years) the family has been a very important 
social and educational structure. If grandparents, or even parents, did not grow up or go 
to school in the same country as their children, they cannot teach younger family 




Rose (2001) state that early life socialization is one of the key determinants of political 
trust.  
Third, when a new political identity takes over a particular region, it changes the 
administration of the region, at least at the higher levels (Putterman et al, 2003). This new 
ruling administration needs time to adjust to local circumstances, customs, and the way 
things are done in a particular region. Also it takes time for the local population to learn 
to trust the new administration. This time-consuming process could decrease trust in 
political institutions in areas where changes of administration happened more often.  
Fourth, a change of power in a region is often accompanied by a changing ethnic 
composition of the region’s inhabitants. Some people from the ethnicity of the old ruler 
of the region may leave, while others from the ethnicity of the new ruler may come. 
Examples of this include re-colonization of the border parts of the Habsburg Empire that 
were reconquered from the Turks, as well as the exodus of German and Italian-speaking 
inhabitants to their motherlands after WW II. These abrupt ethnic changes tear the 
existing social structure, as noted in Acemoglu et al. (2011), and might have adverse 
effects on social and political trust in the region.   
One of the mechanisms that can explain the persistence of the effect of historical border 
changes and can be easily and precisely qualified is the choice of names for primary 
schools in a given region. If a school is named after a significant local figure, then 
individuals in that region are primed to recognize the importance of their own region. On 
the other hand, if a school is named after an individual who is significant at the country 




primed to feel national pride. Therefore, finding that schools in regions with higher HCI 
are more likely to be named after important local individuals, as opposed to important 
country level individuals, would suggest that the region’s inhabitants identify more with 
the region and less with the country and may thus show less trust in country’s political 
institutions. 
To check for this possibility, I have analyzed primary school names in Slovenia, Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro.
40
 Table E1 in the Appendix E gives the descriptive statistics of 
school names for these four countries. If a school is named after an individual who was 
either born or died in the school’s region, then the school is said to carry a local name. If 
a school is named after an individual who was born and died in the current country, but 
not in the school’s region, then that school is said to have a country-level name. Overall, 
in my sample, 35.7% of schools have local names, 22.4% have country names, and 
41.9% have other names.
41
  
Next, Table 18 shows results of analysis of whether the frequency of border changes in 
the past affects the share of schools with local or country names in the given region. The 
unit of observation is the region and the first two columns show the effect of HCI on the 
share of schools with local (column one) and country (column two) name. Columns three 
and four repeat the same analysis, but the units of observation, the regions, are weighted 
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 Data on school names were available  at the official web pages of the ministry of education in those four 
countries.  
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 This last category also includes schools that are named after individuals for whom no information about 




by the overall number of schools in them. The last two columns add regional GDP, the 
share of national majority population and the distance to the country capital as controls.   
Table 18 presents unequivocal evidence that the number of border changes in the past has 
had an effect on school names. If a region changed its rulers more frequently, it has a 
higher share of schools with local names and a lower share of schools with country 
names. School names do not change often and the region’s inhabitants are familiar with 
the school names. Hence, school names can prime the region inhabitants to feel more or 
less favorable towards the current country political institutions. Documenting this 
persistence mechanism related to school names is one of the novelties of this paper. 
Moreover, Table E2 in the Appendix E shows robustness tests, using two additional 
definitions of local names. In the first one, used in column two, schools named after an 
individual for whom no data about place of birth and death could be found are also 
considered as local schools.
42
 In the second one, used in column three, the school is 
coded as local if it is named after an individual from another country.
43
 If a school carries 
a name of a person from another country, individuals will be less primed to identify with 
the current state. Using either definition does not affect the main result – if a region 
changed its rulers more frequently in the past, schools in it will be more likely to have 
local names. 
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  This is very reasonable assumption, if individual was so obscure that no information about his life could 
be found on the internet, then there is high probability that individual in question is just a locally known 
figure. 
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 Among the schools in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, 1.9% of schools are named after 





 Borders in Europe have been redrawn many times in history, and as a 
consequence some regions have changed the states to which they belong quite often. For 
example Alsace-Lorraine has switched between France and Germany five times in the 
last 150 years. West Ukraine changed the country it belonged to eight times in the last 
100 years. Intuitively, these changes seem likely to have an impact on how individuals 
living in those regions today perceive themselves as citizens, the levels of trust they have 
towards political institutions, and their degree of identification with the current state.  
This paper confirms this intuition using within-country variation in the number of border 
changes between different regions within same country. Using three independent data 
sets on six East European countries with rich a history of border changes, the paper 
shows that more frequent past border changes do have a negative effect on contemporary 
levels of trust in political institutions. Moreover, people who live in regions that changed 
their ruler more frequently in the past participate less in voting.  
Other findings corroborate the main idea of the paper. Individuals in regions that had 
frequent border changes identify less with the nation and more with the region or locality 
where they live. Moreover the effect of border changes is stronger for older individuals, 
as well as for individuals who lived all their life in the same place. HCI is not associated 
with other related socioeconomic outcomes like generalized trust, uncivicness and civil 




Furthermore, I discussed a possible mechanism that can explain how these past events 
may still play a significant role today. In regions that changed their rulers more 
frequently, schools today are more likely to carry a name of a locally important 
individual, and less likely to be named after an individual significant at the country level. 
Because people are familiar with the school names, this can prime them to be more aware 
of importance of their regions and thus display less trust in the current country’s political 
institutions. 
 The effect of border changes on current political trust levels is large. For example, 
a change in rulers after WWI would have the same effect on trust in government as that 
produced by a 40% decline in income. In comparison with the United Kingdom, which 
had no border changes over the sample period, this effect could potentially explain 45% 
of the difference of trust in political institutions between countries in the sample and the 
UK. The effect of HCI on political trust persists even if one controls for objective and 
subjective measures of government performance. Instrumental variable estimates where 
past border changes are instrumented with pure geographical variables additionally 




8. Tables and Graphs 
1. Tables used in the first chapter 
 
Table 1-1. Example of calculating HCI for PSUs in Transylvania 
Border change Year Length Effect of change 
Ottomans conquer north Balkans 1526 173 0.18 
End of Habsburg- Ottoman war 1699 219 0.37 
Peace treaty after WW I 1918 82 0.89 
Sum of all changes - HCI 1.46 
 
Table 1-2. Ordered probit regression of trust in various political institutions and voting 
participation in 2006 LiTS I 
 president government parliament courts parties police voting 
HCI -0.14 -0.23** -0.27** -0.23** -0.23** -0.15 -0.23** 
 (-1.38) (-2.24) (-2.58) (-2.28) (-2.41) (-1.47) (-2.18) 
life satisfaction 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.01 
(5.88) (7.92) (7.15) (6.39) (4.50) (6.52) (0.22) 
generalized trust 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.01 
(8.11) (8.14) (9.09) (7.41) (8.48) (6.35) (-0.35) 
income 0.03** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.03* 
 (1.96) (2.94) (3.63) (3.82) (3.75) (1.91) (1.95) 
relative regional 
GDP 
0.01 0.03* 0.03** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
(0.59) (1.72) (1.96) (0.69) (1.05) (0.81) (1.11) 
education FE 
super-region FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3881 3909 3908 3894 3893 3952 4050 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. The dependent variable is the answer to the question - To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions?(1) The Presidency (2) The government (3) The parliament (4) Courts (5) Political parties (6) 
The police. Values range from 1, complete distrust, to 5, complete trust. In the last column, the dependent 
variable is the binary answer to the question about voting in the last election. Variables included in the 
regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority 
dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or 





Table 1-3. Ordered probit regression of trust in various political institutions in 2010 LiTS 
II 
 president government parliament courts parties police 
HCI -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.16* -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 
 (-2.73) (-3.14) (-1.76) (-0.77) (-1.19) (-0.46) 
life satisfaction 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (9.70) (10.09) (9.43) (7.59) (7.82) (8.23) 
generalized trust 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(10.57) (9.75) (9.39) (7.57) (7.56) (7.39) 
income 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 
 (6.28) (7.43) (7.23) (4.97) (6.54) (3.46) 
relative regional 
GDP 
0.22 -0.05 0.09 0.21 0.19 0.06 
(1.25) (-0.29) (0.42) (0.98) (1.10) (0.32) 
super-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6885 6918 6890 6818 6850 6924 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Columns show the answers to the question - To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions? (1) The Presidency, (2) The government, (3) The parliament, (4) Courts, (5) Political parties, 
(6) The police. Values range from 1, complete distrust, to 5, complete trust. Variables included in the 
regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority 
dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or 





























Table 1-4. Ordered probit regression of trust in various political institutions in 2010 LiTS 
II, only non-movers 
 president government parliament courts parties police 
HCI -0.31*** -0.42*** -0.22** -0.03 -0.18* -0.09 
 (-3.21) (-3.97) (-2.00) (-0.35) (-1.84) (-0.95) 
life satisfaction 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 
 (9.51) (8.80) (8.86) (7.09) (6.80) (7.18) 
generalized trust 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(9.28) (7.95) (8.94) (6.90) (6.17) (5.61) 
income 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 
 (5.60) (7.58) (5.63) (4.19) (6.33) (2.67) 
relative regional 
GDP 
0.18 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.27 0.06 
(0.96) (0.21) (0.47) (0.93) (1.59) (0.35) 
super-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4242 4250 4237 4207 4209 4264 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are 
clustered at PSU level. Columns show the answers to the question - To what extent do you trust 
the following institutions? (1) The Presidency, (2) The government, (3) The parliament, (4) 
Courts, (5) Political parties, (6) The police. Values range from 1, complete distrust to 5, complete 
trust. Sample is limited to individuals who never moved. Variables included in the regression but 
omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, 
empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or 
rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and population 





Table 1-5. Ordered probit regression of trust in various political institutions in 2010 LiTS 
II, only individuals who moved 
 president government parliament courts parties police 
HCI -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.56) (-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.40) (0.79) (0.67) 
life satisfaction 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (5.20) (6.49) (5.74) (5.47) (4.98) (4.92) 
generalized trust 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
(7.19) (7.16) (6.34) (4.82) (6.03) (6.82) 
income 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05** 
 (3.61) (3.01) (5.71) (3.30) (3.51) (2.53) 
relative regional 
GDP 
0.27 -0.24 0.09 0.18 -0.14 0.09 
(1.14) (-1.01) (0.35) (0.68) (-0.62) (0.37) 
super-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2605 2631 2617 2580 2608 2626 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Columns show the answers to the question - To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions? (1) The Presidency, (2) The government, (3) The parliament, (4) Courts, (5) Political parties, 
(6) The police. Values range from 1, complete distrust to 5, complete trust. Sample is limited to individuals 
who never moved. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age 
squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the 
capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU 
district and its square and population density in PSU 
 
Table 1-6. Ordered probit regression of confidence in various political institutions in 
2008 EVS 
 government parliament justice 
system 
parties police civil 
service 
HCI -0.18 -0.16** -0.16** -0.01 -0.13* -0.19 
 (-1.34) (-2.27) (-2.03) (-0.08) (-1.85) (-1.38) 
life 
satisfaction 
0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.03*** 
(3.80) (2.73) (5.18) (1.15) (5.65) (3.49) 
generalized 
trust 
0.15*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.11** 0.16*** 
(2.74) (4.19) (3.92) (3.94) (2.31) (3.31) 
income 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
 (1.02) (0.68) (-0.21) (1.58) (0.39) (0.07) 
relative 
regional GDP 
0.24 0.14 0.25 0.08 0.22 0.04 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4961 5012 5002 4987 5075 4931 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Columns 1-6: Q- How much confidence do you have in the following institutions (1) 




ranges from 1, not at all, to 4, a great deal. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: 
gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights,  PSU relative 
distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic 
majority in the PSU district and its square and population density in PSU. 
 
Table 1-7. Identification with geographical groups in 2008 EVS  




HCI 0.24*** -0.23*** -0.03 
 (3.13) (-3.45) (-0.32) 
life satisfaction -0.01 0.02** -0.00 
 (-1.18) (2.16) (-0.33) 
generalized trust -0.07 0.03 0.05 
 (-1.36) (0.61) (0.68) 
income -0.08*** 0.07** 0.01 
 (-2.58) (2.25) (0.26) 
relative regional 
GDP 
-0.14 0.26 -0.24 
(-0.69) (1.46) (-0.86) 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 
super-region FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5157 5157 5157 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. 
Analysis is done using probit regression. Columns 1-3 are different answers to the question: Which of these 
geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? (1) Locality or town where you live or region 
of country where you live (2) Country (3) Europe or the world as a whole. Variables included in the 
regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority 
dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or 
rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and population density in 
PSU. 
 
Table 1-8. Summary of results using first principal component as a dependent variable 
 LiTS 2006 EVS 2008 LiTS 2010 
HCI -0.42** -0.41** -0.46*** 
 (-2.23) (-2.38) (-3.04) 
life satisfaction 0.28*** 0.07*** 0.41*** 
(8.20) (4.43) (10.16) 
generalized trust 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.28*** 
(9.80) (4.04) (9.40) 
income 0.07*** 0.02 0.17*** 
 (3.03) (0.47) (6.35) 
relative regional GDP 0.24 0.37 0.33 
(1.26) (1.18) (1.02) 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 




Observations 3909 4669 3944 
R
2
 0.201 0.181 0.314 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Dependent variable is the first principal component of trust in different political institutions. 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment 
status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, 
dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square 






Table 1-9. Splitting the sample into young and old individuals, where are 50 is taken as 
the threshold 
   2006 LiTS I 2008 EVS  2010 LiTS II 
 young old  young old  young old 
HCI  -0.37 -0.50** -0.29 -0.52*** -0.40** -0.47** 
  (-1.58) (-2.40) (-1.42) (-3.09) (-2.02) (-2.54) 
life satisfaction  0.22*** 0.35*** 0.08*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.11*** 
  (5.57) (6.20) (3.87) (2.38) (5.67) (3.80) 
generalized trust  0.31*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 
 (7.81) (6.92) (2.95) (3.20) (7.10) (7.98) 
income  0.10*** 0.04 -0.03 0.10* 0.22*** 0.16*** 
  (3.29) (1.23) (-0.75) (1.78) (6.28) (4.40) 
relative regional 
GDP 
 0.28 0.23 0.40 0.31 0.60* -0.04 
 (1.35) (0.96) (1.18) (0.95) (1.96) (-0.09) 
super-region FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
education FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2352 1557 2815 1854 2564 1448 
R
2
  0.200 0.203 0.179 0.184 0.314 0.315 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Dependent variable is the first principal component of trust in different political institutions. 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment 
status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, 
dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square 





Table 1-10.  Average trust in parliament on country level   
Country Average HCI 
Average trust in 
parliament 
Average trust in parliament if 
country had no border 
changes 
Slovenia 1.15 2.28 2.46 




Serbia 1.15 2.09 2.27 
Montenegro 1.13 3.05 3.23 
Romania 1.14 1.64 1.82 
Ukraine 1.01 2.20 2.36 
Great Britain 0 2.44 2.44 





Table 1-11.  Government performance and political trust in 2010 LiTS II 
  political trust  political trust political trust 
HCI -0.46*** -0.41*** -0.46*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.35) (-3.64) 
pc political performance  0.61***  
  (18.50)  
average pc political performance 
by others in same PSU 
  0.61*** 
  (7.56) 
life satisfaction 0.41*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 
 (10.16) (8.15) (9.26) 
generalized trust 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 
 (9.40) (7.61) (7.81) 
income 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (6.35) (6.30) (6.17) 
super region FE Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3944 3625 3625 
R
2
 0.314 0.432 0.346 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. The political performance variable is an aggregate rating of local and national governments. 
Ratings range from 1, very bad, to 5, very good. Dependent variable is the first principal component of trust 
in different political institutions. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, 
age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, relative PSU GDP, PSU 
relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s 






Table 1-12. Government performance and political trust in 2006 LiTS I 
  political  trust political  trust political  trust 
HCI -0.42** -0.36** -0.31* 
 (-2.23) (-2.19) (-1.83) 
pc political performance  0.48***  
  (12.58)  
pc political performance - 
others in same PSU 
  0.56*** 
  (5.25) 
life satisfaction 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.25*** 
 (8.20) (5.03) (7.13) 
generalized trust 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 
 (9.80) (8.10) (9.25) 
income 0.07*** -0.03 -0.02 
 (3.03) (-1.65) (-1.33) 
super region FE Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3652 3338 3338 
R
2
 0.200 0.275 0.228 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. 
The dependent variable is the first principal component analysis of  trust in various political institutions. 
The measure of political performance is the result of a principal component analysis based on answers to 
the questions of how much individuals agree with the following statements:(1) The political situation in the 
country is better today than it was in 1989 (2) There is less corruption now than there was around 1989 (3) 
To what extent do you agree that  law and order is important for your country? Variables included in the 
regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority 
dummy, empire weights, relative PSU GDP, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy 
if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and 





Table 1-13. Government performance and political trust in 2008 EVS 
 political  trust political  trust political  trust 
HCI -0.41** -0.32** -0.34** 
 (-2.38) (-2.32) (-2.25) 
pc political performance  0.29***  
  (13.91)  
pc political performance - 
others in same PSU 
  0.22* 
  (1.94) 
life satisfaction 0.07*** 0.03** 0.07*** 
 (4.43) (2.08) (4.10) 
generalized trust 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 
 (4.04) (3.99) (4.10) 
income 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.47) (0.54) (0.87) 
relative regional GDP 0.37 0.32 0.35 
 (1.18) (1.11) (1.17) 
super-regional FE Yes Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4669 4536 4536 
R
2
 0.181 0.286 0.186 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level.  
The dependent variable is the first principal component analysis of trust in various political institutions. 
The measure of political performance is how much does the individual agree with the following statement: 
People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well 
things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good. Variables included in the regression but omitted 
from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, 
PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of 




Table 1-14. Results of IV analysis 
with Montenegro without Montenegro 











  stage) 
HCI -0.42** -0.49**  -0.82** 
 (-2.23) (-2.59)  (-2.03) 
Coast   0.63***  
   (3.92)  
Rough   -0.05***  
   (-2.87)  
Angle   -0.13**  
   (-2.51)  
Observations 3909 3278 3278 3278 
R
2
 0.201 0.179 0.873 0.177 
F- statistic   13.8 
0.163 
 
p-value for overidentification test 
with Montenegro without  Montenegro 











  stage) 
HCI -0.46*** -0.51***  -0.65* 
 (-3.04) (-2.99)  (-1.80) 
Coast   0.64***  
   (3.94)  
Rough   -0.04*  
   (-1.91)  
Angle   -0.14**  
   (-2.46)  
Observations 3909 3278 3278 3278 
R
2
 0.201 0.179 0.873 0.177 
F- statistic   7.7 
0.121 
 
 p-value for overidentification test 
with Montenegro without Montenegro 











  stage) 
HCI -0.41** -0.25  -0.55 
 (-2.38) (-1.31)  (-1.14) 
Coast   0.42***  
   (2.67)  
Rough   0.06*  
   (1.79)  
Angle   -0.19**  
   (-2.49)  
Observations 4669 3895 3895 3895 
R
2
 0.181 0.169 0.863 0.169 
F- statistic   4.8 
0.000 
 




t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at PSU level. First two 
columns are result of OLS regression, while the last two are done with 2SLS. Variables included in the regression but omitted 
from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, PSU GDP p/c, PSU 
relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the 
PSU district and its square and population density in PSU. 
 
Table 1-15. First principal component of uncivicness as the dependent variable 
 LiTS 2006 EVS 2008 LiTS 2010 
HCI 0.46 0.12 0.15 
 (1.40) (0.74) (0.55) 
life satisfaction 0.02 -0.02* -0.01 
(0.56) (-1.66) (-0.22) 
generalized trust -0.07** -0.02 -0.02 
(-2.41) (-0.24) (-0.68) 
Income 0.03 0.07* 0.03 
 (0.89) (1.92) (1.24) 
relative regional GDP 0.03 0.23 0.21 
(0.93) (0.88) (0.57) 
education FE 
super region dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4308 4779 3883 
R
2
 0.179 0.141 0.095 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Depended variable is principal component of various measures of uncivicness. In all regressions 
standard errors are clustered at PSU level. Depended variable is principal component of trust in different 
political institutions. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age 
squared, employment status, religion, minority dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the 
capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU 
district and its square and population density in PSU. 
 
Table 1-16. First principal component of civil action as the dependent variable 
 LiTS 2006 EVS 2008 LiTS 2010 
HCI 0.12 0.16 -0.04 
 (0.81) (1.06) (-0.36) 
life satisfaction 0.04 0.02* 0.04 
(1.43) (1.98) (1.29) 
generalized trust -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
(-0.59) (-0.82) (-0.95) 
income 0.00 -0.09** -0.01 
 (0.08) (-2.44) (-0.64) 
relative regional GDP 0.01 -0.03 0.45 
(0.07) (-0.14) (1.61) 
education FE Yes Yes Yes 
super region FE Yes Yes Yes 






 0.158 0.243 0.203 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Depended variable is principal component of various measures of civil action. t statistics in 
parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at PSU level. 
Depended variable is principal component of trust in different political institutions. Variables included in 
the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, minority 
dummy, empire weights, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is urban or 
rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and population density in 
PSU. 
  Table 1-17.Placebo test with past conflicts instead HCI as the main explanatory variable     
 LiTS 2006 LiTS 2006 EVS 2008 EVS 2008 LiTS 2010 LiTS 2010 
past conflicts -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.21 -0.09 -0.11 
 (-0.34) (-0.17) (-0.86) (-0.72) (-0.48) (-0.61) 
HCI  -0.42**  -0.40**  -0.47*** 
  (-2.25)  (-2.15)  (-3.05) 
life satisfaction 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
(8.20) (8.21) (4.29) (4.31) (10.09) (10.13) 
generalized trust 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
(9.88) (9.80) (4.05) (4.04) (9.21) (9.39) 
income 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.00 -0.00 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (3.07) (3.05) (-0.11) (-0.15) (6.23) (6.34) 
relative regional 
GDP 
0.03 0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.23 0.31 
(0.83) (1.21) (-0.14) (-0.15) (0.66) (0.95) 
education FE 
super region FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3909 3909 4669 4669 3944 3944 
R
2
 0.199 0.201 0.180 0.181 0.312 0.315 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
PSU level. Depended variable is principal component of trust in different political institutions. Variables 
included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, 
minority dummy, empire weights, PSU GDP p/c, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, 
dummy if PSU is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and 






Table 1-18. Names of schools in a region and a region’s HCI 
























(weighted by # 
of schools) 
HCI 0.09** -0.04 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.13*** -0.05*** 
(2.18) (-1.54) (3.02) (-3.10) (3.77) (-3.25) 
distance 
from capital 
    -0.15*** 0.02 
    (-3.12) (0.47) 
regional 
GDP 
    -0.05 -0.03 




    0.00*** -0.00 
    (3.76) (-0.34) 
country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R
2
 0.190 0.771 0.164 0.807 0.354 0.813 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Unit of observation is a region. If a school has been named after an individual who has been born or 
died in the school’s region then the school is coded to carry a local name. If a school has been named after an individual who has been born or died in the current 
country, but not in the school’s region, that the school is coded to have a country level name. In the last four columns units of observation are weighted by the 







Figure A1 Different discount rates used in calculating time discount 
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Table 1-19 Different ways of calculating HCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2006 LiTS I 
HCI 0. 6%, linear -0.57*      
 (-1.91)      
HCI 0.6%, concave   -0.53**     
  (-2.54)     
HCI 0.4%, linear   -0.42    
   (-1.62)    
HCI 0.4%, concave     -0.42**   
    (-2.23)   
HCI 0.2%, linear     -0.25  
     (-1.26)  
HCI 0.2%, concave       -0.29* 
      (-1.78) 
Observations 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 
R
2
 0.200 0.201 0.200 0.201 0.199 0.200 
2008 EVS 
HCI 0. 6%, linear -0.68**      
 (-2.22)      
HCI 0.6%, concave   -0.44**     
  (-2.13)     
HCI 0.4%, linear   -0.56**    
   (-2.11)    
HCI 0.4%, concave     -0.41**   
    (-2.38)   
HCI 0.2%, linear     -0.32  
     (-1.64)  
HCI 0.2%, concave       -0.25* 
      (-1.67) 
Observations 4669 4669 4669 4669 4669 4669 
R
2
 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.180 0.180 
2010 LiTS II 
HCI 0. 6%, linear -0.69***      
 (-2.78)      
HCI 0.6%, concave   -0.52***     
  (-2.92)     
HCI 0.4%, linear   -0.60***    
   (-2.90)    
HCI 0.4%, concave     -0.46***   
    (-3.04)   
HCI 0.2%, linear     -0.43***  
     (-2.83)  
HCI 0.2%, concave       -0.37*** 
      (-3.13) 
Observations 3944 3944 3944 3944 3944 3944 
R
2




t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at PSU level. 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, 
minority dummy, empire weights, PSU GDP p/c, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU 
is urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU  and its square and population density in PSU. 
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Table 1-20. Different ways of calculating HCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2006 LiTS I 
HCI concave, linear -0.18      
 (-1.07)      
HCI concave, concave   -0.21     
  (-1.54)     
HCI linear, linear   -0.31    
   (-1.36)    
HCI linear, concave     -0.32*   
    (-1.91)   
HCI convex, linear     -0.42  
     (-1.62)  
HCI convex, concave       -0.42** 
      (-2.23) 
Observations 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 
R
2
 0.199 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.201 
EVS 2008 
HCI concave, linear -0.26*      
 (-1.66)      
HCI concave, concave   -0.21*     
  (-1.68)     
HCI linear, linear   -0.47**    
   (-2.22)    
HCI linear, concave     -0.33**   
    (-2.12)   
HCI convex, linear     -0.56**  
     (-2.11)  
HCI convex, concave       -0.41** 
      (-2.38) 
Observations 4669 4669 4669 4669 4669 4669 
R
2
 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 
LiTS 2010 
HCI concave, linear -0.34***      
 (-2.69)      
HCI concave, concave   -0.30***     
  (-3.09)     
HCI linear, linear   -0.48***    
   (-2.87)    
HCI linear, concave     -0.39***   
    (-3.09)   
HCI convex, linear     -0.60***  
     (-2.90)  
HCI convex, concave       -0.46*** 
      (-3.04) 
Observations 3944 3944 3944 3944 3944 3944 
R
2
 0.313 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at PSU level. 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: gender, age, age squared, employment status, religion, 
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minority dummy, empire weights, PSU GDP p/c, PSU relative distance from the capital and its square, dummy if PSU is 
urban or rural, percentage of country’s ethnic majority in the PSU district and its square and population density in PSU. 
 










































Slovenia 450 138 19 
Croatia 1145 342 161 
Montenegro 208 115 11 
Serbia 1219 486 487 
 
 
Table 1-22. Robustness tests for region’s school names and Historical Change Index 
(HCI)  
 share of schools 
with local name 
(weighted by # of 
schools) 
share of schools 
with local name 
(weighted by # of 
schools) 
share of schools 
with local name 
(weighted by # 
of schools) 
share of schools 
with local name 
(weighted by # 
of schools) 
HCI 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 
 (3.90) (3.03) (3.89) (4.26) 
distance from 
capital 
   -0.15*** 
    (-3.16) 
regional GDP    -0.06** 




   0.00** 
    (2.07) 
country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R
2
 0.193 0.371 0.613 0.676 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0.1Unit of observation is a region. If a school has 
been named after an individual who has been born or died in the school’s region then the school is coded to 
carry a local name. In second column this definition is expanded to include schools named after individuals 
for whom no information on the place of birth or death could be found. In the last two columns schools 
named after individuals from another country is are also included into set of local schools. Data source are 









Capter 2: The Costs of Adapting to a New Cultural Environment: 
Examining Immigrants’ Outcomes 
The nail that sticks out gets hammered – Japanese proverb 
The squeaky wheel gets the grease – American proverb 
 
1. Introduction 
The cultural environment in a given society, comprised of social norms, beliefs and 
values, is one of the determinants of how individuals interact with each other (Rapport 
and Overing, 2013). But what would be the consequences if social norms, beliefs and 
values suddenly changed? How would individuals function in this changed cultural 
environment? Even though cultural environments change very slowly (Roland 2004), for 
one important subset of the population change is almost instantaneous. When migrants 
move to a new country, they change their cultural environment. As the two proverbs in 
the epigram might suggest, a Japanese worker who moved to the United States could find 
herself in a culture that is more individualistic than the one in which she grew up. 
Adapting to a different cultural environment represents a cost for individuals and might 
affect an immigrant’s labor market success in the host country. Furthermore, new and 
less familiar cultural environments could also affect an individual’s social outcomes.  
Using variation in the distance between the cultural environments of immigrants’ birth 
and host countries, I estimate the economic and social effects of changing cultural 
environment. Although the fact that culture plays an important role in economic 
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outcomes has been well established in the literature (see for example Putnam, 2001, 
Guiso et al., 2008, and Guiso et al., 2009), there is an absence of work on what happens 
when the cultural environment changes and on quantifying the economic and social 
losses individuals face from such changes. Establishing the large cost of a change in 
cultural environment and quantifying it is the contribution of this paper.  
The main finding is that changes in cultural environment matter a great deal: they have 
substantial economic and social consequences. My results are confirmed on the 
individual level using both European and US data. The bigger the distance between the 
cultural environment in which an immigrant was born and initially socialized and the 
cultural environment in which she currently lives, the bigger the loss of economic and 
social welfare. For example, in the US an increase of one standard deviation in the 
cultural distance between an immigrant’s birth country and the US decreases an 
immigrant’s expected weekly earnings by 7.2% and increases the probability of being 
unemployed by 8.8%. This would translate into 10% higher wages for a Swiss immigrant 
compared with exactly the same French immigrant in the US, given that Switzerland is 
1.3 standard deviations culturally closer to the US than France. In addition, immigrants 
experiencing a bigger change in cultural environment are more likely to be involved in 
crime. They are also less interested in host country politics, show less trust in host 
country political and legal institutions, have worse health outcomes, and are less fluent in 
the host country language than immigrants from backgrounds culturally more similar to 
the host country. 
I define cultural environment as aggregate country-level culture. The distance in cultural 
environment between an immigrant's birth and host countries is measured using 
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Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimension measures. Hofstede measured the culture of 82 
countries on four different dimensions – individualism, power distance, masculinity and 
risk aversion.
44
 Following standard procedures in the literature (as in Tadesse and White, 
2009, Dodd et al. 2012, Aggarwal et al., 2012, Siegel et al., 2008, Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 
2010, Anderson et al., 2011, Ahern et al., 2012) I construct measures of cultural distance 
between two countries as the Euclidean distance in four-dimensional cultural space.
45
  
The hypothesis tested in this paper implies the following five heterogeneous effects. First, 
the more time an immigrant spends in the host country, the more adapted she becomes to 
the host country cultural environment. Therefore, the effect of cultural distance should be 
strongest in the first years after arrival in the host country. Second, if the immigrant has 
spent more years in her birth country, she has had a longer exposure to that cultural 
environment. Therefore the effect of cultural distance should be stronger for immigrants 
who were older when arriving in the host country. Third, because the effect of cultural 
distance should matter more for workers who perform creative, non-repetitive and non-
manual tasks, the effect of cultural distance should be larger for more educated 
immigrants. Fourth, if an immigrant's birth country is more globalized, then she should 
have had more exposure to other cultures before she emigrated. Hence, the effect of 
cultural distance should be smaller for immigrants coming from more globalized 
courtiers. The last expected heterogeneous effect is that cultural distance should be less 
important for the second generation of immigrants. All five heterogeneous effects are 
                                                 
44
 I use other measures of cultural distance between countries as a robustness test, without significant 
change in the main findings. This is described in more detail in section 3.3.2  
45
Throughout this paper cultural distance will be used as shorthand for the distance in cultural environment 






economically and statistically significant in the data, yielding univocal support for the 
paper’s main thesis.  
Another important finding of the paper is that there is no “superior” cultural environment 
to be raised in. There are no generally optimal levels of individualism, power distance, 
masculinity or risk aversion that give the best labor market outcome. The effect of 
specific cultural dimensions by themselves is neither positive nor negative. Rather, what 
matters for an immigrant’s job market and social outcomes is the match in cultural 
environments between host and birth countries. 
Immigrants do not represent a random sample and to generalize from immigrants to the 
population in general I have to address issues related to potential self selection. In 
particular, unobservable factors affecting an individual's decision to emigrate might be 
related to cultural distance. I show that under very realistic conditions this will lead to 
underestimation of the effect of a change in cultural environment. This is confirmed by 
applying Heckman's selection procedure to the data. A second potential bias is related to 
the process of choosing a particular host country to settle in. I address this in two separate 
ways. First, I use Dahl’s (2002) method for correction of selection bias in polychotomous 
models. Second, I use a quasi-natural experiment and examine only the subset of 
immigrants who emigrated during war times, when the decision on the destination of 
those fleeing their countries would have been dominated by political factors and reflect 
subtle economic calculations much less. Both procedures give consistent results, 
confirming that the results for immigrants are generalizable to the populations as a whole.  
Using several US Censuses allows analysis of the evolution of the effect of cultural 
distance over time. One possibility is that the effect is decreasing: due to globalization 
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people are more aware and more equipped to deal with different cultures. On the other 
hand the effect might be increasing due to changes in the structure of the US economy 
with a decline in manufacturing jobs and growth in the importance of the soft skills in the 
workplace (Buhler, 2001). I show that the second interpretation dominates: the effect is 
increasing over time. I also confirm this finding using data on Canadian immigrants. 
I use both European and US microdata on immigrant men. Five waves of the European 
Social Survey (2002-2010) together with the 2008 European Values Survey provide data 
on 28 host countries with immigrants from 75 birth countries. This allows the use of host 
and birth country fixed effects. In this way, the specifics of each birth and host country 
are taken into account and the variation that identifies the effect of cultural distance 
comes from a specific pair of immigrant host and birth countries. Furthermore, analysis 
using the larger US 2000 Census yields the same conclusions as the European dataset, 
supporting the main hypothesis that distance in cultural environments does play a role in 
immigrants’ socioeconomic outcomes. 
 As an interesting robustness test I also check if there is an effect of cultural 
distance on native workers in the US. I exploit the fact that the US is culturally a very 
heterogonous country with significant differences in culture between its regions. Thus, 
when US born workers move to another region, they also change their cultural 
environment. I find a negative and significant effect of this change on the labor outcomes 
of US born workers; however, the magnitude of effect is just 20% of the magnitude that 
immigrants face. 
It is accepted in the economic literature that culture matters, that social norms, beliefs and 
values play a significant role in determining socioeconomic outcomes. Many studies have 
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examined how culture affects economic outcomes. Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam 
(2001) and Guiso et al. (2008), among others, examine the effect of social capital on 
economic performance. Grief (1994, 2006) models individualistic versus collectivistic 
beliefs and their effect on contracts, social structure and trade expansion in the medieval 
Mediterranean. Guiso et al. (2009) show that trust between nations and explain trade 
patterns. Barro and McCleary (2003) report on connections between religious beliefs and 
the economic growth of countries. Economic growth is studied in Gorodnichenko and 
Roland (2010), who show that individualism is the most important cultural trait that 
drives differences in growth across societies. This paper takes an additional step by 
showing not only that culture matters, but also that a change in cultural environment has 
important economic and social consequences, and documents the costs associated with 
adaptation to a new culture.  
My paper connects this growing literature on the interplay between economics and 
culture with the voluminous literature on the labor market performance of immigrants. It 
contributes to the literature on immigrant labor market outcomes by examining a new 
determinant – the cultural distance between birth and host countries. The literature has 
identified time spent in the host country (Borjas, 1989, Card, 1993), local networks 
including marriages with natives (Edin et al., 2003, Furtadoa and Theodoropoulos, 2005, 
Beaman, 2010, Dustmann et al., 2011), and quality of birth country human capital 
(Chiswick, 1978, 1979; Mincer and Ofek, 1982 Borjas, 1992) as some of the main 
determinants of immigrant labor market outcomes.  This paper adds the important effect 
of cultural distance. 
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The analysis presented here is complementary to work in the business economics 
literature, for example by Shin et al. (2006) and Van Vianen et al. (2005) which examine 
expatriates’ adaptation to a new host country, but using a small and self-selected sample. 
It is also related to the works by Constant et al. (2006), Manning and Roy (2010), and 
Casey and Dustmann (2010) in the economics literature. Those papers examine the effect 
of an immigrant's identity – an immigrant’s level of identification with the birth country 
and the host country. Casey and Dustmann (2010) find no correlation between an 
immigrant's identity and earnings in Germany. In contrast, I focus on the difference in the 
cultural environment in which immigrants are brought up and the cultural environment in 
which they currently live.  
My paper moves beyond these disparate literatures by documenting the significant and 
large costs of a changing cultural environment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first study that provides quantitative estimates of the cost of a change in cultural 
environment in terms of lower wages, higher unemployment, fewer weeks worked, and 
lower social outcomes. Given the attention paid to selection problems in the paper, its 
results on the effects of cultural change are generalizable to whole populations, rather 
than being specific to immigrants. Moreover, the effect survives numerous robustness 
tests and usage of different measures of cultural distance.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
estimation strategy as well as the different approaches to address immigrants’ self 
selection. In Section 3 the main results regarding immigrant labor market outcomes are 
shown, together with numerous robustness tests. The effect of cultural distance on 
immigrant social outcomes is presented in Section 4. Section 5 documents how the effect 
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of cultural distance evolved over time, how it depends on the number of birth country 
immigrants in the host country, and whether there is a single “superior” culture. Section 6 
concludes.   
2. Data, Estimation strategy, Selection Issues and Cultural Distance 
This section describes the datasets used in the paper, details the estimation strategy and 
discusses the potential self-selection of migrants. It concludes with a description of 
Hofstede’s cultural measures and how the central independent variable – distance in 
cultural environment between an immigrant’s birth and host countries - is constructed.  
2.1 Data and basic estimation strategy 
My European dataset uses five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, and the European Value Survey (EVS) of 2008.
 
These 
surveys have data on 28 host European countries with immigrants from 75 birth 
countries. In addition to country of origin, the surveys include information on timing of 
immigration, as well as standard socio-demographic variables. First, I estimate the 
following basic equation on the sample of European immigrant men aged 16-65 who 
participate in the labor force:
 
 
                           
                                                                              
  
The observations in Equation (1a) are at the individual level for immigrant i, coming 
from birth country b, and living in host country h. The main dependent variable is the 
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immigrant’s household income, specifically immigrant i's placement in one of ten income 
brackets (this being the nature of the survey question).
46
 The independent variable of 
interest is the distance in cultural environments between host country h and birth country 
b, which is described in more detail in section 2.3. Finding a negative sign on the cultural 
distance coefficient would imply that a larger cultural distance between host and birth 
countries leads to a lower household income. Other dependent variables used are various 
immigrant social outcomes--immigrant crime rates, health outcomes, interest in host 
county politics, trust in host country political and legal instructions and command of host 
country language. Those additional social outcomes help to draw a more complete picture 
of the cost of adapting to new cultural environments.  
The vector of individual controls, Xi, includes the immigrant’s education, potential labor 
market experience, years since immigration, marital status and dummies for living in a 
rural, urban or metropolitan area. It also includes a dummy variable for education 
received in the host country, as labor markets may value differently schooling obtained in 
the birth country versus schooling obtained in the host country (Friedberg, 2000). Local 
unemployment is also included, measured at the NUTS-III level (European regions with 
approximately 0.5 - 1 million inhabitants).
47
 Additionally, when the dependent variable is 
the immigrant’s household income I include the number of household members and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the spouse is employed. As stated before, the sample 
                                                 
46
 Ordered probit can be used as a regression method. However, there is no significant difference between 
the results obtained with OLS and ordered probit. I report OLS regression results because of the easier 
interpretation of the coefficients. 
47
 Regional unemployment numbers are obtained from the Eurostat database. 
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is limited to immigrant men aged 16-65 who participate in the labor market. With this 
restriction, my European sample consists of approximately 3600 immigrants.
48
    
The variable countrymen shareb,h  gives the percentage of the population of host country 
h that are nationals of birth country b.
49
 This variable is included to account for potential 
network effects that can arise when a migrant moves to a host country that already has a 
significant population of immigrants from the same country (Fredriksson and Åslund, 
2003, and Beaman, 2012). 
 I include birth (δb) and host country (δh) fixed effects (FE) in order to control for specific 
factors related to each country in the sample. In this way the identifying variation comes 
from a specific pair of countries and does not depend on any individual country 
characteristics.  
In order to increase the generality of my empirical work, I also analyze the 5% sample of 
the US 2000 Census in a separate regression.
50
 My US 2000 Census sample consists of 
360,000 male immigrants aged 16-65 who participated in the labor force.
51
 Because each 
birth country has only one cultural distance –from the US-- it is not possible to use birth 
country dummies due to perfect colinearity. Instead, birth country levels of GDP per 
capita and Human Development Index (HDI) are used as proxies for the quality of human 
capital in the birth country, a standard procedure in the literature (Borjas, 1989). An 
                                                 
48
 Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix B give the descriptive statistics for the most important variables in 
both the European and the US data set.  
49
 World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database was used as a datasource. 
50
 The US census contains information on the exact annual earnings, which is the main dependent variable. 
This allows me to get more precise estimates of the cost of changing cultural environment than I could get 
based on the European data. Differences in the dependent variable, as well as some minor differences in the 
set of covariates prevent combining the US and European data into one, so separate regressions will be run 
for each dataset.  
51
 My main results remain unchanged when I control for the selection into labor force using Heckman 
procedure and the number of children as an exclusion variable 
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additional way to address this issue is to add birth country-group dummies, e.g. Anglo-
Saxon, West European, East European, African, Asian, Latin or Caribbean groups of 
countries. In this way the indentifying variation comes from comparing immigrants with 
other immigrants from the same country group, thus ensuring a more precise comparison 
and increasing the credibility of the results. As substitutes for host country dummies I add 
Metropolitan Standard Area (MSA) fixed effects. Therefore, the basic equation estimated 




                                                        
                              
                                               
  2.2 Immigrant self-selection 
There are two possible self-selection biases that my estimation strategy has to take into 
account to produce consistent estimates of the effect of cultural distance for the general 
population. The first is selection into emigration and the second selection of a host 
country.  
2.2.1 Selection into emigration 
The potential bias related to selection into migration is due to the fact that observed 
migrants do not represent a random sample of citizens of their birth countries. This would 
not present a problem if this paper were interested only in the immigrant population. 
                                                 
52
 Countrymen share is taken at the PUMA level. PUMA is a statistical geographical unit smaller then MAS 
and has between 100,000-200,000 inhabitants. Additionally, to control for the strength of immigrant’s 
countrymen community, their average time since immigration is also accounted, without much effect on the 
cultural distance coefficient.  
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However to be able to draw broader lessons of the effect on the general population, I 
have to account for self-selection into migration. The probability of emigration for 
individual i born in country b can be written as: 
 
                    
                                                                         
where vector Xi,b stands for the usual set of observed individual socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
 If individuals self select into emigration based on some observable there is no problem 
for my estimation strategy. However, if selection into emigration is based on some 
unobservable characteristic that is also correlated with distance between host and birth 
country this might lead to inconsistency. Unobserved individual culture is a variable with 
those characteristics. It is reasonable to assume that self-selected emigrants will be more 
open to accepting and adapting to a new cultural environment and/or they feel more 
culturally distant from the birth culture and closer to another culture then the average 
citizen (Colier 2013). Both these effects would cause downward bias in the estimate of 
the effect of the cultural distance in Equation 1a. To be able to remove this kind of bias 
one has to observe both individuals who choose to emigrate as well as those who decided 
to stay in the specific birth country.  My data allows me to do this just for immigrants 
whose birth countries are included in the EVS and ESS.  Moreover, because this 
procedure entails restricting my data to the smaller sample of emigrants from European 
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OECD countries, I will use this procedure only as a robustness test in Section 3.3.5
53
 
Using Heckman's procedure to account for selection into emigration with parents' 
education as the exclusion variable, as in Bartram (2013), I show that accounting for 
selection into emigration removes downward bias. This is discussed further in Section 
3.3.3.  
2.2.2. Selection into a specific host country  
A second potential bias is related to the fact that an individual who has already decided to 
emigrate faces a choice between many different host countries. An assumption needed to 
estimate consistently the effect of cultural distance on the general immigrant population 
is that cultural distance does not play a role in a migrants’ choice of future host country 
conditional on other factors accounted for by equation 1a.  Bias would arise if an 
immigrant’s choice of host country is related to unobservables correlated with the cultural 
distance. 
The immigration literature has identified size of diasporas in host countries (Beine et al., 
2011, and Grogger and Hanson, 2011), difference in income inequality between host and 
birth countries (Borjas, 1989) and difference in after tax earnings between host and birth 
countries (Grogger and Hanson, 2011, Borjas, 1989, and Belot and Hatton, 2012) as some 
of the main factors that influence an immigrant’s choice of destination. Even though all 
those factors are accounted for in my estimations, it might still be the case that the 
decision to which specific host country to migrate is potentially related to distance in 
                                                 
53
  Immigrants for whom both born and host country are included in the EVS make up approximately 55% 
of my European sample. 
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cultural environments and therefore cause bias.
54
 To control for this possibility I will use 
two separate approaches - using a correction function and using a quasi natural 
experiment by limiting the sample to immigrants who moved out of their birth countries 
during a war. 
The correction function approach 
 In this section I describe the basics of the correction function for multiple choice 
problems developed by Dahl (2002). He analyses returns on education in 50 US states 
plus DC, where workers are free to select their residence state based on possible earnings 
and other amenities. I choose to follow his approach because of the very similar nature of 




Dahl's (2002) approach is to set up an immigrant's problem of picking a new host country 
h out of a set of N possible host countries as a utility maximization problem, where 
individual utility depends on earnings and individual taste for a specific host country h. 
Due to the self-selection of immigrants, the error term in this utility function might be 
correlated with covariates, and this could cause bias. Appendix B provides a detailed 
description of both the selection problem in polychotomous choice models and the 
procedure that solves this multi choice utility maximization. 
                                                 
54
 Analyzing the OECD immigrant database, I find that cultural distance does not have a significant effect 
on the size of the immigrant population from a specific birth country. Sharing the same language and the 
colonial connection between the immigrants’ host and birth countries have high predictive power in 
estimating the size of the immigrant population in a given OECD country. 
55
 The literature has developed several ways of addressing selection in polychotomous choice models. A 
very good review of the most important ones, together with the benefits and restrictions of each, is provided 
by Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
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 The key insight of Dahl’s approach is the Index Sufficiency Assumption (ISA). The ISA 
states that pi,b,h the probability that immigrant i, coming from birth country b would 
choose to settle in host country h, which is the probability of an immigrant’s first best 
(and only observed) choice, is the single relevant factor in accounting for the potential 
bias. In this way, estimation equation (1a) can be extended to Equation 3, where  λ(pi,b,h ) 
stands for the correction function which depends on the first best probability pi,b,h . 
 
                          
                                                                                       
 
The ISA is the main assumption needed for consistent estimation of Equation 3. It 
reduces the dimensions of the immigrant’s problem from choosing from N potential host 
countries to finding the probability of the first best choice, thus avoiding the curse of 
dimensionality. Additionally, it does not require additivity of the utility function or the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, which is necessary in nested logit 
models. Appendix A2 describes the procedure and how I estimated probabilities for 
Dahl’s correction function. 
War immigrants 
Another way to overcome potential bias due to self-selection is to use a quasi-natural 
experiment and limit the sample to cohorts of migrants who emigrated during wartimes in 
birth countries. During war, the destination choice of emigrants fleeing their countries 
would have been more a reflection of political factors than subtle economic calculations. 
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Because of this, migrant destination can be considered more random, where potential 
self-selection on the basis of cultural distance is less pronounced. 
I use the Correlates of War (CoW) database as a source of information on conflicts, and I 
focus only on conflicts happening on the territory of birth countries. Since the European 
dataset only reports year of immigration in an interval, I use the more precise US dataset 
where exact year of entry into the US is known and therefore it can be determined with 
certainty if immigration was happening during war in the birth country. My US 2000 
Census sample consists of 360,000 male immigrants aged 16-65 who had positive 
earnings.  Out of those 50,976 or 14.3% migrated during war times in their birth 
countries. Table 1 gives the numbers of war immigrants in the US by their birth county.  
The CoW database classifies a country to be in a conflict if it commits more than 1000 
troops to the war or suffers more than 100 battle-related casualties. For example, 
numerous skirmishes between India and Pakistan that took place after year 1947 satisfy 
the CoW definition, but they are not very likely to be the prime reason for emigration 
from those countries during conflicts. For a more relevant description of a conflict, I 
construct a measure of conflict intensity – conflict casualties per capita for the country 
involved.
56
 The second column in Table 1 lists countries with the highest war emigration 
when the criterion of at least 50 war-related deaths per 1 million inhabitants is applied. 
Comparing the list of countries in the first and second columns of Table 1 shows that the 
list in the second column more closely reflects common perceptions of which countries 
have had conflicts large enough to cause emigration. 
                                                 
56
  In the CoW database, information about war-related casualties has been provided for 85% of all wars. 
Wars without data on casualties were excluded from my sample. 
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2.3 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
In my study, I use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to measure the distance between the 
cultural environments of two countries. These measures have been used extensively in 
the economics literature (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2010, 2011, Tadesse and White, 
2009, Aggarwal et al., 2012, Siegel et al., 2008). They were originally based on 
Hofstede’s study of employees at IBM subsidiaries in 40 countries in the 1970s. Since 
then, Hofstede’s measures of culture have been expanded to 82 countries. Alternative 
measures of national culture developed in the literature using other data sources correlate 




Hofstede and his team used four dimensions to classify the cultural environment of each 
nation. Power distance (PDI) expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of 
a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It describes the level of 
hierarchy and regard for authority. Individualism (IND) captures society's preferences for 
a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of 
themselves and their immediate families only (i.e. individualism) versus preference for a 
tightly-knit framework in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a 
particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (i.e. 
collectivism). Masculinity (MAS)—a now anachronistic term coined by Hofstede that I 
use simply to avoid confusion for those familiar with this database--measures the 
                                                 
57
 Those measures include World Value Survey scores (Dodd et al 2012), social practices scores from the 
GLOBE project (Dodd et al 2012), and measures developed by cross-cultural psychologist Shalom 
Schwartz (Schwartz 1994).  I will use all of these alternative measures as a robustness test in Section 3.3.2 
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tendency of a culture to favor aggressive values, which emphasize competition and 
ambition as opposed to more caring values, which emphasize quality of life. Uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) measures a society’s tolerance for ambiguity and risk. Since Hofstede’s 
dimensions are a set of values-based metrics, which reflect general societal attitudes, they 
do not change drastically over time (Hofstede, 1980). 
Using these four cultural dimensions  and their standard deviations, I calculate distance in 
cultural environment between a given pair of countries i and j using a widely used 
formula  (as in Tadesse and White, 2009, Dodd et al. 2012, Aggarwal et al., 2012, Siegel 
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Cultural distance, calculated with Hofstede’s dimensions, has been used in analyzing trade between 
countries (Tadesse and White, 2009), the flow of debt (Aggarwal et al., 2012) and equity (Siegel et al., 
2008) between countries, home bias (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011), and the degree 
of cross-border merger and acquisition activity (Ahern et al., 2012). 
59
 There are several advantages of using aggregate measure of cultural distance compared with just 
focusing on one individual cultural dimension. Aggregate measures of cultural distance use all four cultural 
dimensions, thus utilizing all available information. Moreover results obtained using aggregate distance can 
be easily compared with other cultural measures that have different cultural dimensions. Additionally, 
cultural dimensions can be correlated with each other (Individualism and Power Distance are highly 
negatively correlated in Hofstede’s data, ρ=-0.54) which makes interpretation single cultural dimension 
effect harder. Results with individual cultural dimensions are presented in Section 5.2. 
60
Standard Euclidean distance is chosen as because it plays a prominent role in many important application 
contexts not only in economics, statistics, political science and decision theory, but in such diverse fields as 
DNA sequencing, cryptography, image recognition etc. (D’Agostino and Gostino, 2009). As a robustness 
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Table 2 lists selected country cultural distances from the US, together with country-
specific values for all four cultural dimensions. As expected, the US cultural environment 
is closest to that of other Anglo-Saxon countries with Australia being the closest. Central 
American countries have the highest cultural distance from the US with Guatemala being 
the most distant. However there are some non intuitive rankings, like the fact the Iran is 
culturally closer to US than France, showing that Hofstede’s cultural measures are 
capturing phenomena that are deeper than those that get reflected in popular judgments. 
Table 3 lists the same countries by their cultural distance from France. Comparison 
between these two tables reflects a very important feature of my measure of cultural 
distance--it is composed of four dimensions. Because of this countries that seem equally 
distant from the US, like France and Iran in Table 2, do not have to be culturally close, as 
the distance between France and Iran shows in Table 3. 
3. Results  
This section presents the main results of the paper, based on Equation 3 for the European 
datasets and Equation 1b for the US dataset. For both datasets I show that a changing 
cultural environment has both statistically and economically significant consequences on 
immigrants' labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the five heterogeneous effects implied 
by my hypothesis are found in the data. The results are substantively similar when self-
selection into migration is taken into account, when Dahl’s (2002) correction function for 
multi-choice selection models is used, and when analyzing the subset of immigrants who 
                                                                                                                                                 
test regression with Mahalanobis distance, which takes into account correlation between dimensions, are 
preformed without significant change in the results. 
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moved during war times. Including covariates that might cause omitted variable bias, 
using other measures of cultural distance between a pair of countries, and allowing for 
different regional cultures in the US does not appreciably change the main results. 
3.1 The core results 
The dependent variable in the European dataset is an immigrant’s placement on a 
household income scale, which is used in the questionnaires. In the US dataset, due to its 
size and the availability of more precise variables, I analyze three labor market outcomes 
– probability of being unemployed, number of weeks worked in the last year and 
immigrants’ weekly earnings.
61
 The main independent variable of interest, cultural 
distance, is constructed as shown in Equation (4), making it in units of standard 
deviation.
62
 In all regressions standard errors are clustered on two levels – the birth 
country and the survey-host country in Europe, and the birth country and the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in the US.  
Table 4 presents the main results for the European dataset where the dependent variable 
is an immigrant’s placement on ten-step income scale defined for each host country 
separately. The first column shows the results of an OLS regression with the minimum 
set of covariates: distance between the cultural environments of immigrants’ birth and 
                                                 
61
 It is possible that immigrants misreport their labor market outcomes. This would be a problem if the 
propensity to give wrong information is related to the cultural distance. Because true labor market 
outcomes are not observed, the alternative possibility is to analyze the propensity of immigrants to refuse to 
give answers. I find that cultural distance does not play a role in immigrants’ likelihood to refuse to answer 
questions about their labor market outcomes.  
62
 Strictly speaking this is not correct. Cultural distance is calculated using standardized Euclidean distance 
which does not automatically make the distance in standard deviation units. However, the standard 
deviation for all possible 82*81/2 country pairs is 1.05, which from a practical point of view allows 
interpretation of distance as in units of standard deviation. 
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host countries, and birth and host country dummies. The regression reported in the 
second column includes a full set of control variables. In both cases, the coefficient on 
cultural distance is negative and significant. The last column includes a second-degree 
polynomial of immigration probabilities as a Dahl-type (2002) correction function, 
following Equation (3). In all three specifications the effect of cultural distance is 
negative and significant. Given the nature of the dependent variable it is nonintuitive to 
quantify the effect of cultural distance. This issue can be more appropriately addressed 
using the more precise US dataset. 
A Hausman test confirms that adding the correction function in column three did not 
significantly change the coefficient of cultural distance. Moreover, a Wald test performed 
on the correction function shows no statistically significant self-selection into specific 
host countries, with a p-value of 0.78. On a first inspection, one might suspect that this is 
because of the low power of the correction function approach due to imprecision in the 
probabilities. However, this method uses the entire immigrant population data to estimate 
these probabilities making the low precision explanation not very likely.
63
 An alternative 
explanation is that there is no selection on unobservables related with cultural distance, 
conditional on the extensive set of covariates used in Equation 3. This explanation is 
more plausible, especially when one considers the results of Section 3.3.6. In that section 
an alternative way of reducing any problem due to selection is applied, by using s only 
the sample of war immigrants, and there is no evidence of immigrants’ selection on 
unobservables correlated with cultural distance.           
                                                 
63
 Section A.2 of the Appendix A describes how the probabilities used in the Dhal’s (2002) correction 
function are constructed. 
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The next table presents analysis of the effect of cultural distance on immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes using the US 2000 5% Census dataset. As discussed earlier, the US 
dataset is larger and some variables are more precisely measured, but due to perfect co-
linearity, birth country dummies cannot be used.
64
 An important feature of the US 
immigrant dataset is the overrepresentation of one birth country. Almost 40% of 
immigrants are from Mexico and by their sheer size they might influence the results. 
Because of this, an analysis without Mexican immigrants is also presented. 
The first two columns of Table 5 show the effect of cultural distance on an immigrant’s 
unemployment status. The first column gives the probit estimate of Equation (1b) where 
the dependent variable is an indicator variable for unemployment. The second gives the 
results of the probit regression excluding immigrants from Mexico. The effect of cultural 
distance is positive and significant in both regression specifications. The average 
unemployment rate in the sample is 5.2%. In the first column the average marginal effect 
of cultural distance is 0.46 percentage points. This means that a one standard deviation 
increase in cultural distance increases the immigrant’s probability of being unemployed 
by 8.8%. 
The third and fourth column in Table 5 presents the effect of distance in cultural 
environments on the number of weeks worked in the year before the census.  
Approximately 5% of immigrants worked zero weeks in that year and 55% worked all 52 
weeks. To account for both the lower and upper censoring of the data, I use a Tobit 
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 Because there is only one host country, the US, each birth country has only one cultural distance. 
Inclusion of the birth country dummies would cause perfect multicollinearity problem. To address this issue 
I instead control for birth country log of GDP per capita, HDI and Gini coefficient as well as birth country 





 In both columns effect of cultural distance is negative and it is significant in 
the third column. Average number of weeks worked last year is 43.8 and the average 
marginal effect in the third column specification is -.82. 
The effect of cultural distance on immigrant wages is shown in the last two columns of 
Table 5. The main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of immigrant weekly 
earnings, constructed in two steps. First, I divide annual earnings by the number of weeks 
worked in the last year and then take the natural logarithm. Next, weekly earnings are 
standardized at the MSA level to account for the fact that different MSAs have different 
wage variability and this might affect the results. The fifth column presents the basic 
results of an OLS regression with the usual set of covariates, and the sixth column 
excludes immigrants from Mexico. In both regressions, higher cultural distance between 
immigrants’ birth country and the US is associated with statistically significant lower 
weekly earnings. For example, an increase of one standard deviation in cultural distance 
lowers weekly earnings by 7.2%. 
66
 
Overall, Table 5 shows strong evidence of the negative effect of cultural distance on 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes. To get a sense of the size of the effect, consider an 
average immigrant from France. His yearly earnings in 1999 were of $53,800. His Swiss 
counterpart, with the same demographic characteristics, will have 11.4% lower 
probability of being unemployed, will work 1.2 weeks more in 1999 and will have 9.8% 
higher weekly earnings. This is due to the fact that Switzerland is 1.3 standard devotions 
                                                 
65
Tobit has restrictive demands for consistency of estimation; it requires both normality of standard errors 
and homoscedasticity. Because of this, the more robust censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) estimator 
was also used, but it did not change significantly my main results.   
66
Table B4 in the Appendix B shows how the effect of the cultural distance changes as the set of covariates 
expands. As the new covariates are added the coefficient on cultural distance remains fairly stable. 
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culturally more closely to the US. Overall this will translate into 10.2% higher yearly 
earnings for a Swiss immigrant- he will earn $59,287 in 1999 while the French immigrant 
will earn $5,487 less.
67
 This simple example shows that not only is there a negative 
association between immigrants’ cultural distance and his labor market outcomes, but 
that negative effect is also economically important. 
 As stated before, the results from the European dataset in Table 4 and from the 
US dataset in Table 5 are not directly comparable because the dependent variables are not 
the same and there are some differences in the set of covariates. In order to make the 
results from the US and the European datasets comparable, household yearly income 
available in the US 2000 Census needs to be transformed into one of 10 income brackets, 
matching the dependent variable in the European dataset. Additionally, in the European 
dataset, birth county dummies have to be replaced with GDP per capita, HDI, Gini 
coefficient and birth country group dummies as in the US dataset.
68
 Results of the 
regressions based on the European and US datasets with the same dependent variables 
                                                 
67
Another way to illustrate the size of the cultural distance effect is to compare it with other determinants of 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes already known in the literature. Table B4 in the Appendix B presents 
results of the regression on immigrants’ weekly wages when birth country GDP p/c is in standard deviation 
units, as is the case for cultural distance. This allows for direct comparison of the effects’ magnitude in the 
fifth column of Table B4. The fourth column does not include the birth country HDI, because it is highly 
correlated with the birth country GDP. In both columns the size of the effect of cultural distance is 
comparable to the effect of birth country GDP. This shows that the cultural distance between immigrants’ 
birth country and the US is as important in determining immigrants’ wages as the level of the birth country 
GDP p/c, which proxies for the quality of human capital in the birth country (Borjas 1989). 
68
This conversion requires neglecting a lot of valuable information, mostly in the process of transforming 
the exact annual earning into income brackets. Because of this, the more precise separate regressions for 
European and US dataset are used throughout this paper. 
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and a harmonized set of explanatory variables is presented in appendix B, Table B5. It 
shows that the effect of cultural distance is 40% lower in Europe.
69
 
3.2 Heterogeneous effects 
If cultural distance has a causal effect on labor market outcomes, then there are further 
implications which if verified would serve as additional evidence for my hypothesis. In 
particular the effect of cultural distance should not be the same for every subgroup of 
immigrants. For more recent immigrants, immigrants who were older at the time when 
they arrived in the host country, more educated immigrants, and the first generation of 
immigrants, the negative effect of cultural distance on income should be higher. 
Additionally, the effect should be lower for the immigrants coming from more globalized 
countries. This section argues for the five heterogeneous effects and shows their 
consistency with data. 
The first heterogeneous effect is related to time spent in the host country. When an 
immigrant first comes to a host country, the cultural environment is completely new to 
him. On the other hand, an immigrant who has spent many years in the host country is 
probably more accustomed to the host country culture, and has had more time to develop 
the soft skills needed to succeed in the host country labor market. Therefore, the effect of 
cultural distance should be strongest in the first years after arrival in the host country.  
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 Performing the same analysis with the sample of immigrants in Canada gives very interesting results. 
The effect of cultural distance is largest in the US, then Canada. It is lowest in Europe. One of the possible 
explanations for this finding might be due to labor market rigidities and variation in immigrant earnings – 
in the US, the land of vast immigrant possibilities, immigrants can make it big or be at the lower deciles of 
the income distribution. Europe provides more limited income options for immigrants, while Canada ranks 
in-between.  This difference in variability of immigrant earnings has the potential power to explain the 
difference in the magnitude of the earnings in the three data sets analyzed in this paper.  
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Table 6 provides an overview of the heterogeneous effects of cultural distance for 
Europe.
70
 The second column shows that the effect of cultural distance for immigrants 
who have spent less than five years in the host county is double that of those who spent 
more than five years. Table 7 performs a similar analysis for the US dataset.
71
 The US 
dataset provides the exact year of arrival in the US, which permits more precise 
estimation of the heterogeneous effect, allowing years spent in the US to be split into 
more intervals. The results in the first column of Table 7 show a clear pattern – the effect 
of cultural distance declines monotonically with time  
spent in the country.
 72
 
  The second heterogeneous effect is related to the age of the immigrant at the time he 
arrived in the host country. An immigrant arriving at an older age has spent more time in 
the birth country, and has had a longer exposure to the birth country culture. Because of 
this he might have a harder time adapting to the host country culture. Therefore, the 
effect of cultural distance should be larger for immigrants who where older when arriving 
in the host country. The third column in Table 6 shows this is the case in Europe: 
immigrants who immigrated at age 25 or older have a significantly higher negative effect 
of the cultural distance on their income. This is also true for the US dataset, as shown in 
the second column in Table 7, where the effect of cultural distance rises monotonically 
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The first column replicates the third column from Table 4 and gives the general results using full 
specification.  
71
 For the US data, heterogeneous results will be shown for the weekly wages. 
72
Additionally this effect can be shown with one specific cohort of immigrants is analyzed over time. In 
Table B8 in the Appendix B, I show results for the different samples of the same cohort in 1980, 1990 and 
2000 US census. In the first column I analyze sample from immigrant cohort that entered the US in the 
1975-1980 period, and in the second column, for the 1970-1975 immigrant cohort. In both columns there is 
an undisputable pattern– as immigrants spend more time in the US, the effect of cultural distance on their 
weekly earnings diminishes. 
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with age at arrival. The cultural-distance effect is non-existent for individuals who were 
less than five years old when arriving in the US, while for immigrants who immigrated 
when they were older than 40 years, a one standard deviation increase in cultural distance 
lowers weekly earnings by 15%. 
The third heterogeneous effect is related to the educational attainment of immigrants. 
Cultural differences should be less important for workers who perform repetitive manual 
tasks than for workers in creative and managerial positions, where cultural subtleties are 
important and soft skills are crucial. Hence, the effect of cultural distance should be 
higher for more educated immigrants. The fourth column in Table 6 shows that this is the 
case in the European data while the last column in Table 7 shows the same for the US. In 
the US dataset, the effect of cultural distance on weekly wages for an immigrant with a 




The fourth heterogeneous effect of cultural distance can be observed when one compares 
the first and the second generation of immigrants. Second-generation immigrants are born 
and raised in the host country and therefore cultural distance between the birth county of 
their parents and the host country should play a smaller role in determining their labor 
market outcomes for them than for their parents.
74
 This is shown in the last column in 
Table 6 for the European data. The effect of cultural distance for the second generation is 
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 In this analysis wages in the US dataset were standardized on education level as well because variation in 
wages grows with education and this might influence my results. Additionally, when immigrants are 
dividend into blue and white collar occupations, the effect is stronger for white collar one, as predicted by 
this paper hypothesis. 
74
 If the parents come from different countries I take the arithmetic average of their birth country culture. 
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negative and has a smaller magnitude than for the first generation, and it lacks statistical 
significance.  
The 2000 US Census has no information on the parents’ birthplace. Because of this I use 
the aggregate March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1996 till 2004 to compare 
the first and the second generation of immigrants in the US. Differences in the covariates 
in the Census and the CPS data are minimal; March CPS only lacks question about 
language proficiency. To compare the effect of cultural distance between these two 
datasets, the first column of Table 8 shows the effect on first–generation immigrants 
using the US 2000 Census data without the language variable. The second column uses 
eight aggregated March CPSs as a data source and has the same set of covariates as the 
first column. The effect of cultural distance is almost identical in the two different US 
datasets. This gives additional credibility to the empirical evidence, showing that the 
effect is consistent, independent of the dataset used. The third column shows the effect of 
cultural distance on second-generation immigrants. The first generation effect is five 
times the second-generation effect. Comparing the decline in the effect of cultural 
distance between first and second-generation immigrants in the US and Europe reveals 
very interesting results. The decline is more pronounced in the US, which might suggest 
that the second generation of immigrants assimilates faster in the US than in Europe. 
Last heterogeneous effect is related with birth country globalization at the time of 
immigration. If his birth country is more globalized, then an immigrant should have had 
more exposure to other cultures before he emigrated. This experience with different 
cultures in his birth country should prepare him to deal better with a new cultural 
environment in the host country. As a measure of globalization I use the KOF 
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globalization index, created by Dreher (2006).
75
 The KOF has annual data for 207 
countries from 1970. This allows me to use birth country globalization level at the time 
when the migrant left the birth country, thus making my analysis more precise. 
Table 9 shows how birth country globalization is related to the effect of cultural distance. 
In the first column I present regression results for Europe, and in the second for the US. 
In each dataset, I divide immigrants into three groups according to the globalization of 
their birth country at the time when they emigrated (low, medium and high 
globalization). A clear pattern emerges in Table 9: the more globalized the birth country 
is at the time of migration, the easier the adaptation to the new host country and the 
smaller the effect of cultural distance. 
3.3 Robustness tests 
 The previous sections showed that there is both an economically and statistically 
significant effect of cultural distance on immigrants’ labor market outcomes. This section 
examines whether these results still hold under a variety of robustness tests - the inclusion 
of variables that might offer an alternative explanation for the effect of cultural distance, 
use of different measures of cultural distance, controlling for selection into immigration, 
analyzing only the subsample of immigrants who emigrated during war in birth countries, 
and allowing for different regional cultures in the US.  
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 It measures globalization of a country on three dimensions: economic globalization (trade flows, FDI, 
trade restrictions etc.), social globalization (number of tourists, number of McDonalds and Ikeas in a 
country, international phone calls and letters sent, etc.) and political globalization (participation in 
international political organizations, participation in international peacekeeping operations, number of 
embassies, etc). Using these three dimensions the KOF database constructs a single globalization index, 
which I use. 
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3.3.1 Extended set of controls in the European dataset 
 The first robustness test adds variables that are related to the cultural distance 
between two countries and have the potential to influence immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes, i.e., variables that might cause omitted variable bias. These variables offer an 
alternative, non-causal, explanation how cultural distance is empirically related to 
immigrant earnings: the empirical effect of cultural distance exists purely because 
cultural distance is correlated with other variables affecting outcomes.   
 Physical distance between two countries is related to cultural similarities between 
those countries. If countries are close to each other they are more likely to have similar 
cultures. Additionally, if an immigrant comes from a country which is closer it might 
affect his labor market success. The second column of Table 10 shows that the effect of 
cultural distance is still negative and significant once the distance and the distance-
squared between the capitals of the immigrant’s host and birth countries are included. If 
an immigrant’s birth and host country have a common border, an analogous argument can 
be made. The third column of Table 9 shows that inclusion of a dummy for the same 
border between an immigrant’s birth and host country does not have an important effect 
on the estimated coefficient on cultural distance.  
 If an immigrant comes from a country with the same legal origin, it might affect 
his labor market outcome. He might be more familiar with the laws of a country and 
more used to legal proceedings. At the same time, the legal system of a specific country 
is related to the country’s culture. There is a two-way interplay: the legal system and 
legal institutions influence the country’s culture, and the country’s culture has an effect 
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on which legal system was chosen and how it evolved. Using data from Djankov et al. 
(2003) to identify countries with the same legal origins, the fourth column of Table 10 
shows that the effect of cultural distance is negative and significant even after controlling 
for the same legal origin between birth and host countries. 
 Sharing the same language is another variable that might cause bias if omitted. 
Countries with the same language are generally culturally closer. Furthermore, being a 
native speaker in the host country is likely to positively affect the labor market success of 
immigrants. The fifth column in Table 10 shows that the effect of cultural distance is 
robust to inclusion of a dummy for sharing the same language.  
 Next, I test whether the share of the host country population with the same 
religion as the immigrant matters. There are two reasons for including this variable in the 
set of covariates. First, culture and religion are deeply connected and an immigrant who 
has the same religion as most of the host country population might have an advantage on 
the host country labor market. The second reason is related to network effects. As stated 
before, I control for the share of immigrants from the same birth country as this might 
have relevance to social network effects. However, network effects may not be limited to 
countrymen only. Individuals with the same religion might count as members of one’s 
social network that affects labor market success. The sixth column in Table 10 shows 
results from a regression when the share of the host country population with the same 
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religion as the immigrant is added.
76
 As in the previous cases, the coefficient on cultural 
distance remains negative and significant. 
 Finally, I include a dummy variable capturing the whether the immigrant’s birth 
and host country belong to the EU at the time of immigration. Movement is much easier 
among EU members, and becoming a member of the EU might be related with cultural 
distance. The seventh column in Table 10 shows that controlling for the EU membership 
does not changes my results significantly.  
  The last column in Table 10 presents results from an OLS regression with all 
those variables added to the usual set of controls. The cultural distance still has a negative 
and significant coefficient. The overall conclusion from Table 10 is that the effect of 
cultural distance on immigrant income is not a consequence of some other underlying 
mechanism discussed in this section and that it has a direct casual effect on immigrants’ 
labor market success.   
3.3.2 Alternative measures of cultural distance 
 Throughout this paper I have been using Hofstede’s measures of culture. 
However, there are other measures of culture that have been used in the literature. In this 
section I briefly describe them and present results using those alternative measures. I 
calculated cultural distance as standardized Euclidian distance, same as with the 
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 I perform similar analysis in the US dataset, but I use the share of immigrants who speak the same 
language in the immigrant’s PUMA (a geographical unit smaller then MSA). Individuals who speak the 
same language might be member s of immigrants’ social networks that affects labor market outcomes. 
Inclusion of this variable does not change my results significantly. 
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Hofstede’s measures. Those measures are World Values Survey Measure, Schwartz 
Human Values Scale and GLOBE survey measures.  
 Ingelhart and Welzel (2005) use the World Values Survey (WVS) to characterize 
each country on two cultural dimensions. The first is along Traditional vs. Secular - 
Rational values. This dimension is mostly related to how religious the society is and what 
the role of the family is considered to be. The second dimension relates to Survival vs. 
Self-Expression skills. As societies develop, they shift from an overwhelming emphasis 
on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-
being, self-expression and quality of life. These changes are captured in the second 
dimension of the Ingelhart and Welzel measure.   
Schwartz (1994) developed his theory of cultural dimension by looking at the values held 
by college students and kindergarten teachers in a given society. He identifies universal 
values and measures how strongly they are emphasized in a given society. Those values 
are Achievement, Benevolence, Conformity, Hedonism, Power, Security, Self-direction, 
Stimulation, Tradition, and Universalism. The European Social Survey (ESS), a dataset 
used in this paper, has a Human Values Scale (HVS) appendix. HVS was designed with 
help from Schwartz, and it has 21 questions from which Schwartz's values can be 
obtained for countries participating in the ESS.
77
 
The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research 
was a survey of over 17,000 middle managers in 62 countries. It is similar to Hofstede’s 
approach given that its primary focus was on the business community, but it distinguishes 
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between more cultural dimensions; Performance Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Humane Orientation, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Assertiveness, 
Gender Egalitarianism, Future Orientation, and Power Distance. Results of the study are 
published in House at al. (2006), which also served as a data source for the country 
values in specific cultural dimensions.  
 Table 11 presents results for the European dataset using the alternative measures 
of cultural distance.
78
 In all specifications the effect of cultural distance, independently of 
how it is measured and defined, has a negative effect.
79
 It is significant in three out of 
four specifications. Moreover, since cultural distance is measured in standard deviation 
units in all specifications, the size of the effects are directly reflected in the relative sizes 
of the coefficients, which are of the same order of magnitude for all measures. In the US 
dataset, the effect of cultural distance is negative and significant in all specifications with 
very similar magnitudes, as presented in Table 12. Both tables point out to the same 
conclusion – the negative effect of cultural distance on an immigrant’s labor market 
outcomes does not depend on the specific way of measuring culture. 3.3.3 Individual 
cultural distance vs. country cultural distance 
 HVS was administered as an appendix to the ESS, one of the primary data sources 
used in this paper. This allows me to construct a measure of distance between an 
individual immigrant’s culture and host country culture, taking Euclidean distance 
between individual cultural values and aggregated values of the host country. For 
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 Table B6 in the appendix B shows correlation matrix of these four measures of cultural distance. As 
expected  all measures are positively correlated with the average correlation of 0.5 
79
The number of observations differs for each cultural measure because the measures do not cover the same 
set of countries. When analysis is performed on the set of birth and host countries for which data exists for 
all different cultural measures, the basic results do not change appreciably.  
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comparison purposes, the first column in Table 13 is identical to the third column of 
Table 11, showing the effect of cultural distance using Schwartz’s HVS at the country 
level to cultural distance. The second column shows the regression where the cultural 
distance reflects differences between the individual immigrant and the host country. The 
effect of individual cultural distance is negative and significant.   
The third column of Table 13 presents results from analysis when both the individual 
immigrant and the birth country cultural distance from the host country are included in 
the set of regressors. The coefficients on both cultural distances are significant and 
negative. Given that both distances are in standard deviations units, direct comparison of 
the magnitude of the effect is possible. The effect of cultural distance between 
immigrants’ host and birth countries survives the inclusion of the individual cultural fit of 
immigrant and the host country. 
3.3.4 Cultural, economic and genetic distance 
If the economic structures of host and birth countries share many similarities then it 
would be easier for an immigrant to adapt to host country labor markets. Economic 
similarities between countries might be related with the cultural distance and hence the 
effect of cultural distance I am capturing might just be the consequences of the difference 
in economic structure. A similar argument applies to the genetic distance between an 
immigrant’s birth and host country.
80
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I mimic my cultural distance measure and defining a measure of distance in economic 
structure as the standardized Euclidean distance between two countries in four economic 
dimensions. Those dimensions are agriculture, industry, government expenditures, and 
exports as a share of GDP. For the measure of genetic distance I follow Cavalli-Sforza, 
Menozzi, and Piazza (1994), and define it as the probability that two alleles at a given 
locus selected at random from two populations will differ. The data come from Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009). 
The first three columns in Table 14 show results for Europe, while the last contain results 
for the US. All six columns provide indisputable evidence that the effect of cultural 
distance is not just capturing genetic or economic differences between countries. 
Furthermore, Table 14 clearly shows that the cultural distance plays a bigger and more 
significant role in determining immigrants’ labor market success then economic or 
genetic distance. 
3.3.5 Controlling for selection into migration 
Ideally, selection into emigration would be accounted for in all of my regressions, but as 
explained in Section 2.2.1 to do this I need to observe both individuals who chose to stay 
in the birth country and those who chose to emigrate. This would lower the generality of 
my analysis, limiting it only to immigrants born in European OECD countries, and 
therefore it is performed as a robustness test.
81
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 Moreover, analyzing only the set of immigrants from European OECD country would significantly 
reduce both my sample size and the variance in the cultural distance variable.  
102 
 
As discussed at length in Section 2.2.1, an individual who is more open to accepting new 
cultures and/or feels closer to other countries’ cultures is more likely to emigrate (Colier 
2013). This section attempts to address this issue using the Heckman (1979) selection 
procedure, using the same exclusion variable as in Bartram (2013) – parent’s education. 
Parents’ education influences the probability of emigration by altering the relative cost of 
moving to another country. Parents’ social networks also influence the wage an 
individual can earn if he stays in the birth country. In the new host country, however, 
once immigrant education is taken into account, parents’ education should not play a 
significant role in determining immigrants’ outcomes.
82
 As said before this can only be 
performed using immigrants from European OECD countries where I can observe both 
individuals who emigrated and those which decided to not move. 
 Table 15 presents results from regressions that account for selection into 
migration. For comparison purposes the first column repeats Table 4’s third column, but 
estimated on the limited set of European-born immigrants. The coefficient of cultural 
distance is negative and significant, as in the whole sample reported in Table 4. The 
second column shows the same analysis but with the Heckman procedure that accounts 
for selection into migration in the first step. Correcting for selection, the coefficient on 
cultural distance is greater than in the case when no correction is performed. The 
interpretation of this result is that the negative effect of cultural change is larger for a 
random person in the birth country than for an individual who has made the decision to 
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 However, this assumption might not hold. For example, immigrants with more educated parents are more 
likely to have better cognitive skills, and better cognitive skills will increase immigrants’ earnings. If 
immigrants’ cognitive skills are not related with the cultural distance, then my estimates will not be biased. 
However, if immigrants with higher cognitive skills have chosen host countries with lower cultural 
distance, then my results will be underestimated. 
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emigrate. Results presented in this paper are obtained on immigrants, which makes these 
results an underestimation of the true effect of cultural change for the overall population. 
3.3.6. War emigrants 
 The last robustness test is related to the selection host county by an immigrant. 
This issue has already been addressed using Dahl’s (2002) correction function. As 
described in more detail in Section 2.2.2, an alternative way to tackle this potential 
problem would be to use quasi natural experiment and to focus just on those who moved 
during wartime in their birth countries. It is reasonable to assume that the destination of 
emigrants fleeing their countries during war time would be more a reflection of political 
factors than subtle economic calculations and thus can be seen as more random for the 
purposes of my analysis.  
Table 16 gives the results of the analysis on the set of immigrants who emigrated during 
war in their birth countries.
83
 The European dataset does not have the exact year when the 
immigrant moved to the host county, so this method can be applied only to the US. As 
shown in Table 16, analyzing only war immigrants gives the results very similar to those 
for the whole sample. A Hausman test shows no significant change in the coefficient on 
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 As stated before, the data source for war conflicts was the Correlates of War database. Table 1 gives the 
number of war immigrants in the US. 
84
 The effects of knowledge of English and the size of the diaspora change when only war immigrants are 
analyzed, suggesting that immigrants’ self-selection is related with these variables. 
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3.3.7 Regional culture in the US  
The US is culturally a very heterogeneous country (Lieske, 1993). This feature can be 
exploited by allowing separate regions in the US to have different cultural environments. 
I define regional culture using two separate procedures--answers to the World Values 




Besides the fact that regional cultural environment might be the more relevant measure 
and therefore using it is a valid robustness test, there are two additional advantages of 
using regional culture in the US. First, different cultural regions in the US act and can be 
analyzed like different host countries. In this framework birth country dummies can be 
used, possibly improving identification. Second, having more host countries allows use of 
Dahl’s (2002) correction function to account for selective migration.
86
 According to Dahl 
(2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), the best way to test the Index Sufficiency 
Assumption (ISA), underlying the validity of  the correction function approach, would be 
to allow all possible probabilities,                  , to enter Equation (3) as part of the 
polynomial correction term λ and to test whether these terms significantly change the 
estimated coefficients of interest. This is often impossible to do because it leads to a huge 
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 Using WVS cultural measures, cultural variation between 9 US regions is approximately 30% of the 
variation in the whole sample with 82 countries. When early immigrants are used to construct regional 
culture, variation between 9 US regions is 20% of the variation in culture in the whole sample with 82 
countries.  
86
 As in the European case, I construct the immigration probabilities that immigrant will finish in a 
particular US region fallowing Dahl’s (2002) semi parametric approach. Immigrants are divided into cells 
according to their birth country, education, time of immigration and age at immigration. Then, using the US 
2000 5% Census I calculated the probability that an immigrant from a given cell will finish in the specific 
US region. However, because these probabilities are calculated from a sample, and not from a population as 
in European data, I use bootstrapping for calculating the standard errors.  
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increase in the set of covariates and therefore to the curse of dimensionality. By dividing 
the US into nine Census regions, I am able to avoid this problem and test the ISA.
87
 
The first approach to constructing the regional culture measure uses the WVS. As 
described in earlier in Section 3.3.2, Ingelhart and Welzel construct two cultural 
dimensions from the WVS: traditional vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-
expression. I use their cultural measures from the third, fourth and fifth waves of the 
WVS administered in the US in 1995, 1999 and 2006. I construct regional culture for 
nine Census regions by aggregating the cultural values of all of the region’s inhabitants. 
Next, to measure cultural distance as before, I take the standardized Euclidean distance 
between the culture of an immigrant’s birth country and the culture for the US region in 
which the immigrant lives.  
The first four columns of Table 17 present results with this WVS measure of cultural 
distance. The first column shows the results when aggregate US culture is used (repeating 
the second column in Table 12). The results of the regression using regional culture to 
calculate cultural distance and including birth country fixed effects are presented in the 
second column. The third column adds Dahl’s correction function, composed of the 
second polynomial of the first best probability. Finally, in the last column, I test for ISA 
by including the second polynomial of all probabilities. In all specifications the effect of 
cultural distance is negative and significant. Therefore, allowing for cultural 
heterogeneity in the US does not significantly change the main results. Additionally, 
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 With nine possible host regions, the second polynomial of all probabilities consists of 54 factors. The 
general formula for the number of regressors in a second-degree polynomial correction function with N 
probabilities is          .  
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comparing results in the third and fourth columns using Hausman test shows that taking 
into account all possible probabilities does not affect the results, confirming the ISA. 
An alternative way of calculating regional culture in the US is to take advantage of 
information about the ancestry of early immigrants in each region. Because of cultural 
persistence, culture of early immigrants plays a significant role in contemporary cultural 
environment (Grosjean, 2011). I use the US 1880 100% Census for information about 
ancestry of early immigrants. For each of the nine census regions I obtain the share of 
each birth country among early immigrants ancestry. I calculate regional culture as the 
average of Hofstede’s cultural measures of early immigrant birth countries, weighted by 
their respective share from the 1880 Census. 
The last four columns of Table 17 present the regression results when US regional culture 
is calculated using data on early immigrants. The fifth column replicates the fifth column 
in Table 5 for the case when one aggregate measure of US culture is used. The sixth 
column treats US regions as culturally separate entities, which allows the use of birth 
country fixed effects. The seventh column adds Dahl’s (2002) correction function, while 
the last column includes the second polynomial of probabilities that the immigrant will 
finish in any of the nine possible regions. The effect of cultural distance is again negative 
and significant in all cases and a Hausman test confirms that the coefficient does not 
change significantly across different specifications in columns six, seven and eight.  
 Table 17 provides an unequivocal message. Even accounting for the culturally 
heterogeneous regions in the US, I still obtain a negative effect of cultural distance on 
economic outcomes. Furthermore, I show that the core assumption for using Dahl’s 
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(2002) correction function to account for possible immigrants’ selection into specific host 
countries is valid. 
 3.3.8 Effect of cultural distance on US natives who moved to another cultural region  
 So far, I have analyzed the effect of cultural distance only on individuals who 
moved to another country. By allowing US regions to have different cultural 
environment, which construction is described in the previous subsection, opens a 
possibility for analyzing the effect of change in cultural environment for US natives who 
changed their cultural region. Natives who moved to another region within the US 
represent a significantly distinct sample than immigrants and face different constraints. 
They do not have to worry about knowledge of the local language, there are no legal 
status issues, the potential discrimination is smaller and their motivation and decision 
process related to moving to another region could be completely different from the one 
that immigrant workers face. Therefore, finding an effect of cultural distance on US-born 
individuals would yield strong additional support to my hypothesis that changing cultural 
environments is not costless, either for immigrants or for natives. 
 To test this hypothesis, I identify individuals from the 5% US 2000 Census who, 
in 1995, lived in the same US Census region they were born in, but in 2000 they lived in 
another US Census region.
88
 Table 18 shows analysis of the effect of cultural distance on 
the US-born workers who moved to another cultural region within the US. In the first 
column, US cultural regions are constructed using information about ancestry of early 
immigrants, while the second column uses responses to the WVS of current inhabitants of 
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the region. In both specifications, the effect of cultural distance is negative and 
significant. However, the effect of the change in the cultural environment is just 20% of 
the effect that immigrants face.  
4. Social outcomes 
 Up to this point, I have shown that changing cultural environments has significant 
consequences for labor market success. If changing cultural environment is not costless, 
it should also have consequences for social outcomes. The more unknown the cultural 
environment of the host country is, the worse the social outcomes should be for 
immigrants. This section provides evidence for this claim, thus giving support to the main 
idea of the paper –changing cultural environment lowers both economic and social 
wellbeing.  
4.1 Interest in politics 
 The first set of social outcomes analyzed is related to an immigrant’s participation 
in the political life of the host country. If the immigrant’s birth and host countries share 
similar culture, then the issues discussed in politics will be similar (for example, gay 
rights, abortion, taxes, etc.). Because of the similarity in political discourse between host 
and birth countries, it would be easier for immigrants to follow politics in the host 
country. Therefore, immigrants from culturally closer countries should be more interested 
in the host country political life. This is shown in the first column in Table 19 using the 
European dataset. The dependent variable is an immigrant's interest in politics with 
answers ranging from 1(no interest at all) to 4 (very interested). An ordered probit 
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analysis shows a negative and significant effect of cultural distance: if an immigrant 
comes from a culturally more distant country, he will be less interested in politics. The 
second column shows the results from a probit regression for immigrant participation in 
the last election.
89
 Immigrants with a larger distance in cultural environments tend to 
participate less in elections, but the effect lacks statistical significance.    
4.2 Trust in host country institutions 
 The second set of social outcomes is immigrants’ trust in the host country 
political and legal institutions. If the cultural environment of the host country is more 
familiar to the immigrant, then he should have more trust in the host country institutions. 
Table 20 shows relevant evidence for Europe by examining an immigrant's trust in the 
host country parliament (first column), legal system (second column), police (third 
column), politicians (fourth column), political parties (fifth column) and a first principal 
component of all five political and legal institutions (sixth column). Cultural distance has 
a negative effect on all measures of trust in the host country institutions.  
4.3 Language outcomes 
 Another social outcome that might be affected as a consequence of moving to a 
new and unknown cultural environment is command of the host country language. 
Because of lack of familiarity with the host cultural environment, immigrants might be 
less interested in the social life of the host country, follow politics less, watch TV and 
read newspapers in the host country language less, and have less social contact where the 
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 The second regression in Table 19 is restricted to immigrants with the voting rights, while the first 
regression controls for immigrant’s voting rights in the host country. 
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host country language is used. All this will lead to worse knowledge of the host country 
language. In the US 2000 Census, immigrants assess their level of knowledge of English, 
and I use this information as an outcome variable in Table 21. In the first column, the 
usual set of covariates is used. The second column adds a variable quantifying how hard 
it is to learn English for someone who is a native speaker of the immigrant’s mother 
tongue, using data from Chiswick and Miller (2005).
90
 In both specifications, the effect of 
the cultural distance is negative and significant: the bigger the difference in cultural 
environment, the less fluent the immigrant will be in English language.  
 The European dataset does not have a variable that directly captures immigrant 
knowledge of the host country language. However, there is a variable that reports if the 
immigrant uses the host country language in communication within his household. The 
third column in Table 21 shows that the effect of cultural distance is negative and 
significant, as in the US dataset. Since I cannot control for difficulty of learning the host 
country language, the results in the third column should be considered less informative 
than those presented in the second column. 
4 .4 Health and marriage outcomes 
 Adapting to less familiar cultural environment can be stressful and might have 
other negative consequences on immigrants’ health. The first column in Table 22 shows 
results for Europe of an ordered probit regression when the dependent variable is 
immigrants’ health. Immigrants self assess their health with answers ranging from 1 (very 
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 It is based on how fast English-speaking students can learn other languages and it assumes symmetry in 
language learning difficulty between two languages. 
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bad) to 5 (very good). As the analysis shows, the bigger the difference in cultural 
environments, the statistically worse is immigrant self-assessed health.  
 Marriage market outcomes should also be affected by cultural distance. If an 
immigrant was born and raised in a culture similar to the host country culture, he will be 
more likely to marry a host country national. The second column of Table 22 shows a 
probit analysis with the dependent variable being a dummy equal to one if the immigrant 
married a wife born in the host country. Results show that if an immigrant grew up in a 
birth country that is more culturally distant, he will have a lower probability of marrying 
a spouse born in the host country.  Unfortunately, information about the birth country of 
the spouse is available only in an 2008 EVS, with a much smaller sample size, which 
weakens the significance of the effect of cultural distance. 
4.5 Crime 
 An immigrant’s participation in crime is the last social outcome that is analyzed. 
If the immigrant’s birth country has a very different culture from that in the current host 
country, it will probably also have different views on what is permitted in a given society 
and what is considered to be a crime. For example, cultural differences could affect 
differences in family laws, corruption-prevention laws, drug-abuse laws, bankruptcy 
laws, domestic violence laws, etc. Therefore, I expect immigrants coming from culturally 
more distant countries to have a higher probability of being involved in criminal 
activities.  
 As a data source on criminal activity of immigrants, I use the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) yearly reports on immigrant deportations. 
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Individuals are subject to deportation from the US if they are not United States citizens 
and have a conviction by a US court for a crime for which the maximum punishment is 
more than one year in prison. The DHS keeps a record of the aggregate number of 
deportations due to criminal conviction by immigrant nationality.
91
 I use the total number 
of deportations in the four year period from 2000-2003, divided by the number of non-
citizen immigrants of that nationality residing in the US taken from the 2000 Census. 
Table 23 gives the results of the regression when this percentage is used as an outcome 
variable for the 73 countries in my sample. Because this is a very different dataset from 
those used in previous regressions and one whose unit of observations is countries, the 
number of explanatory variables is limited. All the variables are in the units of standard 
deviations for easier comparison of the coefficient magnitudes. In the first column, 
cultural distance is the only explanatory variable. In the second column, murder rate in 
the immigrant birth country is added. According to Pinker (2011), this can be used as a 
good proxy for violence and crime in the birth country in international comparisons. In 
the third column, birth country GDP per capita was added and the fourth column also 
includes the birth country Gini coefficient. In all specifications, larger cultural distance 
leads to more deportations due to criminal convictions.
92
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 The DHS distinguishes between deportations due to criminal convictions (approx. 70,000 per year, or 
40% of all deportations) and ones due to illegal immigration. 
92
 If cultural distance between the US and the immigrant’s birth country increases for one standard 
deviation, then according to the specification in the fourth column in Table 22 share of immigrant’s 
deportation will increase for 0.19 standard deviations. 
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5. Characteristics of the cultural distance effect  
 Up to this point I have documented the extensive evidence of an intuitive social 
phenomenon which has not previously been empirically analyzed in the literature: 
changing cultural environment has real consequences for individuals in both the 
economic and social spheres. All regressions presented in this paper show that 
immigrants coming from culturally more distant countries have worse labor market 
outcomes as well as social ones. 
This section goes one step further and analyzes three additional aspects of this 
phenomenon. First, I study how the cultural distance effect has evolved over time. 
Second, I show that the effect is truly one of mismatch between cultures rather than some 
'superior' home-country culture being beneficial for the immigrant independent of host 
country. Lastly, I examine how does the effect of cultural distance depends on the size of 
immigrant’s diaspora. 
5.1 Change of the cultural distance effect over time 
Cultural distance has a substantial effect on socioeconomic outcomes, but how did this 
effect change in the last 40 years? On the one hand, cultural adaptation costs may be 
decreasing over time: due to increased globalization, people are more equipped to deal 
with different cultures, as shown in Section 3.2 on heterogeneous effects. On the other 
hand, changes in the structure of the economy of developed countries would suggest 
otherwise because of the decline in manufacturing jobs and growth in the importance of 
soft skills in the workplace (Buhler, 2001). 
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To answer this question, I use the last three available US Censuses from 1980, 1990 and 
2000.
93
 I interact the main explanatory variable, cultural distance, with dummy variables 
for 1980, 1990, and 2000, and examine differences over time. The results are shown in 
the first column of  Table 24.
94
 The effect of cultural distance is increasing over time. In 
1980, a one standard deviation increase in cultural difference leads to 5.7% lower weekly 
earnings, while in 2000, the same increase in cultural distance is associated with a 
decrease in earnings of 8.7%.  
One possible explanation for this finding is the change in the composition of US 
immigrants during the time period under consideration. To address this possibility, I 
perform the same analysis for Canada. While the US experienced an increase in low-
skilled immigration in the last 40 years, Canadian immigration in the same period is 
characterized by an increased share of high-skilled immigrants. The Canadian Census 
indentifies immigrants from 16 specific countries only, so results obtained on the 
Canadian sample should be considered less general than the ones from the US.  
Before turning to the results over time, to check if cultural distance plays a role in 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes in Canada, I analyze the effect of cultural distance on 
unemployment, months worked and monthly earnings in the 2001 Canadian census. 
There is a negative effect of cultural distance on all three labor market outcomes shown 
                                                 
93
 Earlier US Censuses have different sets of variables and my European data does not have a time span 
long enough for this kind of analysis. 
94
 In the time period in the question there has been a shift towards immigrants from less globalized 
countries. As shown in Section 3.2 globalization influences the effect of cultural distance, and because of 
this in Table 23 all regressions have an extra variable – globalization of the birth country at the time of 
immigration. Adding this variable lowers the magnitude of the effect by only 5%. 
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in the table B7 in the Appendix B; the effect is bigger than the one in Europe and smaller 
than the one in the US.
95
  
The second column of Table 24 shows how the effect of cultural distance evolved in 
Canada. The effect of cultural distance over time is the same as in the US – in the last 30 
years it has increased in magnitude.
96
  
5.2 Individual cultural dimensions and ‘most productive’ culture 
 As previously discussed, the distance between cultural environments is a 
composite measure of the Euclidian distance between an immigrant’s birth and host 
countries based on four cultural dimensions. Table 25 shows the results of regressions 
when the absolute distance in individual dimensions between two countries is used 
instead.
97
 The first four columns represent regressions done on the European dataset, 
while the last four columns give the same regressions on the US dataset. Distance in all 
four cultural dimensions has a negative effect; in the US distance in individualism has the 
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 The Canadian dataset does not have the same question about language fluency as the US Census. 
Because of this, Table B4 should be compared with the first column of Table 12 where the US 2000 Census 
dataset is analyzed without the language variable. Direct comparison of the cultural distance effect between 
Europe, the US and Canada is not possible because the European and the Canadian dataset have different 
independent variables. However, both Canadian and European datasets can be compared with the US 
dataset. In Europe the effect is 40% smaller than in the US (Table B3) and in Canada the effect is 20% 
smaller than in the US (Table B6 for Canada and second column in Table 12 for the US). 
96
Interestingly, in the US increase over time is the highest for the most educated immigrates, while in 
Canada the increase in the effect is the most pronounced for the low educated immigrants. 
97
 This is the same as the Euclidian distance, but now just in one dimension. 
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 Having different cultural dimensions with the most negative effect in Europe and the US is another 




 Next, rather than analyzing differences in cultural dimensions, I study whether 
cultural levels in specific dimensions matter. I the paper I have emphasized the cultural 
distance effect, but alternative way to think about how birth country culture affects 
immigrants success is given in Equation 5:    
                                                                    
 
  In this alternative setting birth country culture might affect the labor market 
success through two possible channels: either by the level of the birth country culture in 
specific dimension or by the absolute distance from the host country: 
 
           
                                                                                            
                          
 
If distances are more important than levels, the coefficient    in Equation 6 should be 
smaller than   . Cultural level and cultural distance are in the same units, so direct 
comparison of the coefficients is possible. Tables 26 27 28 and 29 provide results from 
the estimation of Equation 6 in the European data for four cultural dimensions.
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Additionally, because cultural levels and cultural distances are correlated, separate 
regressions for each variable are also reported. Overall, Tables 26 27 28 and 29 show that 
the distance in cultural environment between immigrant’s birth and host country matters 
more than the cultural levels of the birth country in almost all specifications. 
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 This exercise could not be performed in the US due to multicollinearity problem.  
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An alternative way to address the question of whether distance or levels matter more is   
to ask if there are optimal levels of individualism, power distance, masculinity or risk 
aversion to be born and raised in, that give the best labor market outcomes. If so, then the 
combination of the different optimal levels would represent a ‘superior’ culture. If there 
is such ‘superior’ culture, countries close to it should to have the best economic 
outcomes. Hence, I construct ‘superior’ culture as the average of the cultures of the ten 
richest countries.
100
 I calculate distance of each birth country from such ‘superior’ culture 
and add it to my set of covariates. Table 30 shows the results in the European and the US 
dataset -- distance from the ‘superior’ culture does not play a role. There is no ‘superior’ 
cultural environment to be raised in and what matters is the distance between birth and 
host country cultural environment.  
5.3 Effect of cultural distance and the size of diaspora 
Having big diaspora, i.e. the larger share of same nationals in the same geographical 
location is generally considered beneficial for immigrant, primarily through larger social 
networks (Dustmann et al., 2011, Edin et al., 2003), even though large diaspora can 
sometime have an negative effect as an increase in direct competition for jobs (Beaman, 
2012). However, there is another effect, larger diaspora will slower the process of 
immigrant assimilation to the host country culture (Collier, 2013). This would make the 
effect of cultural distance stronger in the areas where there is a large immigrant’s 
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 Those are: Luxemburg, Singapore, Norway, Canada Hong Kong, US, United Arab Emirates (UEA), 
Switzerland, Netherlands and Austria. As a robustness test, I also use the average of the five richest 
countries, as well as the ten richest countries but without UAE, and using HDI instead of GDP p/c to 
indentify the richest countries, all without much effect on my results. 
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countrymen population. This is confirmed by my empirical analysis in the US and shown 
in the first column in of Table 31. 
101
Taking one step further, assimilation process should 
be slower the smaller share of native population in MSA at the time of immigrants’ 
arrival in the US. Thus the effect of cultural distance should be the strongest in MSAs 
with high immigrant share. This is shown in the second column in Table 30. 
6. Conclusion 
Culture matters. This paper studies a novel channel of interaction between culture and 
socio-economic outcomes by documenting the consequences of a change in cultural 
environment. I show that a change in values, beliefs and social norms of the surrounding 
environment has a significant negative effect on both economic and social outcomes.   
Because a given cultural environment changes very slowly, I examine the effect of 
cultural change on immigrants. For them, the change in cultural environment depends on 
the cultural distance between their birth and host countries. The identifying variation used 
in this paper comes from comparing immigrants with different cultural distances between 
their host and birth countries. Using five independent datasets (the European Social 
Survey and the European Values Survey in Europe, the Census and the Current 
Population Survey in the US, and the Canadian Census), four different measures of 
cultural distance and two separate ways of accounting for immigrant self-selection, I 
present unequivocal support for this paper’s main idea: the bigger the change in cultural 
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 Because of possible self-selection of immigrants in specific MSA, the Dahl’s correction function is 
constructed. The procedure used is the same as for correction function described in section 2.2.2. 
Immigrants are grouped into cells by birth country – education - time of immigration – age, and for each 
cell, the probability that an individual from that cell finishes in a specific MSA is calculated.   
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environment, the worse the labor market outcomes. Additionally, I show that a change in 
cultural environments has an effect on social outcomes: immigrants from culturally more 
distant environments have lower trust in political and legal institutions, are less interested 
in politics, have worse health outcomes, and are more likely to be involved in crime. 
Throughout the paper, I present unambiguous and robust evidence that the change in 
cultural environment diminishes overall immigrant welfare. Furthermore, the negative 
effect is also present for native workers who moved to another region within the same 
country.  
The effect of cultural distance on labor market outcomes is large. A one standard 
deviation increase in cultural distance increases the probability of being unemployed for 
8.8% and decreases weekly earnings for 7.2%. As an example consider two identical 
immigrants in the US, where one was born and raised in France and the other in 
Switzerland. Switzerland is 1.3 standard deviations culturally closer to the US, causing 
Swiss immigrants to earn on average $5,487 more in 1999 than an identical French 
counterpart. Moreover, examining previous Censuses in the US and Canada, I showed 
that the magnitude of the negative effect of cultural distance is increasing over time. 
The exact mechanism by which cultural distance affects immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes remains an open question. Immigrants from culturally more distant countries 
could be less productive, because they are less experienced in the specific ways that 
things are done in a given society. Moreover, new and unknown environment causes rise 
in the uncertainty and distrust which might prevent immigrants’ from engaging in 
otherwise beneficial economic activities. A bigger cultural distance might lead to fewer 
social interactions with host country natives, and as a consequence to less valuable social 
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networks. Besides having lower productivity, culturally more distant immigrants might 
face both employer and customer discrimination. All these factors lead to worse labor 
market outcomes. Identifying the specific channels of the cultural distance effect is the 






7. Tables  
2. Tables used in the second chapter 
  
 Table 2-1 War immigrants by the birth country in the US 
rank 
War on territory > 50 deaths per million 
Country 






in overall war 
immigrant 
population 
1 India 24.2% Philippines 46.4% 
2 Philippines 23.6% Colombia 10.8% 
3 El Salvador 17.1% Vietnam 7.2% 
4 Colombia 5.5% Peru 6.7% 
5 Iran 4.7% Guatemala 5.8% 
6 Vietnam 4.4% Iran 5.4% 
7 Peru 3.7% Russia 4.0% 
8 Guatemala 2.9% Turkey 2.3% 
9 Russia 2.3% Ethiopia 2.3% 
10 Turkey 1.2% Iraq 1.8% 
11 Lebanon 1.2% Lebanon 1.1% 
12 Ethiopia 1.2% Pakistan 1.1% 
13 Nigeria 1.1% Egypt 0.6% 
14 Iraq 1.1% Israel 0.6% 
15 Pakistan 0.9% Hungary 0.5% 
16 China 0.9% Indonesia 0.5% 
17 Indonesia 0.8% Thailand 0.4% 
18 Ecuador 0.5% Argentina 0.4% 
19 Egypt 0.3% Germany 0.3% 










Table 2-2. Individual country values for cultural dimensions and cultural distance from 
the US 
rank country PDI IDV MAS UIA 
distance from 
the US 
1 US  40 91 62 46 0.00 
2 Australia  36 90 61 51 0.31 
3 United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 0.61 
8  Switzerland  34 68 70 58 1.29 
16 Belgium  65 75 54 94 2.64 
18 France  68 71 43 86 2.67 
19 Iran  58 41 43 59 2.72 
46 Sweden  31 71 5 29 3.52 
51 China  80 20 66 40 3.76 
53 Mexico 81 30 69 82 3.79 
66 Singapore  74 20 48 8 4.08 
82 Guatemala  95 6 37 101 5.49 
Source: Hofstede cultural measures, http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html 
 
Table 2-3.  Individual country values for cultural dimensions and cultural distance from 
France 
rank country PDI IDV MAS UIA 
distance from 
France 
1 France  68 71 43 86 0.00 
2 Belgium  65 75 54 94 0.77 
23 Iran  58 41 43 59 1.89 
39 Mexico 81 30 69 82 2.47 
47 Australia  36 90 61 51 2.59 
48  Switzerland  34 68 70 58 2.59 
50 US  40 91 62 46 2.67 
66 United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 3.22 
71 Guatemala  95 6 37 101 3.30 
74 China  80 20 66 40 3.44 
78 Sweden  31 71 5 29 3.84 
81 Singapore  74 20 48 8 4.26 









Table 2-4. Effect of cultural distance on immigrants' incomes—Europe. 
 Income Income Income  
Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 
-0.21** -0.17*** -0.18*** 
(-2.18) (-3.60) (-3.48) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE No Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  No Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes 
Correction function  No No Yes 
F test for correction function 
p value   
- - 0.24 
p value 0.78 
Observations 3619 3603 3603 
R
2
 0.162 0.565 0.565 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 
2008 EVS. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 
brackets).Covariates included in the regression in columns 2 and 3 but omitted from the table: working 
spouse, marriage dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work 
experience, share of same nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education in host country 
dummy, unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the 
last 100 years  Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level.
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Distance in cultural 
environments between 
immigrant’s birth country 
and the US  
 
0.04*** 0.04*** -0.82** -0.61 -0.072*** -0.079*** 
(3.69) (3.43) (-2.07) (-1.63) (-3.29) (-3.48) 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in US Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in 
PUMA 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 341531 209588 342449 211028 306476 188573 
     0.300 0.302 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is the 5% US 2000 Census. In the first two columns dependent variable is 
dummy for being unemployed and probit is used as a regression method. Overall immigrants’ unemployment rate is 5.4%, and the average marginal 
effect of distance in cultural environments is 0.46% for the first column specification. In the third and fourth column dependent variable is the 
number of weeks worked last year (in intervals) and tobit regression is used. Average number of weeks worked last year is 43.8 and the average 
marginal effect in the third column specification is -.82. In the last two columns dependent variable is logarithm of immigrant weekly earnings, 
transformed to standard normal distribution on each MSA level and the OLS regression is used. Variables included in regression but omitted from 
the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI index and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, education FE, regional unemployment 
and wage rates, imputed years of US schooling, experience. Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, East European, Arab, Asian, Latin 
American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering of standard errors was done on birth country and the MSA level. 
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Distance between cultural 
environments of immigrant’s 
birth and host country 
 
-0.18*** -0.15*** -0.13** -0.12** -0.10 
(-3.48) (-2.61) (-2.47) (-2.02) (-1.53) 
Distance*Arrived less than 5 
years ago 
 -0.12*    
 (-1.66)    
Distance*Arrived older than 
25 
  -0.08**   
   (-2.07)   
Distance*College degree    -0.13**  
    (-2.13)  
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 2411 
R
2
 0. 565 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.360 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 
2008 EVS. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 brackets). 
Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage dummy, 
number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals 
in host country, urban and rural dummies, education in host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and 
dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors based on 
clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level. 
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Table 2-7. Heterogeneous effects of cultural distance and immigrants’ wages- US. 
 Weekly earnings 
(effect of the time 
spent in the US) 
Weekly earnings 
(effect of the age 






Distance*Spent less than 5 years in US -0.10***   
 (-5.21)   
Distance*Spent between 5 and 10 years in US -0.08***   
 (-4.45)   
Distance*Spent between 10 and 15 years in US -0.07***   
 (-3.96)   
Distance*Spent between 15 and 20 years in US -0.05***   
 (-2.75)   
Distance*Spent between 20 and 30 years in US -0.03   
 (-1.64)   
Distance*Spent more than 30 years in US 0.01   
 (0.84)   
Distance*Arrived when 0-5 years old  0.01  
  (0.54)  
Distance*Arrived when 6-15 years old  -0.00  
  (-0.28)  
Distance*Arrived when 16-20 years old  -0.02  
  (-0.87)  
Distance*Arrived when 21-25 years old  -0.07***  
  (-2.83)  
Distance*Arrived when 26-30 years old  -0.10***  
  (-4.89)  
Distance*Arrived when 31-35 years old  -0.12***  
  (-6.47)  
Distance*Arrived older than 35 years  -0.15***  
  (-6.68)  
Distance*No high school degree   -0.03* 
   (-1.71) 
Distance*High school degree   -0.05*** 
   (-2.75) 
Distance*Some college   -0.05*** 
   (-2.85) 
Distance*College degree   -0.10*** 
   (-3.93) 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in US Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.300 0.301 0.300 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census. Dependent variable is 
logarithm of immigrant weekly earnings, transformed to standard normal distribution on each MSA level and the OLS 
regression is used. Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, 
HDI index and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, education FE, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US 
schooling, experience, share of same nationals in PUMA (geographical unit smaller then MSA). Country groups FE are 
Anglo-Saxon, European, East European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering 
of standard errors was done on birth country and the MSA level. 
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Table 2-8. Cultural distance and immigrants’ earnings; first and second generation of 
immigrants-US. 

















Distance in cultural environments 
between immigrant’s (or parents’) birth 
country and the US 
-0.09*** -0.10** -0.02* 
(-3.61) (-2.50) (-1.81) 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE No No No 
Years spent in US Yes Yes No 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 306476 39593 15877 
R
2
 0.295 0.253 0.393 
t statistics in parentheses . * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census in the first 
column and 1997-2004 March CPA in second and third column. Dependent variable is logarithm of 
immigrant weekly earnings, transformed to standard normal distribution on each MSA level and the OLS 
regression is used Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural 
logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI index and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, regional unemployment and wage 
rates, imputed years of US schooling, experience, share of same nationals in PUMA (geographical unit 
smaller then MSA). Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, East European, Arab, Asian, Latin 
American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering of standard errors was done on birth 


























Table 2-9. Distance in cultural environments and economic outcomes of immigrants. 
Effect of the birth country globalization 




Low overall globalization of birth country*distance 






Medium overall globalization of birth 






High overall globalization of birth country*distance 






Host country FE  Yes No 
Birth country FE Yes No 
Survey FE Yes No 
Birth country group FE No Yes 
Correction function Yes No 
Observations 3594 293801 
R
2
 0.552 0.476 
Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS in the first column and the 5% US 2000 Census in the 
second column. In the first column dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). In the second column dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, standardized 
on MSA level. OLS regression is used. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: 
marriage dummy, potential work experience, share of same nationals, education in host country, 
unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US regressions include birth country GDP, HDI and GINI 
coefficient and MSA FE. Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host 
countryXsurvey level (in the US second level was MAS). Birth country globalization levels are taken at the 
time when immigrant was moving from birth to host country. Data source for globalization data was 
Dreher, Axel (2006). "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization". 
Applied Economics 38 (10): 1091–1110 
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Table 2-10. Robustness test of the effect of  cultural distance on economic outcomes of immigrants- Europe. 
 Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income 
Distance between cultural environments 
of immigrant’s birth and host countries 
 
-0.18*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.13** -0.18*** -0.20** 
(-3.48) (-3.85) (-3.69) (-2.98) (-3.31) (-2.13) (-3.40) (-2.49) 
Distance in 1000 km between capitals  0.21**      0.14 
  (2.49)      (1.36) 
Squared distance in 1000 km between 
capitals 
 -0.02*      -0.02* 
 (-1.80)      (-1.78) 
Birth and host country share the same 
border 
  -0.19     -0.01 
  (-1.50)     (-0.05) 
Birth and host country have same legal 
origins 
   -0.26    -0.35* 
   (-1.52)    (-1.87) 
Birth and host countries share the same 
language 
    -0.01   0.17 
    (-0.08)   (1.01) 
Share of host country population with 
the same religion 
     0.03  0.03 
     (0.29)  (0.31) 
Birth and host country members of the 
EU at the time of immigration 




Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 3603 3603 3003 3603 3003 
R
2
 0.565 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.565 0.427 0.565 0.430 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS for all columns, except for six, where 
data source is only ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010, because there is not religion question in EVS2008. Dependent variable is individual household income 
(placement in one of 10 brackets). Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage dummy, number of 
household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education in 
host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors 
based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level.  
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Table 2-11. Robustness test with different measures of distance between cultural 
environments of immigrants’ birth and host countries – Europe. 
 Income Income Income Income 
Cultural distance (Hofstede) -0.18***    
 (-3.48)    
Cultural distance (Ingelhart and Welzel WVS)  -0.18   
  (-1.65)   
Cultural distance (Schwartz HVS)   -0.13***  
   (-2.79)  
Cultural distance (GLOBE project)    -0.16* 
   (-1.90) 
    
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3823 1734 2259 
R
2
 0.565 0.561 0.534 0.541 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 brackets). Main 
independent variable in each column is the distance in cultural environments between immigrant’s host and 
birth country calculated using various measures of culture; 
-in column 1 Hofstede (2001) measures 
-in column 2 Ingelhart and Welzel (2005) WorldValue Survey cultural measure  
-in column 3 Schwartz (2006) cultural measures constructed from Human Value Scale (part of the ESS 
dataset) using the appropriate instructions from  http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/ess1_human_values_scale.pdf 
-in column 4 results from GLOBE project by House et al. (2004)  
 Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage dummy, 
number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals 
in host country, urban and rural dummies, education in host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and 
dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years  Standard errors based on 
clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level. 
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Table 2-12. Robustness test with different measures of distance between cultural 







Cultural distance (Hofstede) -0.07***   
 (-3.29)   
Cultural distance (Ingelhart and Welzel WVS)  -0.05**  
  (-2.14)  
Cultural distance (GLOBE project)   -0.04** 
 (-2.13) 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in US Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 306476 290477 265281 
R
2
 0.300 0.299 0.299 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census. Dependent 
variable is immigrant weekly earnings, transformed to standard normal distribution on each MSA level. 
OLS regression is used. Main independent variable in each column is the distance in cultural environments 
between immigrant’s host and birth country calculated using various measures of culture; 
-in column 1 Hofstede (2001) measures 
-in column 2 Ingelhart and Welzel (2005) WorldValue Survey cultural measure  
-in column 3 results from GLOBE project by House et al. (2004)  
Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, 
HDI index and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years 
of US schooling, experience, share of same nationals in PUMA (geographical unit smaller then MSA). 
Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, East European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean 




Table 2-13. Cultural distance and immigrant’s income. Using Human Value Scale – 
Europe. 
  Income  Income Income  
Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 




Distance between individual immigrants’ 
culture and the host country culture 
 
 -0.09* -0.08* 
 (-1.96) (-1.87) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1734 1718 1718 
R
2
 0.434 0.433 0.435 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010.Cultrual 
distance variables are constructed following Schwartz guide 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/ess1_human_values_scale.pdf 
 Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 brackets). Covariates included 
in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage dummy, number of household 
members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals in host country, 
urban and rural dummies, education in host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and dummy for host 
and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors based on clustering by 
both birth country and host countryXsurvey level. 
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Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
-0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
(-3.49) 
 
(-3.65) (-3.69) (-3.40) (-2.91) (-3.07) 
Economic distance between immigrant’s birth 
and host country 
-0.02  -0.01 -0.03*  -0.03 
(-0.17) 
 
 (-0.16) (-1.68)  (-1.62) 
Genetic distance between immigrant’s birth and 
host country 
 0.07 0.07  -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.32) 
 
(0.32)  (-1.50) (-1.48) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Education FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.565 0.565 0.565 0.302 0.300 0.301 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source for the first three columns is the ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and the EVS 2008 with 
dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 brackets). In the last three columns US 2000 Census is analyzed and the 
depended variable is the natural logarithm of immigrants’ weekly earnings. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: marriage 
dummy, potential work experience, share of same nationals, education in host country, unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US regressions include 
birth country GDP, HDI and GINI coefficient and MSA FE. Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level (in 
the US second level was MAS). Economic distance constructed as the Euclidian distance between two countries in the share of agriculture, industry, 
exports and government expenditures in the GDP. Country level data for those economic variables is obtained from World Bank.  
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Table 2-15. Cultural distance, trust and economic outcomes of immigrants. Controlling 
for the selection into immigration – Europe.  
 Income Income 
(controlling for selection 
into immigration) 
Distance between cultural environments of 






lambda  -1.27*** 
 (-2.95) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes 
Observations (Emigrants) 2394 60112 
Observations (non-Emigrants) 0 57718 
R
2
 0.581  
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 brackets). In second 
column selection into immigration is taken into account using Heckman procedure with parents’ education 
as exclusion restriction variable. Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working 
spouse, marriage dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work 
experience, share of same nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in 
host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same 







Table 2-16.  Cultural distance and immigrant wages. Analyzing war immigrants – US. 
 Weekly earnings 
(whole sample) 
Weekly earnings (war 
on birth country 
territory) 
Weekly earnings 
(>50 war deaths 
per million) 
Distance in cultural environments 
between immigrant’s birth country and 
the US 




English proficiency  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in US Yes Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in PUMA Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes No No 
Observations 306476 45491 25867 
R
2
 0.300 0.273 0.265 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census. Dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, 
standardized on MSA level. Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI index and Gini 
coefficient, marriage dummy, education FE, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US schooling, experience. Two way clustering of standard 
errors was done on birth country and the MSA level. The second column only has immigrants who moved during war times in the birth country. The third 
column only has immigrants who moved during war times in the birth country with more than 50 war related deaths per million of birth country inhabitants. 
Information about wars was obtained from Correlates of War database. 
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Table 2-17. Allowing for regional culture in the US using Ingelhart and Welzel WVS measures and information about early 
immigrants. 

















WVS  distance in cultural environments between 
immigrant’s birth country and the US  
-0.05**        
(-2.14) 
 
       
WVS distance in cultural environments between 
immigrant’s birth country and the US Region  
 
 -0.06** -0.07*** -0.07**     
 (-2.45) 
 
(-3.01) (-2.51)     
Hofstede’s  distance in cultural environments 
between immigrant’s birth country and the US 
    -0.07*** 
(-3.29) 
   
      -0.06** -0.07** -0.06** 
Hofstede’s    distance in cultural environments 
between immigrant’s birth country and the US 
Region 
     (-2.09) 
 
(-2.35) (-1.99) 
         
Years spent in US Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in PUMA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes No No  No Yes No  No No 
Birth country FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function (1st best probability) No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Correction function (all probabilities)   No No No Yes No No No Yes 








Observations 290477 290477 290477 290477 306476 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.299 0.304 0.304 0.305 0.300 0.302 0.301 0.302 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census and the third, fourth and fifth wave of the WVS for information about regional 
culture in the US. Country of origin for the early immigrants was obtained using the 1880 100% US Census. Dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, 
standardized on MSA level. Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI index and Gini coefficient, 
marriage dummy, education FE, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US schooling, experience. Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, East 
European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering of standard errors was done on birth country and the MSA level. US is 
divided into nine Census regions.  
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Table 2-18. Effect of cultural distance on the US born workers who moved to another region 





Hofstede’s  distance in cultural environments between immigrant’s 
birth country and the US 
-0.0107***  
(-2.75)  
WVS distance in cultural environments between migrant birth and 
current region the US 
 -0.0051*** 
 (-3.28) 
race FE Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
birth region FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 89633 89633 
R
2
 0.374 0.374 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census and sample is limited 
to US born men aged 16-65 who participate in the labor force who in 1995 lived in the same US Census region they 
were born in, but in 2000 they lived in another US Census region  .Country of origin for the early immigrants was 
obtained using the 1880 100% US Census and used in calculations of regional culture in the first column. In the 
second column third, fourth and fifth wave of the WVS was used in to calculate regional culture in the US. 
Dependent variable is US born migrant weekly earnings standardized on MSA level. Variables included in 
regression but omitted from the table are: marital status, experience and dummy for being a member of the US army. 
Standard errors clustered on birth country level 
 
Table 2-19. Cultural distance and political participation – Europe. 
 Interested in 
politics  
Voting on the 
last election 
Distance between cultural environments of 




Host country FE  Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes 
Observations 3715 2558 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS. In 
column 1 depended variable is the individual interest in politics, with answers ranges from 1, not at all interested, to 
4, very interested and ordered probit regression is used. In the second column dummy for voting on the last election 
is the depended variable and probit regression is used. Sample is limited only to immigrants who had the right to 
vote on the last elections. Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage 
dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals 
in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, unemployment dummy, 
and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors based on 





Table 2-20. Cultural distance and trust in the host country institutions – Europe. 












Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 
-0.07 -0.12* -0.08** -0.02 -0.11* -0.10* 
(-1.27) 
 
(-1.83) (-2.23) (-0.32) (-1.68) (-1.81) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3519 3618 3695 3589 2810 2687 
R
2
 0.179 0.152 0.135 0.170 0.166 0.219 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS. In columns 1-5 is the individual trust in 
the following host country institutions (1) parliament (2) legal system (3) police (4) politicians and (5) political parties is the dependent variable.  
Answer ranges from 1, not at all, to 10, a great deal. In the last column the depended variable is the first principal component of the measures of trust in 
host county institutions from columns 1-5.  In all columns OLS regression is used. Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: 
working spouse, marriage dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same nationals in host 
country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country 
belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level. 
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Table 2-21. Effects of cultural distance on immigrant’s command of the host country 













Distance between cultural 
environments of immigrant’s birth 
and host country 
Difficulty of learning English 







Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country FE No No Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes No 
Correction function No No Yes 
Observations 294603 294603 3675 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In the first and the second column data from the US 2000 
Census is analyzed. Depended variable is the individual command of English with answers ranging from 1, not 
speaking English all to 4, speaking very well. Data source for the third column is ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010. Dependent 
variable in the third column is a dummy if individual uses host country language as a primary language of household 
communication. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: marriage dummy, potential work 
experience, share of same nationals, education in host country, unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US 
regressions include birth country GDP, HDI and GINI coefficient and MSA FE. Standard errors based on clustering by 
both birth country and host countryXsurvey level (in the US second level was MAS). Source for difficulty for learning 
English is Chiswick and Miller (2005). Immigrants for whom the native language is the host country language are 
dropped from the sample. 
 
Table 2-22. Effects of cultural distance on immigrants’ health and marriage outcomes – 
Europe. 
 Self assessed 
health 
Married to a spouse born 
in the host country 
Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 







Birth country FE Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes 
Observations 4471 543 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 . Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS in the 
first column and 2008 EVS in the second column. Dependent variable in the first column in immigrant self assessed 
health. Answers range from 1 -very bad, to 5- very good. Ordered probit regression is used in the first column. In the 
second column depended variable is a dummy equal 1 if immigrant married a wife born in the host country and 0 
otherwise. Probit regression is used. Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, 
marriage dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same 
nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, unemployment 
dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 years. Standard errors based 
on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level. 
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Table 2-23. Cultural distance and immigrants’ deportation due to criminal conviction – US. 
  Deportation due 
to criminal 
conviction 






 Deportation due 
to criminal 
conviction 
Distance in cultural environments between 










Murder rate in the birth country  0.53*** 0.56*** 0.50*** 
  (5.31) (5.50) (4.27) 
Birth country natural log of GDP p/c   0.14 0.14 
   (1.33) (1.31) 
Birth country Gini coefficient    0.12 
    (1.03) 
Observations 73 73 73 73 
R
2
 0.090 0.352 0.368 0.378 
t statistics in parentheses* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is the US 2000 Census and the DHS yearly statistics about deportation obtained 
from http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics. Dependent variable is the ratio of overall number of immigrants from a specific birth country deported 
due to criminal convictions in four year period 2000-2003, divided first with the number of non-citizens immigrants from that specific birth country 
living in the US in 2000 and second with its standard deviation to make coefficient magnitudes easier to interpret. All variables are in the standard 
deviation units.  The source for murder rates in the birth country was the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime. 
141 
 
Table 2-24.  Evolution of the cultural distance effect in the US and Canada in 1980, 1990 





Cultural distance*Year 1980 -0.0663*** -0.0223 
 (-3.18) (-0.78) 
Cultural distance*Year 1990 -0.0742*** -0.0520** 
 (-3.82) (-2.36) 
Cultural distance*Year 2000 -0.0947*** -0.0655** 
 (-3.38) (-2.12) 
Metropolitan area FE  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year X State FE  Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE No No 
Education FE Yes Yes 
Year X Education FE Yes Yes 
Birth country groups FE Yes No 
Year X Birth country groups FE Yes No 
Observations 611516 44061 
R
2
 0.285 0.258 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Data sources are 5% US 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Censuses in column 1. In column 2 data sources are 1981, 1991 and 2001 Canadian Census. Dependent 
variable is immigrants’ weekly earned income standardized on MSA level in the first column and 
immigrants’ monthly earned income standardized on CSA level. Variables included in regression but 
omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI and Gini coefficient, time 
dummies, marriage dummy, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US and Canadian 
schooling, experience, share of same nationals in region. Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, 
East European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and African dummies. Standard errors based on 






























Absolute distance between birth and 
host country in the Power Distance 
dimension 
-0.08    -0.05**    
(-1.43) 
 
   (-2.22) 
 
   
Absolute distance between birth and 
host country in the Individualism 
dimension 
 -0.18*    -0.11***   
 (-1.89) 
 
   (-7.60) 
 
  
Absolute distance between birth and 
host country in the Masculinity 
dimension 
  -0.03    -0.01  
  (-0.75) 
 
   (-0.40) 
 
 
Absolute distance between birth and 
host country in the Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension 
   -0.25***    -0.04* 
   (-5.27) 
 
   (-1.71) 
 
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Birth country FE No No No No No No No No 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Years in host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 3603 306476 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.546 0.547 0.546 0.549 0.296 0.299 0.295 0.296 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS in the first four columns, while in the 
last four columns source is the US 2000 5% Census. In the first four columns dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). In the last four columns dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, standardized on MSA level. OLS regression is used. 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: marriage dummy, potential work experience, share of same nationals, education in host 
country, education FE, unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US regressions include birth country GDP, HDI and GINI coefficient and MSA FE. 
Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level (in the US second level was MAS).  
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Table 2-26. Culture levels vs. cultural distance -Power distance. Europe.   
 Income Income Income 
Absolute distance between birth and host country 
in Power distance  
-0.52 -0.16  
(-1.26) (-0.59)  
Birth country level of Power distance  -0.25  -0.34 
 (-0.50)  (-1.08) 
Host country FE  No Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 
R
2
 0.519 0.548 0.548 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS and OLS regression is used. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage 
dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same 
nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, 
unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 




Table 2-27.Culture levels vs. cultural distance –Individualism. Europe   
 Income Income Income 
Absolute distance between birth and host country 
in Individualism  
-0.29 -0.81*  
(-0.61) (-1.94)  
Birth country level of Individualism  0.13  0.66* 
 (0.28)  (1.77) 
Host country FE  No Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 
R
2
 0.518 0.549 0.549 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS and OLS regression is used. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage 
dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same 
nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, 
unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 




 Table 2-28.Culture levels vs. cultural distance –Masculinity. Europe.   
 Income Income Income 
Absolute distance between birth and host country 
in Masculinity  
-0.09 -0.14  
(-0.21) (-0.63)  
Birth country level of Masculinity  -0.65**  -0.05 
 (-2.20)  (-0.16) 
Host country FE  No Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 
R
2
 0.519 0.548 0.548 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS and OLS regression is used. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage 
dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same 
nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, 
unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 




Table 2-29.Culture levels vs. cultural distance –Uncertainty avoidance. Europe   
 Income Income Income 
Absolute distance between birth and host country in 
Uncertainty avoidance  
-0.67** -1.07***  
(-1.99) (-4.88)  
Birth country level of Uncertainty avoidance  -0.31  -0.63*** 
(-1.10)  (-3.54) 
Host country FE  No Yes Yes 
Birth country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 
R
2
 0.520 0.551 0.550 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 
EVS and OLS regression is used. Dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). Covariates included in the regression but omitted from the table: working spouse, marriage 
dummy, number of household members, regional unemployment, potential work experience, share of same 
nationals in host country, urban and rural dummies, education FE, education in host country dummy, 
unemployment dummy, and dummy for host and birth country belonging to a same polity in the last 100 
years. Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level.
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Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 
-0.13***  -0.12*** -0.07***  -0.10*** 
(-3.42)  (-3.92) (-3.29)  (-4.03) 
Distance between immigrant’s birth 
country culture and the ‘most productive’ 
culture 
 
 -0.10 -0.00  -0.08** 0.06 
 (-1.56) (-0.04)  (-2.47) (1.61) 
Host country FE  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Birth country FE No No No No No No 
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Years in host country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Correction function Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Education FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3603 3603 3603 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.547 0.546 0.547 0.294 0.292 0.294 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS in the first three columns, while in the 
last three source is the US 2000 5% Census. In the first three columns dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 10 
brackets). In the last three columns dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, standardized on MSA level. OLS regression is used 
Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: marriage dummy, potential work experience, share of same nationals, education in host 
country, education FE, unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US regressions include birth country GDP, HDI and GINI coefficient and MSA FE. 
Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host countryXsurvey level (in the US second level was MAS). ‘Most productive’ culture is 
constructed as an average of the values in specific cultural dimensions for the ten richest countries. 
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Table 2-31. Cultural distance and the immigrants’ wages. Effect of diaspora size and the 





Small diaspora*cultural distance -0.04**  
 (-1.99)  
Medium diaspora*cultural distance -0.10***  
(-4.32)  
Large diaspora*cultural distance -0.15***  
(-5.01)  
Low share of immigrants*cultural distance  -0.04 
  (-1.43) 
Medium share of immigrants*cultural distance  -0.06*** 
  (-2.62) 
High share of immigrants*cultural distance  -0.11*** 
  (-5.15) 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
education FE Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE Yes Yes 
Years spent in US Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in puma Yes Yes 
Observations 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.296 0.296 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% US 2000 Census. Dependent 
variable is logarithm of immigrant weekly earnings, transformed to standard normal distribution on each 
MSA level and the OLS regression is used. Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are 
birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI index and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, education 
FE, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US schooling, experience, share of same 
nationals in PUMA (geographical unit smaller then MSA). Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, 
East European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering of 
standard errors was done on birth country and the MSA level. Size of diaspora was calculated at the PUMS 






Appendices used in the first chapter  
Appendix A1 – Alternative ways of calculating HCI 
In this section series of robustness test will be preformed to show that main results of the 
paper are stabile when different ways of calculating HCI are used. In the specification 
used in the main body of the paper discount rate applied for calculating time discount was 
0.4%. In the first robustness test time distance discounts will be calculated using 0.6% 
and 0.2% rates as well. Figure A.1 shows how those time distance discounts look in a 
given year, when appropriate discount rates are plugged in equation 3.  
 One of the alternative ways to calculate length effects would be to use linear form which 
would allow that each additional year of change in political borders of the region has the 
same effect. Length effect will not grow after change in borders has lasted for more than 
two generations time which is 50 years. After two generations have been raised, schooled 
and lived in the same country, the family is very well accustomed to the country and 
additional years will bring little change in a family’s identification with the current 
country. 
This linear specification of the length effect will be: 
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Both linear and concave length effect, which is used in the paper, are shown in the Figure 
A.2. Results of this robustness tests for all three datasets used in the paper is given in the 
Table A.1. First two rows are using discount rate of 0.6%, third and fourth row 0.4% and 
last two are 0.2% when calculating time distance discounts. Even rows use concave way 
of calculating length effects, while odd rows use linear procedure give in equation A.1. 
Specification applied in the main body of the paper is in the 4
th
 row of each dataset – one 
where time distance discount is calculated with discount rate of 0.4% and concave form 
is used for length effect.  
Table A.1 shows that the highest coefficient associated with HCI are obtained when 
discount rate of 0.6 is used. On the other hand there is no clear pattern of how statistical 
significance of HCI changes with various ways of calculating HCI across 3 datasets. 
Overall negative and statistically significant results are preserved in almost all 
specification, which shows that negative effect of past border changes on current level of 
political trust is robust to changes in ways of HCI calculation. 
More interesting robustness test, which can also tell something more about the nature of 
the effect of past border changes is using different functional forms for calculating time 
distance discounts. One used in paper is a convex one, and linear and concave will be 
constructed in the following way:  
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Figure A.3 shows these three functional forms for time discounts – concave, linear and 
convex. Results obtained using these various functional forms for time discounts on three 
datasets are given in Table A.2.  First two rows are obtained using concave form 
(equation A3), third and fourth with linear form (equation A.2) and last two with convex 
form (equation 2). As in Table A.1 even rows use concave way of calculating length 
effects, while odd rows use linear procedure give in equation A.1. Functional from that 
corresponds to the one used in the main body of the paper is given in the row 6. 
From Table A.2 clear pattern emerges. Results show that the biggest and the most 
statistically significant effect of HCI is when convex time discounting is applied. This is 
line with the mechanisms described in this paper, which predict that marginal effect of 
each additional year should be higher for more recent events. Convex time discounting 
model has feature that the difference between two consecutive year effects is larger the 
closer one is to the current time.    
Appendix B1 – list of variables used in the paper 
Purpose of this appendix is to give a list of variables used in the paper, as well as short 
description on how those variables constructed and/or source of the variable. 
HCI 
Construction of a HCI was described in great detail in the paper. However two more 
things have to be noted. For a change to count it is required that it lasts for at least 6 
years.
102
 In this way, frequent changes of borders during WW I, WW II or other wars are 
                                                 
102
  To avoid double counting of the same polity reconquering the same area does not count, unless there 
was at least 50 year period between two rulings. This would mean that when Austria won Eastern Adriatic 
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omitted, which allows focusing on more permanent changes that could have had a long-
lasting effect on political trust. 
Furthermore for a change to be counted in HCI it must include a change in the political 
and military administration of the region. It is usually the result of a war. It excludes 
peaceful union forming between two countries, for example personal union of Poland 
with Lithuania and then with Saxony, or Hungarian Kingdom's decision to choose 
Habsburgs for their rulers after defeat from Ottomans in 1526.  
Hapsburg weight and Ottoman weight 
Economic literature recognizes different effects of these two empires that affected all 6 
countries, as in Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, Woessmann (2011), Grosjean (2011) and 
Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007).  Empire weights are constructed in the same fashion as in 
Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007). Each 25 years under certain empire prior to 1700 adds 1 to 
empire weights, while each 25 years after 1700 spent under empire rule adds 2 to the 
ruling empire weight.  Left out rulers that are not captured by these Hapsburg and 
Ottoman dummies include Russian Empire, Polish kingdom, Venice, Napoleon, Italian 
kingdom, and since middle of 19
th
 century independent national states.  
Furthermore, because of huge Hungarian minority in Romania which considered 
Habsburg Empire to be their national state, additional Romanian Habsburg variable is 
created. This intercept between Romanian country dummy and Habsburg weight variable 
allows influence of Habsburg Empire to be different in Romania then in other countries 
in the sample.  
                                                                                                                                                 
shore back from Napoleon this change did not count since the time period between two Austrian rules was 




It is answer to how much does an individual agrees with the following statement:  
All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now. 
Possible answers range from 1- strongly agrees to 5- strongly disagree 
generalized trust 
This is the answer to the standard question in social survey: 
 “Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?”  
Possible answers range from 1, complete distrust, to 5, complete trust. 
income 
Measures of income are not the same in all three datasets used in this papar. In LiTS I 
and II this was an answer to the following question: 
  Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the 
poorest people and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest. On which step of the 
ten is your household today 
where possible answers go from 1 to 10. In EVS 2008 income is reported more objective. 
Variable income is monthly household income corrected for PPP in euros. 
Education FE  
dummies that correspond to the following 6 educational levels: not finished primary 
school, finished primary school, finished high school, some college,  finished college and 
post graduate education 
Super - regional FE 
152 
 
There are 21 variables that represent super regional dummies. Number of superregional 
dummies is chosen to be proportional to the country size. 
Montenegro – South and North Montenegro 
Slovenia – West, Central and East Slovenia 
Croatia – West, East and South Croatia 
Serbia – North, Central and South Serbia 
Romania – West, South, Central and North Romania 
Ukraine - West, Center-West, Black Sea, Center, North, East 
Gender   




age and age squared of the individual reported in the survey. Using square of age allows 
for non linear effects. 
Majority share, majority share
2
  
For each country the biggest ethnic group is indentified.
103
 This variable gives the 
percentage of that ethnicity in the PSU region. Square of it allows for the non- linear 
effects.  Source for this variable is the latest census data, which can be found on 
Wikipedia 
Employment status 
Dummy variable that is equal 1 if the individual has worked for salary in the last month 
prior to the survey 
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 All countries in my sample are nation states; therefore Ukrainians are majority in Ukraine, Romanians in 




This variable is individual’s answer to a question about religious believes. Possible 
answers are Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, Atheist and others 
Rural, urban or metropolitan status of the PSU  
three dummies that show if PSU is a rural, urban or metropolitan location. 
Measure of economic output of the region   
This is relative (comparing to the country average) measure of regional GDP per capita. 
Regional GDP measure was not available for Montenegro and Ukraine. In Ukraine the 
average regional wage was used instead, while for all regions in Montenegro, country-




 This variable measures closest road distance from the PSU to the country’s capital.  
Distance is then transformed into relative because of discrepancy in sizes of the country 
in the sample (Ukraine has above 600 000 km2, while Montenegro size is only 13 800 
km2). Square of it allows for the non- linear effects. Source for this variable was Google 
maps software.  
density  
This variable gives population density in a given PSU region.  Source for this variable is 




This is one of the variables used as an instrument for HCI. For each country, the 
influencing Empires are indentified.
104
 Lines that connect empire capitals are determined, 
and with usage of mapping software and cosine theorem angles of each location within 
country with respect to that line are calculated. Figure B.1 shows an example of those 
lines for the Romanian capital Bucharest. The empire capitals in question are Vienna 
(Habsburg) and Istanbul (Ottoman) and the line connecting them is shown in red color. In 
this way, for every location two angles are calculated. Each represents the angle between 
the line connecting a specific location with one of the empire capitals and line that 
connects empire capitals. In the example in figure 1 angle 1 will be at Istanbul between 
lines that connect it with Bucharest and Vienna, while angle 2 would be at Vienna 
between lines that connect Vienna with Bucharest and Istanbul. The maximum of those 
two angles is taken, and if the country was influenced by more than two Empires, like 
Croatia, Romania and Ukraine, maximum angles connecting different Empire capitals are 







                                                 
104
 For Slovenia those are Venice and Habsburg empire, for Croatia - Venice, Habsburg and Ottoman 
Empire, for Serbia - Habsburg and Ottoman, and for Romania and Ukraine - Ottoman, Habsburg and 
Russian Empire. As noted before, Montenegro is dropped from the sample due to unavailability of data for 
calculating terrain roughness. 
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Appendix C1 – placebo test 
This appendix list questions used in robustness tests performed on various measures of 
uncivicness and civil action using all there available datasets. In LiTS I 2006 the 
following question is asked and the answers to it will serve as a measure of uncivicness: 
In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial 
payments/gifts in these situations?  
(1) Interact with the road police 
 (2) Request official documents from authorities  
(3) Interact with the police on matters other than traffic and other than requesting 
documents  
(4) Go to courts for a civil matter? 
 (5) Receive medical treatment in the public health system  
(6) Receive public education  
(7) Request unemployment benefits? 
 (8) Request other social security benefits 
Answers are in the range (1) - Never to (5) – Always 
Even though the question does not directly ask about the individual’s own unofficial 
payments, it is commonly used as a measures uncivincess in social science literature. 
Overall the results of the analysis when answers to the questions about unofficial 
payments are used as the dependent variable, show no effect of HCI on measures of 
uncivicness. Results are available from author upon request. 
In LiTS II question that can be used as a measure of uncivicness was the following: 
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Some people think that certain behaviors are always wrong, whereas other believe that 
there are occasions when breaking the rules may be justified. How wrong, if at all, do 
you consider the following behaviors to be? 
1. Speeding to take somebody to the hospital in an emergency 
2. Paying cash with no receipts to avoid paying VAT or other taxes 
3. Selling something second hand without mentioning all of its defects 
4. Making an exaggerated insurance claim 
5. A public official asking for a favor or gift in return of services 
6. Buying a university degree that one has not earned 
7. Keeping an accidental overpayment from an employer 
The possible answers range from 1, not wrong at all, to 4, seriously wrong. Results of the 
individual regressions on each answer show no statistical significance of HCI coefficient 
and are available from author upon request. 
 In the last survey used in this paper, EVS2008, the question about individual 
attitudes toward uncivicness is: 
Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between, using this card. 
- Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to 
- Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
- Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
- Paying cash for services to avoid taxes 
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 Answers in this case range from 1 - Never justified to 10 - always justified. Individual 
question results show that HCI does not play a significant role in any measure of 
uncivicness and are available from author upon request. 
Another placebo test is conducted on individual measures of potential civic participation. 
In all three surveys the following questions were asked: 
How likely are you to 
- Attend lawful demonstrations 
- Participate in strikes 
- Join a political party 
- Sign petitions 
The possible answers are 1, have done, 2, might do and 3, would never do. Results for all 
three datasets confirm that HCI is not significant predictor for any of the measures of 
uncivicness. Those result are available from author upon request. 
Appendix D1 –list of PSUs and their HCI and super-regions 
This appendix gives the list of all PSU used in LiTS II 2010 together with their HCI and 
super-region they belong to. 
PSU Super-region HCI 
            Croatia 
Apatovec West Croatia 0.9 
Belajske Poljice South Croatia 1.77 
Bestovje Central Croatia 0.9 
Dalj Central Croatia 1.46 
Donji Grad Central Croatia 0.9 
Drljanovac West Croatia 0.9 
Dubrovnik South Croatia 1.95 
Gaj Central Croatia 0.9 
Gornja Dubrava Central Croatia 0.9 
Gornja Vrba Central Croatia 1.46 
Jeducevac West Croatia 0.9 
Kamenmost South Croatia 2.36 
Karlovac South Croatia 1.2 
Kasel Stari South Croatia 1.8 
Koprivnica West Croatia 0.9 
Kras West Croatia 2.67 
Kruskovac South Croatia 1.77 
Maksimir Central Croatia 0.9 
Martinnjscinana West Croatia 0.9 
Matulji West Croatia 2.67 
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Mraclin Central Croatia 0.9 
Nova Gradiska Central Croatia 1.46 
Novi Zagreb-Istok Central Croatia 0.9 
Okucani Central Croatia 1.46 
Osijek Central Croatia 1.46 
Pleternica Central Croatia 1.46 
Pribislavec West Croatia 0.9 
Primorski Dolac South Croatia 1.8 
Prosenik West Croatia 0.9 
Pula West Croatia 2.67 
Rijeka West Croatia 2.67 
Sesvete Central Croatia 0.9 
Sisak South Croatia 0.9 
Slavonski Brod Central Croatia 1.46 
Solin South Croatia 1.8 
Split South Croatia 1.8 
Stenjevec Central Croatia 0.9 
Terezino Polje West Croatia 1.46 
Topid West Croatia 2.67 
Topolovac South Croatia 1.77 
Treshnjevka-Jug Central Croatia 0.9 
Treshnjevka-Sjever Central Croatia 0.9 
Trnje Central Croatia 0.9 
Trpinja Central Croatia 1.46 
Virovitica West Croatia 1.46 
Zadar South Croatia 2.67 
Zaton South Croatia 1.95 




Djechji Vrtich Lj.Popovich North Montenegro 0.89 
Djechji Vrtich Palchica North Montenegro 0.89 
Danilovgrad Ii North Montenegro 0.69 
Gradevinska Shkola "Marko 
Radevich" North Montenegro 0.89 
Jp Centar "Moracha" North Montenegro 0.89 
Ju Osh "Pavle Rovinski" North Montenegro 0.89 
Ju Osh "Sutjeska" North Montenegro 0.89 
Ju Osh Shtampar Makarije North Montenegro 0.89 
Jzu Dom Zdravlja North Montenegro 0.89 
Kucha Pprelevich Bozidara North Montenegro 0.89 
Mk North Montenegro 0.89 
Udruz.Pronal.I Autora Teh. 
Unapr. North Montenegro 0.89 
Zgr.Grad.Opsh.Tuzi(Ranije 
Osh"M.Lekich) North Montenegro 0.89 
Zgrada Vrhovnog Suda Rcg North Montenegro 0.89 
Bar South Montenegro 0.89 
Berane South Montenegro 1 
Bjelo Polje South Montenegro 1 
Budva South Montenegro 1.8 
Cetinje North Montenegro 0.76 
Herceg Novi South Montenegro 1.8 
Kolassin North Montenegro 0.83 
Kotor South Montenegro 1.8 
Mojkovac North Montenegro 1 
Niksic North Montenegro 0.89 
Plav South Montenegro 1 
Pljevlja South Montenegro 1 
Rozaj South Montenegro 1 
Tivat South Montenegro 1.8 




23 August South Romania 0.89 
Amarastii De Jos West Romania 1.18 
Barcanesti South Romania 0.83 
Breaza North Romania 1.55 
Bucuresti Sectorul 2 Central Romania 0.83 
Bucuresti Sectorul 3 Central Romania 0.83 
Bucuresti Sectorul 4 Central Romania 0.83 
Bucuresti Sectorul 5 Central Romania 0.83 
Bucuresti Sectorul 6 Central Romania 0.83 
Caiuti North Romania 0.86 
Cuza Voda South Romania 0.83 
Floresti Central Romania 1.46 
Galateni South Romania 0.83 
Hidiselu De Sus Central Romania 1.46 
Ivanesti North Romania 0.86 
Mileanca North Romania 0.86 
Moftin Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul  Moreni South Romania 0.83 
Municipiul Adjud North Romania 0.86 
Municipiul Bacau North Romania 0.86 
Municipiul Baia Mare Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Brasov South Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Calarasi South Romania 0.83 
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Municipiul Cluj-Napoca Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Constanta South Romania 0.89 
Municipiul Craiova West Romania 1.18 
Municipiul Dej Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Deva Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Focsani North Romania 0.86 
Municipiul Galati North Romania 0.86 
Municipiul Iasi North Romania 0.86 
Municipiul Petrosani Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Ploiesti South Romania 0.83 
Municipiul Ramnicu Valcea West Romania 1.18 
Municipiul Rosiori De Vede South Romania 0.83 
Municipiul Sibiu Central Romania 1.46 
Municipiul Suceava North Romania 1.55 
Municipiul Timisoara West Romania 1.46 
Oras Agnita Central Romania 1.46 
Oras Ghimbav South Romania 1.46 
Oras Saveni North Romania 0.86 
Ozun South Romania 1.46 
Pischia West Romania 1.46 
Rosia De Amaradia West Romania 1.18 
Sanpetru De Campie Central Romania 1.46 
Tartasesti South Romania 0.83 
Tepu North Romania 0.86 
Tomesti North Romania 0.86 
Valeni West Romania 1.18 




Aleksandrovac Central Serbia 1.11 
Aleksinac South  Serbia 0.89 
Arandelovac Central Serbia 1.11 
Bachki Petrovac North Serbia 1.46 
Bajina Bashta Central Serbia 1.11 
Beograd Central Serbia 1.11 
Bogatic Central Serbia 1.11 
Bor North Serbia 1.11 
Bujanovac South  Serbia 1 
Chachak Central Serbia 1.11 
Choka North Serbia 1.46 
Gornji Milanovac Central Serbia 1.11 
Jagodina Central Serbia 1.11 
Kikinda North Serbia 1.46 
Kragujevac Central Serbia 1.11 
Kraljevo Central Serbia 1.11 
Krushevac Central Serbia 1.11 
Lajkovac Central Serbia 1.11 
Leskovac South  Serbia 0.89 
Loznica Central Serbia 1.11 
Mali Idosh North Serbia 1.46 
Negotin North Serbia 1.11 
Nish South  Serbia 0.89 
Nova Crnja North Serbia 1.46 
Novi Pazar Central Serbia 1 
Novi Sad North Serbia 1.46 
Odzaci North Serbia 1.46 
Panchevo North Serbia 1.46 
Paracin Central Serbia 1.11 
Pecinci North Serbia 1.46 
Pirot South  Serbia 0.89 
Pozarevac North Serbia 1.11 
Priboj Central Serbia 1 
Prokuplje South  Serbia 0.89 
Shabac Central Serbia 1.11 
Shid North Serbia 1.46 
Smederevo North Serbia 1.11 
Sombor North Serbia 1.46 
Sremska Mitrovica North Serbia 1.46 
Subotica North Serbia 1.46 
Trstenik Central Serbia 1.11 
Uzice Central Serbia 1.11 
Valjevo Central Serbia 1.11 
Vranje South  Serbia 0.89 
Vrbas North Serbia 1.46 
Vrshac North Serbia 1.46 
Zajechar North Serbia 1.11 
Zrenjanin North Serbia 1.46 




Ajdovshchina West Slovenia 2.08 
Apache East Slovenia 0.9 
Azhenski Vrh East Slovenia 0.9 
Beka West Slovenia 2.08 
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Bochna East Slovenia 0.9 
Boracheva East Slovenia 0.9 
Breg Pri Zagradcu Central Slovenia 1.2 
Breginj West Slovenia 2.08 
Brezovica Pri Ljubljani Central Slovenia 1.2 
Celje East Slovenia 0.9 
Chreta East Slovenia 0.9 
Cirkovce East Slovenia 0.9 
Col West Slovenia 2.08 
Dolenje Kronovo Central Slovenia 1.2 
Dolga Vas Central Slovenia 1.2 
Dolini East Slovenia 0.9 
Fuzhine West Slovenia 1.2 
Gabrje Central Slovenia 1.2 
Gazhon West Slovenia 2.08 
Golobinjek Central Slovenia 1.2 
Goricah East Slovenia 0.9 
Gorichica Pri Moravchah Central Slovenia 1.2 
Gornja Radgona East Slovenia 0.9 
Gornji Dolich Central Slovenia 0.9 
Grachnica East Slovenia 0.9 
Hrastulje Central Slovenia 1.2 
Ivanchna Gorica Central Slovenia 1.2 
Izola West Slovenia 2.08 
Jesenice West Slovenia 1.2 
Jurovski Dol East Slovenia 0.9 
Kamnik Central Slovenia 1.2 
Kljucharovci Pri Ljutomeru East Slovenia 0.9 
Kochevje Central Slovenia 1.2 
Komendska Dobrava Central Slovenia 1.2 
Koper West Slovenia 2.08 
Koroshka Bela West Slovenia 1.2 
Kostanjevec East Slovenia 0.9 
Kovor West Slovenia 1.2 
Kranj West Slovenia 1.2 
Krapje East Slovenia 0.9 
Krshka Vas East Slovenia 1.2 
Krtince East Slovenia 0.9 
Lemberg Pri Novi Cerkvi East Slovenia 0.9 
Lendavske Gorice East Slovenia 0.9 
Levec East Slovenia 0.9 
Levpa West Slovenia 2.08 
Ljubljana Central Slovenia 1.2 
Logatec Central Slovenia 1.2 
Lokovica Central Slovenia 0.9 
Maribor East Slovenia 0.9 
Mestinje East Slovenia 0.9 
Murska Sobota East Slovenia 0.9 
Nedelji East Slovenia 0.9 
Novo Mesto Central Slovenia 1.2 
Podmilj Central Slovenia 1.2 
Poljche West Slovenia 1.2 
Portorozh West Slovenia 2.08 
Postojna Central Slovenia 2.08 
Ptuj East Slovenia 0.9 
Rajnkovec East Slovenia 0.9 
Ravne Na Koroshkem Central Slovenia 0.9 
Ravnica West Slovenia 1.2 
Razori Central Slovenia 1.2 
Renche West Slovenia 2.08 
Rova Central Slovenia 1.2 
Rozhno East Slovenia 1.2 
Rushe East Slovenia 0.9 
Sedlashek East Slovenia 0.9 
Sevnica East Slovenia 1.2 
Shempeter Pri Gorici West Slovenia 2.08 
Shentjur East Slovenia 0.9 
Shkofja Rizha Central Slovenia 1.2 
Shkofljica Central Slovenia 1.2 
Stanezhiche Central Slovenia 1.2 
Trate East Slovenia 0.9 
Trbovlje Central Slovenia 1.2 
Trchova East Slovenia 0.9 
Velenje East Slovenia 0.9 
Veliko Brdo Central Slovenia 2.08 
Zagaj East Slovenia 0.9 
Zagorje Ob Savi Central Slovenia 1.2 
Zgornje Bitnje West Slovenia 1.2 
Zhelezniki West Slovenia 1.2 
 





Birki West Ukraine 2.32 
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Chasiv Yar East Ukraine 0.5 




Desnyanskiy - School 306 - 
Balzaka North Ukraine 0.31 
Donetsk East Ukraine 0.5 
Drogobych West Ukraine 2.28 
Gola Prystan' East Ukraine 0.5 
Golosiivskiy - 40-Richchya 
October, 94 North Ukraine 0.31 
Gorlovka East Ukraine 0.5 
Goroholina West Ukraine 2.28 
Green Guy East Ukraine 0.5 
Ilnicya West Ukraine 2.28 
Izyum North Ukraine 0 
Kalush West Ukraine 2.28 
Kamyanka Central Ukraine 0.54 
Kharcizk East Ukraine 0.5 












Krasnodon North Ukraine 0.37 
Kremenchuh Central Ukraine 0.31 
Krivoy Rog Central Ukraine 0.31 
Kulykiv West Ukraine 2.28 
Kyseliv West Ukraine 2.28 
L'Viv West Ukraine 2.28 
Lugansk North Ukraine 0.37 
Luptsi North Ukraine 0 
Lypiv Rih North Ukraine 0.56 
Makeevka East Ukraine 0.5 
Melitopol East Ukraine 0.5 
Mykolaiv Black Sea Ukraine 0.72 
Nikopol Central Ukraine 0.31 
Novomyrgorod Black Sea Ukraine 0.54 
Novopskov North Ukraine 0.37 
Obolonskiy - Heroes Of Dnepr, 
40A North Ukraine 0.31 




Oktyabrskoe Black Sea Ukraine 0.5 
Ol'Shans'Ke Black Sea Ukraine 0.72 







Rivne West Ukraine 2.32 
Salgany Central-West  2.26 
School 135 Central Ukraine 0.31 
School N101 - Krasnogvardeiskiy 
- Balakereva Central Ukraine 0.31 
Serdytsya West Ukraine 2.28 
Sevastopol Black Sea Ukraine 0.5 
Severodonetsk North Ukraine 0.37 
Shevchenko - Artem St, 60 - 
„Institute Of Transport Of Oil" North Ukraine 0.31 
Simferopol Black Sea Ukraine 0.5 
Starolozuvatke Central Ukraine 0.31 
Sumy North Ukraine 0.17 
Svyatoshinskiy - Zodchih St, 44 North Ukraine 0.31 




Tuchyn West Ukraine 2.32 
   
Uzin North Ukraine 0.31 




Vinogradiv West Ukraine 2.28 
Vyshnopil Central Ukraine 0.54 








Zhovtneve North Ukraine 0.17 
Zuya Black Sea Ukraine 0.5 
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Appendices used in the second chapter  
Appendix   2.A1 – Dahl’s (2002) correction function approach 
This Appendix describes in more detail mechanism behind Dahl’s (2002) 
correction function approach. For an individual immigrant i from birth state b who 
chooses to move to host state h, the income function is equation (A1): 
                                                              
                                             
Individual wages are not observed for all states, just for the one where the immigrant has 
chosen to settle.  Due to self-selection of immigrants, it might be the case that that error 
term        does not have zero mean conditional on covariates, and this could cause bias 
in OLS estimates. 
 Immigrants choose their host country based on utility maximization. The utility of 
immigrant i from birth state b who moved into host country h can be presented as an 
additively separable function of earnings and tastes: 
                                            
Tastes represent all non earnings determinants that affect utility, which can be written as:   
                                           
where        stands for a vector of individual characteristics like climate, political, 
language and religious distance between birth country b and host country h.         is the 
error term. The overall utility can be written as: 
                                        
where            denotes observable factors that affect the utility of individuals moving 
from  country b to h. The term        represents the sum of income and taste error 
terms,                       . 
An immigrant from birth country b will move to the host county h only if the move 
maximizes his utility. An indicator function,         for an immigrant who chooses to 
immigrate from b to host country h is defined as: 
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In this way, the error term from the income Equation (A1), which represents selectivity 
bias of immigrant I, can be written as: 
                                                
                                                         
In general, it will not be equal to 0, thus making OLS estimates biased. Bias will depend 
upon the joint distribution of        and the error terms from all possible N migration 
equations (A4). Dahl (2002) reduces the dimensionality of this problem using the 
findings of previous work by  Lee (1983).  
Lee’s approach starts with defining a joint density function of the error term in the 
income equation (A1) and the error terms of the selection criteria:                    
                      .      denoting the corresponding cumulative distribution. This 
cumulative function can also be written as: 
                                                          
                                                                
                        
                                                     
                                                  
                                                                 
where      represents well defined cumulative joint distribution function for        and 




                                                                                      
                                                                
                                             
As Dahl (2002) notes, equation A8 has reduced the dimensionality of the error 
terms that must be accented for. It express an N-variate joint distribution in terms of a 
bivariate distribution of        and maximum order statistics                 
                        . The underlining assumption that is used in Lee’s approach is 
the following one: 
                                                      does not depend on 
                       
   
        
   
          
  
        
   
         
Dahl (2002) relaxes this assumption by taking advantage of the observation that 
selectivity bias can be written as a function of the probability of selection given 
covariates: 
                                                               
                                    
                                                                              
where       represents the probability that immigrants i from birth country b will 
immigrate to host country N. Key insight of Dahl’s approach is the index sufficiency 
assumption which states that only         or the probability of immigrants’ first best 
choice, is the only relevant probability is estimating (A10). Other probabilities add no 




                                                               
                                   
                                                                       
Dahl gives a simple example of the index sufficiency assumption. If we consider two 
immigrants born in the same birth country b, who chose to immigrate to the same host 
country h, then the fact that their second choice of where to immigrate differs plays no 
role and cannot affect the error term       in the income equation (A1). In that case, a 
correction term           can be added to the income function: 
                                                             
                                                         
where           can be approximated with polynomial of Fourier series of         In this 
way equation A12 can be estimated using OLS. 
The Index sufficiency assumption reduces the dimensions of the correction 
function and thus avoids the problem of curse of dimensionality.  Additionally, it does 
not require additivity of the utility function or the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption, which is common in nested Logit models. However, it assumes that the 
covariance between the error term of the income equations,       , and the various error 
terms from the selection model in equation (A4) are only a function of       .  According 
to Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), the best way to test this assumption would 
be to allow all the possible probabilities,                  to enter the income function 
(A12) as part of the polynomial correction term.  However, this would lead to a huge 
increase in dimensionality which could make the estimation impossible due to the curse 
of dimensionality. In my application, I will be able to include all probabilities in the 
correction function in the US dataset, where the US is divided into 9 census regions. 





Appendix 2A2 -Estimating probabilities for Dahl’s (2002) correction function 
 
 In this subsection I describe how Dahl’s (2002) correction function, λ(pi,b,h) from 
Equation 3 can be approximated using a polynomial function or Fourier series of        . 
To obtain probabilities        of immigrant i from birth country b choosing host county h, 
I use a non-parametric approach as in Dahl (2002). First, I divide immigrants into cells 
based on their demographic characteristics. Immigrants who have the same 
characteristics have similar costs and benefits of immigration to a specific host country 
and can be grouped into the same cell. Second, for each cell, I find the probabilities that 
the immigrant from that cell will end up in any of the possible host countries. Finally, 
       is the probability that any immigrant from the same cell as immigrant i chooses host 
country h for his destination. I will describe this process in more detail separately for the 
European dataset. 
In the European dataset immigrants are assigned to a specific cell according to 
their birth country, education level, and time of immigration, following Dahl’s (2002) 
semi parametric procedure. This classification has been chosen based on the data 
availability. There are 79 possible birth countries, 3 possible educational levels (primary 
school, high school and college education) and 2 possible times of arrival in host country 
(prior to 1991 and after 1991). This results in 395 cells. Given that the number of 
immigrants that I observe in the ESS and EVS surveys represents just a small fraction of 
the overall number of immigrants, any immigration probability estimated from my 
dataset would not be very precise. Because of this, I extract immigration probability for 
each cell using the more comprehensive dataset created by Docquier, Lowell and 
Marfouk (DLM) 2009. 
 Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (DLM) compiled a dataset on immigration by 
host and birth country, educational attainment and time of immigration. They used an 
OECD database containing aggregate information about all immigrants from 193 
countries that entered any of the 34 OECD countries. Using the DLM dataset, I collect 
the exact number of overall immigrants for each of the cells I have in my dataset. The 
fraction of immigrants in a specific cell who immigrated to a given host country estimates 
the probability that any immigrant in the cell will follow the same immigration path. This 
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is also true for my much smaller dataset, because there is no reason to believe that 
immigrants who take part in the ESS and EVS differ from the overall immigrant 
population. Because 93% of the immigrants in my European sample move to one of the 
OECD countries, this procedure gives probabilities        for almost my entire sample.
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Moreover, because I use true probabilities for the whole population, and not estimated 
ones from the sample, standard errors from the OLS regression in my European dataset 
will be consistent.  
To give an example, Table B3 in Appendix B shows cell probabilities for a 
limited subsample of immigrants from Croatia who moved to Italy, Austria or 
Switzerland. As stated before, birth and host country cells are also divided based on 
education and the time of migration. For example, first row in Table B3 shows that out of 
all Croatian immigrants without high school degree and who immigrated before 1991, 
1.9% of them ended in Italy, 5.7% in Austria and 9.7% choose Switzerland as a host 
country. Moreover, Table B3 shows that there is a substantial variation in the cell 
probabilities, thus allowing identification using correction function.  
                                                 
105
 Immigrants who moved to non-OECD countries (Russia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia) are dropped from the 
analysis with the correction function. 
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Appendix 2B – Additional tables and graphs 
3. Additional tables and graphs used in the first chapter 
 
Table 3-1. Example of immigration probabilities for immigrants from Croatia which 






% of immigrants choosing host country 




no high school 
degree 
1981-1991 1.9% 5.7% 9.7% 
1991-2001 0.0% 4.3% 7.6% 
high school 
degree 
1981-1991 2.9% 5.5% 8.4% 
1991-2001 0.2% 25.6% 18.5% 
college degree 
1981-1991 1.6% 1.4% 3.8% 
1991-2001 0.1% 11.7% 14.0% 
Source: Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) 
 















Variable Mean (standard deviation) Min Max 
Household income 4. 35 (2.7) 1 10 
Years of education 13.03 (3.01) 8 18 
Potential experience 22.67 (11.51) 0 52 
Age at arrival at host country 22.83(11.43) 0 30 
Schooling in host country .27  (  .44) 0 1 
Cultural distance 2.57  ( 1.07) 0.39 5.42 
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4. Additional tables and graphs used in the second chapter 
 
 





Variable Mean (standard deviation) Min Max 
Yearly earnings 36518.89( 45789.27) 5 354000 
Weeks worked last year 46.30   (11.34) 7 52 
Unemployed .055 (.229) 0 1 
Years of Education 12.40 (3.32) 8 18 
Potential Experience 19.41 (11.80) 0 52 
Years in the US 15.61    (11.48) 0 64 
Age at arrival in the US 22.32 (10.94) 0 63 
Schooling in US .31 0 1 
Cultural distance 3.43 (0.98) 0.30 5.10 
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Distance between cultural 













Immigrant is married 
     
 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
  (10.74) (9.04) (8.42) (8.53) 
Log birth country GDP p/c, in 
standard deviation units 
   0.05* 0.11** 
   (1.84) (2.22) 
Birth country HDI     -0.60 
     (-1.43) 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local labor market conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years schooling done in the US No No Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in US No No Yes Yes Yes 
English proficiency  FE No No No Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in PUMA No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 306476 306476 306476 306476 306476 
R
2
 0.116 0.271 0.286 0.294 0.295 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Data source is 5% US 2000 Census. Dependent 
variable is log of immigrant weekly earned income, standardized on MSA level. Standard errors clustered 
on birth country level and MSA level  
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Table 4-3. Effects of cultural distance and immigrants income, comparison of the 





Distance between cultural environments of 
immigrant’s birth and host country 
 
-0.14*** -0.23*** 
 (-3.11) (-3.99) 
host country FE  No No 
birth country FE No No 
years in host country FE  Yes Yes 
Birth country group No No 
correction function  No No 
Observations 3606 346584       
R
2
 0.519 0.260 
Data source ESS 1-5 from 2002-2010 and 2008 EVS in the first column and the 5% US 2000 Census in the 
second column. In the first column dependent variable is individual household income (placement in one of 
10 brackets). In the second column dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, standardized 
on MSA level. OLS regression is used. Variables included in the regression but omitted from table are: 
marriage dummy, potential work experience, share of same nationals, education in host country, education 
FE, unemployment dummy. Additionally, the US regressions include birth country GDP, HDI and GINI 
coefficient and MSA FE. Standard errors based on clustering by both birth country and host 






Table 4-4. Correlation between different measures of cultural distance used. 
  Hofstede WVS Schwartz GLOBE 
Hofstede 1       
WVS 0.4136 1     
Schwartz 0.2443 0.5256 1   
GLOBE 0.5408 0.5673 0.3604 1 
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Table 4-5. Effect of cultural distance on immigrants' labor market outcomes in 2001 
Census- Canada. 




Distance in cultural environments between 
immigrant’s birth country and Canada 
 
0.01 -0.42*** -.08*** 
(0.35) (-3.73) (-2.71) 
CSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes 
Years spent in Canada Yes Yes Yes 
Share of same nationals in CSA Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27574 27157 25707 
R
2
 .  0.127 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is 5% Canadian 2001 Census. 
Dependent variable is immigrant unemployment status in the first column, months worked in the second 
column and the natural logarithm of monthly wage standardized on CSA level in the last column. In the 
first column probit regression was used, in the second column tobit was used and in the last column OLS 
was used Variables included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of 
GDP p/c, HDI and Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed 
years of Canadian schooling, experience. Two way clustering of standard errors was done on birth country 
and the CSA level.  
 
Table 4-6. Different cultural measures and immigrant unemployment on 1970-1975 
cohorts- US. 
 Wages 
(cohort that entered the 
US in 1970-1975) 
Wages 
(cohort that entered the 
US in 1975-1980) 
Cultural distance*year 1980 -9.72*** -10.90*** 
 (-3.71) (-3.23) 
Cultural distance*year 1990 -7.49*** -9.41*** 
 (-3.88) (-3.86) 
Cultural distance*year 2000 -7.00*** -7.44*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.76) 
metropolitan area FE  Yes Yes 
Years in the US  FE Yes Yes 
Birth country group FE Yes Yes 
Observations 51669 74849 
R
2
 0.264 0.289 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source is US 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census. 
Dependent variable is immigrant weekly earned income, standardized on MSA X year level. Variables 
included in regression but omitted from the table are birth country natural logarithm of GDP p/c, HDI and 
Gini coefficient, marriage dummy, regional unemployment and wage rates, imputed years of US schooling, 
experience, education FE, education X year FE, year FE, year X state FE, share of same nationals in 
PUMA (geographical unit smaller then MSA). Country groups FE are Anglo-Saxon, European, East 
European, Arab, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and African dummies. Two way clustering of standard 
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